The Hunt Begins
It’s gonna be one of these guys (or maybe Mac Jones)
After the absolutely massive trade that sent three first-round picks and a 2022 third rounder to the Dolphins in exchange for the No.3 pick in this month’s draft, the Niners seem dead set on drafting their quarterback of the future. While Jimmy G could still be the dude in 2021 (more on that later), this is the big swing that could define John Lynch and Kyle Shanahan’s tenure with the 49ers. Although drafting Solomon Thomas instead of Patrick Mahomes will likely wind up the biggest net-loss in terms of value during the ShanaLynch era, we at least netted three mid-round picks that year from the trade down. We gained draft capital that would be spent on additional players. Obviously, that’s not the case with this deal.
So… should we have done this?
While I am typically in favor of trading down, I’m not against trading up if it’s for the right player at the right position. Franchise quarterbacks certainly fit that bill. Much has been written about NFL scouts (or scouts in any sports league for that matter) wildly overestimating their ability to judge and evaluate talent and value—thus feeding the argument that you shouldn’t package picks to trade up. While Tom Brady is the obvious example of a missed evaluation, even in today’s age (yes, Brady is old enough that we should be considering the current age different than the era he was drafted in) experts get stuff wrong all the time.
Take this 2014 excerpt from NFL.com’s official scouting report on a defensive tackle out of Pittsburgh:
They thought so little of him, they didn’t even get the aspect ratio of his photo right…
All this seems to point to the idea that batting averages are low, no one knows as much as they think, and the best way to mitigate risk is to accumulate picks and simply take more swings. But while history is littered with failed attempts to trade up for franchise quarterbacks (Jared Goff, Mitch Trubisky, Carson Wentz, RG3), three of the best young quarterbacks in the NFL (Patrick Mahomes, Deshaun Watson, Josh Allen) were also acquired through similarly aggressive draft day maneuvers. Ultimately, you have to take your swings at some point, and while this Niners regime has been critiqued at times for being too aggressive in pursuit of “their dudes,” a combination of factors means this could be the right time to make this particular move.
Unless we run into a string of injuries that is even more historically bad than last year’s, we shouldn’t expect to be drafting as high as No.12 in the near future. And certainly not while facing down a quarterback class that has at least four QBs who I’d actually be cool with taking in the first round. For reference, I typically only like somewhere between two and zero quarterbacks in the first round of any given draft class (in fact, from 2013 through 2016 I only really liked two, and neither are currently NFL starters). There have been some talking heads who have critiqued the Niners’ trade as positioning them to pick “the draft’s third-best quarterback,” but I don’t think that argument’s valid. As stated above, quarterback draft talent fluctuates wildly from year-to-year and it doesn’t matter how many good quarterbacks there are in any given draft, it matters that the quarterbacks are good in the first place. According to Peter King of SI, the Niners were encouraged to make this move because they both recognized the talent in this class and saw the slim pickins next year (Sam Howell? Kedan Slovis?). So if the Niners like three (or more) of the top QBs in this draft—which this trade basically confirms—that’s all the more reason to move up in a rare year where draft capital, positional talent, and need at a priority position all coincide with one another.
In summary, I like the move. IF we pick the right guy. Because if we don’t get that right, we’ve screwed ourselves for the foreseeable future. Given the stakes, everything I post for the next month will be about who we pick at No.3, starting with a breakdown of what we’ll likely be looking for in the position.
A new(ish) game
The game has changed dramatically since Kyle Shanahan and John Lynch took over the Niners four years ago, with the shifts the most noticeable (and undeniable) over this past season. As proof that I’m not just an old man yelling at kids to get off his lawn, here’s a five-year breakdown of total accepted penalties, sorted by type.
NFL penalties by season
A 14.1% increase in defensive PI calls over the previous four-year average is a legitimate uptick but nothing compared to the 26.6% decrease in defensive holding or the astronomical 33.4% decrease in offensive holding over that same time period. It’s pretty easy to see why the NFL made these changes: (1) They want to encourage more scoring; and (2) it’s way harder for people to bitch about a missed holding call than the more-obviously-apparent missed PI. But despite not changing the definition of any of these rules in the past year, the NFL’s choice to drastically change how said rules are implemented and officiated has had massive gameplay ramifications.
I’d like to take this time to point out that both these stats and the result of the Chiefs-Bucs Super Bowl have 100% validated my bitching and moaning about the piss-poor officiating from our Super Bowl a year ago. The NFL made a conscious effort to shift away from calling holding of any kind starting in that 2019 Super Bowl and running through this past season, and the Chiefs—who led the league in defensive holding in 2019 and were top 3 in both offensive and defensive holding last year—were the primary benefactor. While the Chiefs likely would have lost the championship this year regardless, the fact that—unlike last year—they were actually called for defensive holding when they committed it, led to a boring blowout of a Super Bowl. While Kansas City was missing their starting tackles this February, the Bucs didn’t have our epic pass rush from two years ago, and if the 2019 Super Bowl was officiated like the 2020 Super Bowl was, I believe we’d have won the game by a similar margin that the Bucs just did.
