The Jamal Adams Trade
At least he won’t have to get rid of any of his green clothes?
![How worried should we be? [Rich Barnes - USA Today]](https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5e40f3a094d5fa3ebbbedb09/1595873956305-X1IW1HWPZJA1G6DW5DGY/jamal+adams.jpg)
How worried should we be? [Rich Barnes - USA Today]
While this isn’t specifically Niners news, I felt I should chime in since the Seahawks are our top rival, we were in on trade discussions with Adams, and now we’ll have to see him twice a year.
But I’ll try and make it (relatively) quick.
The Trade
Jets receive: SS Bradley McDougald, 2021 first-round pick, 2022 first-round pick, 2021 third-round pick
Seahawks receive: SS Jamal Adams, 2022 fourth-round pick
In short, it’s a bummer that Jamal Adams—the best box safety in the game and one of, if not the single best safeties period—is now with our division rivals. The combination of the underrated Quandre Diggs, the probably slightly overrated Shaquill Griffin, and now Adams makes for a formidable secondary and quickly shores up what was a major weak spot for Seattle as recently as the beginning of last season. Adams is a superstar player, and he clearly makes the Seahawks better.
That being said, I have major questions about what they gave up.
Pick haul
Losing two first-rounders (and change) is always a tough sell—and probably more so when the NFL is facing at least one year of a diminished salary cap—but the Seahawks likely made this move because they feel they’re one player away from Super Bowl contention. While a +7 point differential last season, the loss of their only good pass rusher from an already weak front, and an unrepeatable 10-2 record in close games—a giant statistical outlier helped in part by opponents missing would-be game-winning field goals to end at least two divisional contests—makes me doubt their elite status, the Seahawks clearly believe the first-round picks they gave up will be deep in the twenties. Now will the three picks they lost net a single player of Adams’ caliber? Unlikely, especially given the Seahawks haven’t selected a single first-round pick who could even be considered decent since 2012, but this isn’t the NBA where you should always flip a handful of good players for one great one. Depth matters more and you need at least 4x as many regular contributors in the NFL, the Seahawks had much bigger areas of need (OL and DL) that they now have fewer means to address, and early round draft incompetence is no excuse for devaluing high picks; believing so would be the literal equivalence of thinking two wrongs make a right.
And we haven’t even gotten to the money yet.
Salary
Jamal Adams will play out the cheap fourth year of his rookie contract this season before demanding a long-term extension that will almost certainly have to reset the safety market. He left the Jets in part because they were dragging their feet on a long-term deal and made it public that he’d be willing to play out the 2020 season on his current contract with the right squad but that an extension would need to come next summer. With the top four safeties currently making $14M or more and Earl Thomas right on their heels, the baseline average annual salary that we should expect him to make following this season is at least $15M/year. As a super conservative estimate, let’s say he signs an extension of 4 years at $60M. Meanwhile, the two first-rounders the Seahawks gave up (at ~$12M/yr in the mid-twenties) and the third-rounder (at $4.5-5M/year) will combine to make around $29M over the same time span. So you’re paying literally twice as much for one player over three. And while you could make an argument for that at certain positions, it’s hard to make that argument for this position in this scheme.
Positional value within scheme
The Seahawks run the same base scheme as we do, and—like us—shifted more towards quarters coverage last year as they dealt with life after Earl Thomas. While some might think that means Adams will slide into Thomas’ vacated single-high role and Seattle can re-animate the corpse of the Legion of Boom, that would be quite a stretch. Adams, while great, has spent his entire career lined up in the box, where he is unquestionably at his best and most disruptive. In fact, he actually tallied more snaps lining up at linebacker or defensive end than he has at safety since entering the league, and if you look at where he’s lined up over that time, I feel pretty comfortable saying he won’t be playing centerfield for the Hawks.
Every offensive and defensive scheme prioritizes which positions are worthy of top-dollar pay. For the Chiefs (Mathieu), Ravens (Earl Thomas), Patriots (Devin McCourty and Patrick Chung), and Vikings (Harrison Smith and Anthony Harris), it makes more sense for them to pay their safeties well because they’re asked to do roles that are either much harder to accomplish (single-high safety) or require a varied Swiss Army knife skillset. I actually love the movement towards safeties as the defensive equivalent of versatile chess piece—playing in the box, running the alley, locking up slot receivers, or sitting back in coverage—but that’s not what we or the Seahawks do; thus it doesn’t make sense to pay top dollar for the position.
Role / Scheme Changes?
Adams can play the Kam Chancellor role and do it better than Chancellor ever did (at least now that you can’t murder people over the middle), and while he could also perform well as a two-high safety, he—similar to Matthieu— is still at his best closer to the line of scrimmage. So perhaps the Seahawks have aspirations for him grander than a strong safety?
As the league shifts towards hybrids, it’s not hard to see Adams playing more linebacker on passing downs, setting the edge against the stretch runs of the Niners and Rams, spying Kyler Murray, and being used to man up in the slot against the George Kittles of the world. Or perhaps he’s a hybrid Will LB/nickel corner, bouncing in and out of the box but always staying near the line of scrimmage? Adams is also one of the league’s best pass rushers amongst DBs so he could help off the edge, but that’s still amongst DBs and would require a pretty significant change to the Seahawks’ scheme in order to tap into.
Seattle has drafted four safeties in the past three years (plus two safety/corner types who wound up playing on the boundary); this includes spending last year’s second-round pick on Marquis Blair. They have the numbers to run a lot of three safety packages and keep Adams near the line of scrimmage where he rarely—if ever—has to play deep (similar, again, to the Chiefs and Mathieu).
But how much are the Seahawks willing to adapt their scheme to maximize Adams’ skills? I’m sure to some extent. Carroll is a top notch DB coach and whenever you add a star player—and Adams is exactly that—you adapt to what they bring to the table. But the safety-reliant schemes that the Chiefs, Ravens, and Patriots employ all heavily lean towards man coverage, and it’s difficult to see the Seahawks going that far away from the core defensive principles that Carroll has specialized in since arriving in Seattle. They’re still the second-winningest team in the league since Russell Wilson showed up, and if there’s anything Carroll has shown with his commitment to ineffectively running the ball out of pro sets, it’s that he believes in his schemes, regardless of what direction the league may be going.
If I’m just totally guessing right now (which I am), I’d say Adams plays the Kam Chancellor role in base packages, setting the edge against the run, working shallow underneath coverages, and mirroring Kittle-like people, while he bounces between Will linebacker and big nickel in sub packages, where he can be utilized off the edge as a pass rusher, can help offset the coverage limitations that have started showing a bit with Bobby Wagner, and can keep Seattle from being outmatched based on personnel sets alone.
Future Team-Building Power
While Griffin and Adams will need long-term extensions next year, the rest of their 2021 free agents are take-it-or-leave-it types, and the Seahawks will be in relatively good spending position regardless of where the Corona cap lies. But—as stated above—I think they’re a much less complete team than they do, so they’ll likely need that money.
Their OL, which was already meh, is replacing two starters with unproven commodities and is being projected by PFF as the 28th-rated unit going into 2020. Their pass rush, ranked 30th last year, just lost Jadeveon Clowney while LJ Collier—his heir apparent, but realistically the dude they’re hoping is their next Frank Clark—will need to play much better as a sophomore after registering just 3 total tackles in 11 games of part-time duty last year. While these holes could theoretically be filled via second-day picks (where the Seahawks have often excelled), losing two firsts greatly diminishes their drafting power and the capital they need to move around as much as they typically like to. Compound that with the fact that offensive line and pass rush are two of the highest-demand and highest-drafted positions, and they may have to dip into free agency to patch their roster holes.
The problem with that strategy is that paying for top-tier players in free agency often means overpaying, and offensive line and pass rush are notoriously the most expensive free agent acquisitions to begin with. Any valuation bump in the draft is reflected in free agency tenfold and by giving up your two most valuable future picks while expending big money on a position that your own scheme doesn’t necessarily prioritize, the Seahawks have made their future fixes along the OL and DL more expensive and thus—due to cost and a greater squeeze on the salary cap with Adams’ eventual extension—inherently riskier. In the Seahawks’ nightmare scenario, the trade and extension for Adams will push them to reach for both a new tackle and a new edge rusher, and they’ll find themselves paying top-dollar for a great safety while greatly overpaying two average-or-worse performers at crucial positions; it could result in an expensive snowball.