I’m not bitter, you are.
Anyways, enough stick shaking. While the NFL’s rule changes mean they’re clearly playing favorites in terms of play-style, it’s something we need to take into account moving forward. You gotta play with what you’re dealt with and these officiating decisions force a trickle down effect to both our offensive scheme, and—in turn—what we’re looking for in a young quarterback.
Defensive PI: Up
This obviously benefits an offense that passes more often, but more specifically—as pass interference is a spot foul—it encourages deep ball passing. That means getting a quarterback with the arm strength and touch to be comfortable with down-the-field throws.
Defensive Holding: Down
I’m not sure if allowing defenses to hold specifically benefits one style of offense over another, but—if I were to guess—I’d say it benefits the deep ball. Holding is a penalty that probably (maybe?) is called against short-to-intermediate routes more often because if the call isn’t made on a receiver’s release it’s typically made on their break. On short routes those breaks are harder, with less time for separation, which can elicit a hold-worthy grab. On deep routes you’re looking at speed cuts (or no cuts at all) and the ball is often released before a wideout is open. Any holds at this point become pass interference. The line is murkier on shorter throws.
It’s a theory. It may not be legit.
Offensive Holding: WAY Down
A drop in offensive holding greatly helps the vertical passing game (seeing a trend here?). More time to pass means more time for wideouts to get open. That part’s simple. But it also helps mobile quarterbacks in a way that is a bit less apparent. A QB who can scramble in and out of the pocket and buy time with his feet presents a lot of advantages, but one of the inherent drawbacks with that style of play is that it’s much harder for offensive linemen to pass protect when the strike zone (pocket) keeps moving. By backing up deeper than expected or sprinting out of the pocket, a mobile quarterback changes the rush angles of the defensive line, and—since the OL has no idea what the QB is doing behind them—naturally leads to more holding calls.
Or it did. With holding calls down a third from last year, that drawback is greatly mitigated.
Hitting the Quarterback: WAY Down
While there’s no easy way to determine how many late hit and unnecessary roughness calls are directed towards breathing on quarterbacks on scrambling plays nor how those numbers have increased in recent seasons, our direct experience playing against Kyler and Russ twice a year should give us more than enough anecdotal evidence to the fact that dual-threat quarterbacks are protected more so than ever. That mitigates the second biggest drawback of a dual-threat quarterback: durability concerns.
In recent years there’s been a lot of talk about a study that shows that the rate of injury to a quarterback on scrambling plays (1 in every 91.7 plays) is comparable to the rate of injury when a QB is sacked (1 in every 92.5 plays) and that knockdowns—due in part to the awkwardness of attempting a throw while being hit—actually cause the most quarterback injuries. While those figures are intriguing, that doesn’t change the fact that scrambling inherently creates more total plays—thus increasing injury chances based on volume—and that the rate of being exposed to a hit on a scramble is considerably higher than the rate of being exposed to a hit on a common dropback. That said, the data implies that while dual-threat quarterbacks will still be injured more often than pocket passers, as long as a team is being smart about it, working to protect their quarterback through scheme, and said quarterback is actively trying to preserve their body, the difference in injury risk is lower than traditionally thought.
The league’s emphasis on protecting quarterbacks on these kinds of plays only lessens that risk.
In summary, the way the league is calling the game incentivizes throwing the ball down the field and mitigates the drawbacks—while accenting the benefits—of a quarterback who can scramble and make plays off-schedule. That doesn’t mean we need someone as electric as Lamar Jackson or Kyler Murray—throwing ability will always be the more important trait as long as Shanahan is calling the offense—but having good mobility and the arm talent to throw from outside a clean pocket is more important than ever.
It’s also worth noting that the big-play benefits that we get from Shanahan’s system can also lead to the occasional negative play. We know that increased variance is inherent in a zone/stretch scheme, but we can also see it in the passing game. We accept that variance because when the offense is humming it’s near-unstoppable and the average output per play and per game is greater than we’d see if Shanahan chose to play it safe. But with a quarterback who can extend plays and create off-schedule, we’d not only give ourselves the chance at more explosive gains but—perhaps as importantly—lessen the damage of our negative plays. Turning five-yard losses into one-yard losses and three-yard losses into throwaways adds up in a hurry. A quarterback who can extend plays could help raise the floor of our offense as well as the ceiling.
What hasn’t changed
What Shanahan’s looking for in a signal caller has certainly evolved since he took over in 2017 and had his eyes set on Kirk Cousins, but there are a few mainstays of his offense—and the type of quarterback he seems likely to pursue—that remain constant.