Perhaps they’ll get it right, finding help on the second-day of the draft or with buy-low prospects in free agency. Or perhaps they’ll continue to stop-gap the tackle position—letting Russell Wilson run for his life—while Collier lives up to his first-round selection. But as always, giving up draft picks means giving up rounds in the chamber. With this trade for Adams, the Hawks are really banking on the idea that they won’t miss.
Conclusion
Adams is a great player, but while the Chiefs’ high-priced acquisition of Tyrann Mathieu made sense for them, they were transitioning to a scheme that required a hybrid player of his talents, and—even more importantly—they got him in free agency. They gave up nothing. Meanwhile, the Seahawks traded two first-round picks, a third, and a starting safety, a bounty that is hard to justify for anyone other than a quarterback. It’s probably not a great sign that—other than the Khalil Mack trade, which you can at least justify—the other three trades of a similar scope were by the Rams—who no one should be taking cap management and big-deal transaction advice from—the Dave Gettleman Giants and Bill O’Brien.
So have the Seahawks improved through this trade? Absolutely. Adams is too durable and too strong of a locker room presence for this trade to blow-up in their faces like the Percy Harvin deal; he’s too young and good of a player to underwhelm in a new setting like Jimmy Graham did. Adams gives them one of the best secondaries in the league, and I don’t look forward to seeing him twice a year. But have the Seahawks improved enough through this trade to offset the future team-building power they gave up? Unlikely.
Closing Time Pt I: Do we have an issue closing games?
It’s more than just that song that’s played at the end of high school dances despite clearly being about an alcoholic
![Didn’t love it [Sports Illustrated]](https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5e40f3a094d5fa3ebbbedb09/1595703064204-HOCNDKD85ZXLGFF2QS92/closing+time+pt+1.jpg)
Didn’t love it [Sports Illustrated]
Ever since the end of the Super Bowl, you knew this was going to be a point of discussion during the off-season, and while a lot of things had to go wrong for the Niners to lose the Super Bowl in the fashion that they did (including the refs absolutely blowing it on missed calls), there have been enough traces of late game issues to give it a closer look. Also, who knows if there’s even a season, so fuck it. At least it’s an excuse for some football content.
For the first section of this three-part series, I’ll be trying (and potentially failing) to determine how substantial our late game issues really were based on a mix of statistics. In the second part, I’ll look at potential culprits and solutions in regards to our late-game offense. The third part will focus on defense.
Alright, let’s jump in.
Level 1 Analysis: Drunk at a bar with a rando
On the surface level, the worry—or more realistically, the trolling—centers around the fact that the Niners’ biggest blown lead was in the Super Bowl and that Kyle Shanahan was the OC of the most famous Super Bowl meltdown in league history (and for some reason has shouldered the majority of the blame in both instances). This is also the easy media cop-out as, well, sports media kind of sucks, and—in the case of most outlets (and unfortunately most standard news media as well)—they make their money by stirring up knee-jerk theories, manufacturing hilariously bad takes, and generating hot take clickbait.
Others could point to Shanahan’s first season as the head man, when the Niners started 0-9 and went an (I think record) five straight games where they lost by three or fewer points. But that team was absolutely devoid of talent, had Hoyer/Beathard at the helm, and close losses like that are actually more of a sign of future success than anything else. You keep your young guys energized and focused, you show progress while not destroying your draft positioning, and you get the bad close game luck out of the way so you can regress to the mean in future seasons when the games actually matter. Also—in this particular case—how the locker room gelled and stayed together despite that brutal start actually pointed to how well Shanahan and Lynch had started to build a team culture and how hard players would play for Shanahan, even when there was no hope for the playoffs.
I’ve already made clear what I think happened during the Super Bowl, but in general, know that the people who are making the “Shanahan chokes away leads” claim likely share a healthy Venn diagram overlap with those who have said Andy Reid can’t win the big game or that Dabo Swinney’s five-game losing streak to South Carolina (the longest in the 100+ year history of the series) was proof that Clemson would never amount to championship material. They’re right only until they’re inevitably very very wrong, and since neither accuracy nor projection are barometers for success in the sports media world, it’s unfortunately something that Shanahan will have to hear until he breaks through and wins a Lombardi trophy.
Level 2 Analysis: Drunkenly discussing with friends
But how much did the Niners REALLY struggle to close out games last year? The Niners were 6-3 in one score games (if we include both Cardinals games in the equation), but while our defense finished 7th in points allowed/game (19.5), it was 17th in points allowed per fourth quarter (6.3). Over their last six games, we saw fourth quarter leads of nine (Falcons), ten (Chiefs), and—almost—twelve (Seahawks) evaporate in dramatic fashion. That included allowing 14+ points in the fourth quarter of five of our last seven games (despite winning three of those contests) and—in four of those five games—letting the opposition score within the last 3:36 of the game to either take the lead, tie, or get within a field goal.
Now, there is very clearly a correlation between those figures and our injury status on defense by the end of the regular season, but it would be overly optimistic to believe that was the entirety of the problem. After all, the Niners’ offense was riddled with key injuries through much of the first-half of the season, but the effect on that side of the ball in close games—save for the Seahawks OT loss—wasn’t nearly as pronounced. And while our scheme and the natural obligations of different position groups demands more depth on the defensive side (particularly along the defensive line) than on offense, we still had all of our non-IR guys back for the Super Bowl and the NFC Champ Game but allowed a combined 34 points in the fourth quarters of those two contests. Sure, letting in 13 in the NFC Champ Game when we were up 27 may not seem like much, but there’s enough anecdotal evidence throughout the season to at least warrant a closer look.
Level 3 Analysis: Nerding the fuck out / being hammered
As is always the case, there’s a ton of noise in football stats, so I tried to look deeper into our late game questions by charting the team’s performances in the fourth quarter and overtime but excluding blowouts. Thus, the only games included in this chart (which unfortunately has to be opened in a separate Google Sheet because Squarespace lacks table functionality) are ones where the Niners or their opponent were within a score at any point in the fourth quarter. That means 12 of 19 games.
While the reasoning behind this selection was to see how the Niners fared in higher pressure situations while both teams were playing their starters and trying their best to win, this sampling decision will inherently—based on the type of year the team had in 2019—skew against the Niners. They had no blowout losses, didn’t lose a single game until the Super Bowl by more than one possession (on a score that happened when the game was functionally already decided), and all of the instances where they had a comfortable lead then put teams away in the fourth are missing from this chart. For clarification, the 7 games excluded from this table were all “blowout” wins, with two coming in the playoffs. So any takeaways should be met with a grain of salt.
Now is this the best way of charting for these purposes? I dunno. I took like one statistics class in college and rarely even showed up. But as I’d rather lean more pessimistic/conservative when evaluating the weaknesses of a 13-3 team that was some bad luck, a few missed opportunities, and a game filled of blatant missed holds away from winning a Super Bowl, it’s the way I went with.
Again, my apologies for the table and the write-up existing in separate windows. If there’s any solace to this formatting fail it’s that the chart is so large that perhaps it will be easier to read and reference in two windows rather than one (he said only half-believing it).
A quick glossary before we dive in:
Drives: the number of drives on offense or defense in the fourth quarter + OT. This was far from scientific, with drives that were in progress as the fourth quarter started or ended as the game did counting as 0.5 while full drives counted as 1.
YPP: Yards per play
YPD: Yards per drive
Penalties: “Pen” marks the total number of penalties committed by either team while “P. Yards” is the net difference in yardage. For the purposes of this chart, positivity/negativity of P.Yards is in regards to how the penalty affected the Niners (i.e. negative yards while the Niners are on offense hurt the offense while negative yards when the Niners are on defense helped the offense. So a negative mark is always bad for the Niners).
“P. FD” is how many first downs were taken away or given out based on penalties. This includes instances where a player was granted a first down despite the result on the field, but not in addition to the result. So when George Kittle rail-roaded the entire Saints team and then was face-masked thirty-yards past the sticks, the first down was already earned and so a “penalty first down” is NOT recorded.