Intelligence: The Niners really prioritize intelligence when building their roster and this is especially the case on offense. Shanahan’s scheme is notoriously complicated and difficult to learn—with complex blocking rules and countless minute details that separate his scheme from others’. In the past two years, we’ve seen the Niners grab offensive linemen (Skule, McKivitz) higher than many expected because they emphasized their smarts over pure athletic traits. Those same rules apply to the quarterback position. If a prospect fails on the whiteboard or the staff has any hesitation that he’ll be able to soak up the entirety of the playbook, the Niners will not be taking them.
Accuracy: Even if we start throwing deep more often, we’ll always prioritize accuracy over raw arm strength. Shanahan’s offense requires precise timing and pinpoint passes, and a pass on time and in stride is all the difference when it comes to maximizing the YAC potential of our many offensive weapons. Shanahan would surely like to be able to open the passing attack up more, but not at the expense of our efficiency in creating chunk plays underneath.
Personnel: With Kittle and Juice both on multi-year deals, it’s clear that the Niners are committed to heavy doses of 21 personnel and an emphasis on running the ball effectively to set up play action. While a strong-armed quarterback could lead to more deep shots and a mobile one could present some nice wrinkles running option pulls opposite a Raheem Mostert stretch the other way, the foundation of our offense will remain unchanged—regardless of who we draft. The new addition will be tasked with helping open up and elevate our offense, not force wholesale changes in what we’re doing schematically.
What happens with Jimmy G?
While Jimmy G’s days in San Francisco appear numbered, that doesn’t mean he’ll be gone right away. The idea of Garoppolo starting in 2021 may seem counterintuitive to the move the Niners just made, but when taken in the context of the rest of the off-season, it actually makes a lot of sense.
The Trent Williams and Juice deals are multi-year pacts with high price tags, but the return of guys like Jeff Wilson, DJ Jones, Jason Verrett, Jaquiski Tartt, and K’Waun Williams on one-year deals means the Niners clearly believe they can compete at a high level in 2021. Entrusting a rookie quarterback to run Shanahan’s complex scheme in a year when OTAs and training camp could still be greatly impacted by COVID restrictions would be quite the leap of faith. While there are enough similarities in BYU’s offense and ours that you could see a three-year starter like Zach Wilson starting right away, Justin Fields is moving from an air raid scheme and Trey Lance has only 17 career starts on the D-1AA level. The Niners made their free agent decisions knowing that they could make this blockbuster trade. They didn’t bring so many guys back on one-year deals just to go through the ups and downs of a starting rookie quarterback.
We also have to think about market value. By bringing so many guys back on one-year deals, the Niners are banking on many of them playing their way into bigger and better contracts—whether that’s with the Niners or elsewhere. Jimmy G is basically in the same boat. He’ll want to have a good year to secure a starting role and sizable contract from wherever he winds up next, while the Niners want him to have a good year so that they can take advantage of their current window and maximize his return in any future trade. If Jimmy G absolutely goes off this season then the Niners could be in for a Drew Brees/Philip Rivers-like decision a year from now. If he plays well enough to net a good draft return, then we could be looking at something similar to the Chiefs with Alex Smith/Patrick Mahomes. While I’m not saying whoever we draft will be the next Rivers or Mahomes, both of those situations wound up pretty beneficial for all parties involved. It never hurts to have more than one capable quarterback. One of the overlooked factors in evaluating our trade up to No.3 is figuring out what we’re getting for Jimmy G when we move him. Starting him this season would give us the best chance to win and the best chance of increasing that return.
Creating cap space is one of the primary reasons people give for moving Jimmy before the season. While there’s little to no reason to do that this year—as we’re likely done with free agency for the spring—cap space rolls over, we’ve got a lot of backloaded deals, and a net gain of $23.6M in 2022 looks nice as we start extension talks with guys like Warner, Bosa, Samuel, and McGlinchey. There’s validity to this argument, but if the rookie isn’t ready to start or gets injured, how comfortable are you with one of the Joshes (Rosen or Johnson) taking the reins for 2022?
Additional arguments that have been floated include the likes of “you don’t draft someone at No.3 just to sit them for a year” or “the best way for a young quarterback to gain experience is in playing time.” But there are major flaws in both of these claims. None of the three quarterbacks to receive MVP votes this year were starters at the beginning of their rookie seasons and two—Aaron Rodgers and Patrick Mahomes—didn’t play a single meaningful snap their first year in the league. The two most successful quarterbacks of the 2018 class—Josh Allen and Lamar Jackson—were meant for the bench but were basically forced onto the field due to necessity midway through their rookie seasons. If the Niners do move on from Garoppolo before the year, it’s because they’ve been offered a handsome package in return and believe they can compete with a rookie starter, not because they feel the need to get Jimmy out of town.
All that said, I still believe that Jimmy G is our most likely starting quarterback to open the 2021 season. Whether he finishes the season as the starter—either due to injury or play by a rookie—is a much harder question. But rest assured, the Niners’ blockbuster trade was done both with the future in mind and the belief that we have a team that can compete in the present.
Next up, we’ll take a deep dive on each of the three (or four) quarterbacks who we could be drafting at No.3.
Go Niners 👍🏈