Finally, “P. Mar” refers to marginal penalty yards, which tries to look at the hidden yardage found in particular types of penalties. While blocking penalties are likely the most common offensive penalty, they’re spot fouls that don’t reset the downs, and—on any successful run or completed pass—they take away otherwise earned yardage (i.e. a hold that comes on a five yard run can result in the exact same penalty yardage of a hold that comes early in a forty yard run). Thus their yardage impact is typically minimized in pure statistics. In contrast, the only spot fouls on defense are pass interference, which—while potentially accounting for a whopping amount of yards—spot the ball at the point of the penalty so the yardage is much more likely to be shown on the stat sheet. And while there are instances where a pick six or a sack or a would-be touchdown could be wiped out by a pass interference call, the most likely positive defensive outcome that gets erased by pass interference is typically an incomplete pass.
The shit-show of the Steelers game is a perfect example of all of this at work. In the fourth quarter, two holds and a clip on Justin Skule created -29 in official penalty yardage, while a defensive hold on Mark Barron gave the Niners 5 yards. In terms of penalty yards, that would make the Niners -25 on offense for that quarter. But while Barron’s defensive holding nullified an incomplete pass—thus making his net yards and marginal yards the same—Skule’s penalties wiped away 11 yards of offense. Thus, his marginal loss generated was -40 yards. Meanwhile, on defense, we had one -32 yard pass interference penalty from Jason Verrett on an incomplete pass. The net and marginal penalty yardage were the same. And yes, that’s right, we had -68 marginal penalty yards in the fourth quarter alone against the Steelers, which largely contributed to how hideous and close a game it was.
Exclusions: Drives that were nearly finished (had one play to go) when they started the fourth quarter, I excluded. The same goes for last play defensive touchdowns that did nothing but mess with the spread (to end the second Cardinals game and to end the Falcons game). Those tell us nothing about our actual play and are (outside of Vegas) totally pointless to include.
Offensive Takeaways
Positives: In terms of drives and yardage, we’re nearly identical from the first three quarters to the fourth. In fact, in the fourth quarter we actually average slightly more yards, slightly fewer turnovers, and half a point more than in each of the other three quarters. We also trended the right way as we got healthier. After the first Cardinals game (in which we were missing both our starting tackles, our top swing tackle, Juice, and — by the end of the game — Kittle), the only real instances of a massive fourth quarter drop in YPP were against the Ravens and Chiefs. And while you could also include the Saints game, going from an otherworldly 10.15 YPP to 5.9 YPP—which would have been good for 6th-best in the NFL across all quarters and was only 0.1 YPP under our season average—shouldn’t reasonably be called a “massive drop.”
Our yards-per-drive (YPD) stat also sees a slight boost, but it’s important not to take away too much from that figure. Remember that drive # is the loosest figure in this chart by far and was put in primarily just to see how many times each team got the ball in the last stanza. Since it is a figure that basically rounds to the nearest half-drive, once it is divided / multiplied / manipulated it becomes increasingly irrelevant.
Negatives: The dips in yards per play (YPP) and first downs (FD) are worth noting, particularly because when you’re up in the fourth quarter the most important thing is keeping it that way. That means generating consistent yardage and first downs. Some of the 1.1 YPP difference could be explained by a natural conservative lean when you have a lead (the Niners entered 9 of 12 of these fourth quarters ahead) and how that can eliminate the big shot plays that balloon averages, but you shouldn’t actually get very conservative until much later in the fourth quarter than many people think and conservative or not, that doesn’t shed any light on the 1.1 FD drop. You’re never NOT trying to get first downs and keep the ball. Penalties could also be somewhat at fault. -3.3 marginal yards doesn’t sound like much, but it’s not hard to imagine that yardage being the difference between a stalled out drive on a third down and a narrow conversion to continue running the clock. There’s also the obvious ripples that come from a penalty putting the offense behind the sticks and that affecting future play-calling. But we’ll get into that more in detail in the second part.
Defensive Takeaways
Positives: The stats aren’t pretty, but the majority of the issues were back-loaded to the time when we had fewer healthy bodies. Other than the Steelers game and a first matchup with the Cardinals where the YPP numbers are greatly skewed by a 90-yd touchdown catch, we didn’t see a major drop-off in YPP until that Saints game in week 14 (and by the end of that game we were down Dee Ford, DJ Jones, Jaquiski Tartt, Ronald Blair, Damontre Moore, and Jullian Taylor). We also showed the ability to adapt while far from full-strength with incredibly impressive fourth quarter performances against the Ravens (2.94 YPP) and the Rams (3.09 YPP) during the second-half stretch, not to mention our work in the playoffs.
Negatives: Unfortunately, there are quite a bit of worrisome figures. The upticks in plays +4.2, yards allowed +43, and points +3.5 do not paint a friendly picture. While the first down figures may not shift much, it’s clear that opposing teams are getting bigger gains past the sticks in the fourth quarter. If you look at an even broader picture, while we finished 7th in points allowed/game (19.5) across the regular season we were T-18th in points allowed/4th quarter (6.5). The figures look even worse across this particular sample of close games. Our 8.5 points allowed/4th quarter would rank 29th in the NFL if prorated across an entire season (which isn’t a fair thing to do, but still…), and even if you take our two fourth quarter defensive touchdowns (and their two point conversions) to subtract that from that total points allowed (which is even more arguable, but whatever) our figure of 7.2 points allowed/4th quarter would still rank 25th in the league.
Again, some of this is injuries. If you take the first seven games on this chart (when we were still reasonably healthy on defense) and count the Seahawks OT game as two separate fourth quarters (as it went the entire extra stanza), our defense was allowing less than 3.4 first downs and 4.6 points allowed/4th quarter. The first figure would be excellent and much better than the 5.1 first downs conceded/quarter across the first three periods of this 12-game sample. The second figure would be good for T-4th in the NFL if extrapolated over an entire season. On the flip side, over the last five games, our first downs conceded more than doubled to 7 first downs/4th quarter and our points allowed nearly tripled to 13 points/4th quarter. Unsurprisingly, that scoring mark—if applied to an entire season—would be worst in the league. It’s important to note that it is far from fair to extrapolate either the good or the bad figures of this chart to a whole season, but it at least lets you see the potential issues at hand.
Now is there some bad penalty luck on the defensive side as well? Sure. -4.8 marginal yards and half a first down per fourth quarter can certainly be the difference when you’re looking at one score games. But that doesn’t account for such a drastic dip in performance late in games.
Again, it’s important to note these statistics are only statistics and what they’re inferring is far from world-ending. We were 13-3, on a the edge of a championship, and our 6-3 record in close games means there was considerably less luck involved—and thus, more repeatability—than, say, the 2018 Rams’ 6-1 record. While the Super Bowl hangover is something that is often referenced, I actually think we’re in a great position to avoid that fate, but finding and addressing any late-game concerns will be necessary for sustained long-term success.
We’ll look at that in the next post, coming… hopefully soon cause I don’t have a job.
Mid-Summer Questions
Would like more of this in 2020 plz
![A lot of this last year [Niners Wire]](https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5e40f3a094d5fa3ebbbedb09/1594743261157-LSCHZDKG117W4SEXPORV/mid-summer+questions.jpg)
A lot of this last year [Niners Wire]
With NFL football still theoretically a thing and the Niners expected to report to the facility on July 26th, here are a few lingering questions before training camp begins.
Where’s Kittle’s extension and should we be scared yet?
The hang-up in getting Kittle signed to a long-term deal is likely due to a number of factors, most of which we’ve already discussed.
Nothing has changed in terms of the poorly paid tight end market, whose highest-paid player makes $10.6M and whose franchise tender value—since its calculated by the average of the top five salaries in regards to cap percentage—is currently $10.5M. This gives the Niners leverage because they can lock in Kittle for 2020 and—if using the franchise tag—for 2021 at a grand total of about $13M. It also presents a starting point for contract negotiations. Since the tight end market is so low, even a second consecutive franchise tag—which would likely mean a 20% increase of the previous tag’s rate—would put the Niners out something like $26M over three years. And while there’s no way the Niners are pitching a $8.3M/year contract to Kittle, you can understand why they’d be hesitant to blow all other deals out of the water considering the power they hold.
On Kittle’s side, his agent wants a “Kittle deal, not a tight end deal,” which is totally fair given Kittle is definitely the best tight end in the league and his role on the Niners makes him vitally important given his skill set. There is not a single tight end in the league who could replicate Kittle’s receiving and blocking impact, and there’s an argument that there isn’t one who could replicate either given how well he fits into our scheme and what he brings to the table.
Add in the fact that sweet sweet coronavirus continues to rage on and that there’s been no concrete solution as to what the NFL plans to do to offset losses in revenue in regards to future salary cap figures, and it’s easy to see the impasse.
Am I worried about Kittle being traded for picks? Absolutely not. But I will be worried if the Niners don’t iron out a deal before the season starts. While the franchise tender may give a team control, it has burned many a bridge and usually leads to either a messy divorce or an absolutely gigantic long-term salary. Considering Kittle has been a top performer for multiple years on a fifth-round draft pick salary, he needs to get paid, and doing so this off-season would be cheaper, easier, and better than doing it later down the road.
Some expect the deal to wind up at a team-friendly $13M/year. If so, that would be a major win for the Niners.
Should we trade for Jamal Adams?
No.
He’s both a great player and the guy we realistically should have drafted instead of Solomon Thomas back in 2017 (Pat Mahomes clearly being the player we unrealistically should have drafted), but—in terms of salary and capital lost to acquire him—we can’t afford it.
Since Adams is entering the fourth year of his rookie contract, any trade that includes Jaquiski Tartt (which I would assume would have to be the case), would actually help our cap situation for 2020 but would kill our books long-term. Adams is demanding a trade because (a) he plays for the Jets, (b) he wants to get paid as one of the top safeties in the NFL, and (c) he plays for the Jets. The five highest-paid safeties in the league average just over $14M/year. Jimmie Ward, who—despite the increased interchangeability of our safeties last year and a greater shift towards quarters coverage—plays the deep middle and is thus the more important safety for our scheme, is making $9.5M/year. There’s just no way to make the math work, especially for a scheme that ultimately wants to save money on the strong safety position.
Additionally, the amount of draft capital we’d have to give up would be untenable, especially considering how many picks we’ve lost in the past season. The Jets’ starting price is a first round pick, but—while Adams can be worth that for a team that asks for a more versatile chess piece and playmaker from the SS position—given our cap situation, scheme, and the fact that Adams has already used three years of his rookie discount years and would want an extension after this year at the latest, it’s an unfortunate no from me.
Please, for the love of god, no more trading picks.
What will/should happen with Raheem Mostert’s contract?
I’d off-hand mentioned earlier this year how Mostert’s deal now looked like a brilliant move for the Niners since he was one of the top backs in the league last year and is making approximately $3M/year over the next two years. Well... apparently Mostert’s agent realized that as well, and—after an undetermined length of behind the scenes negotiations—went to Twitter to request a trade last week.
From the Niners’ perspective, Shanahan’s system has been churning out runners for literally decades, they run a backfield-by-committee approach, and they don’t want to set the precedent of renegotiating contracts that were just signed one year ago. They also see a 2020 salary cap that needs to juggle possible extensions to Kittle and Kendrick Bourne and a 2021 off-season that will feature a ton of key free agents and a very cloudy salary cap situation.
From Mostert’s perspective, he has clearly outplayed his contract, wants to finally get paid after a journeyman special teams career, wants more guaranteed money, and—if rumors are true—legitimately only wants to be paid like the rest of the 49ers backs (aka Tevin Coleman). That would mean a bump in $2M or less, which seems deserved.
Bridging that $2M gap seems doable, although it is annoying that it has gotten to this point for so many reasons. First off, while Shanahan’s system can create backfield production, Mostert is the prototypical ideal for it as a runner, and—while 28–he has very little tread on his legs and could theoretically age well. Mostert is a guy we should want to keep, and I think it would be presumptuous to think we can replace his production with a full platoon when he so clearly outperformed that platoon last year. Secondly, much has been made about Tevin Coleman’s lack of guarantees on the remaining $4.55M of his contract and how he could have been (or could still be) cut to save money. But since we’re so late in the process, that is no longer entirely the case. $2M of Coleman’s deal became guaranteed in the spring, and while cutting him would free up $2.55M to potentially send Mostert’s way, there is no outcome that involves moving Coleman where we’re not left disappointed that—if he was gonna get moved anyways—it wasn’t done sooner.
Obviously, this is a case where Mostert has zero leverage, but whereas a team like the Patriots has created a culture of business-first, second, and also hand jobs, sticky contract situations could be more damaging to a Niners locker room that has been repeatedly lauded as being more family-like, personally close, and transparent. While I get the worry about setting a precedent of restructuring deals one year in, I also don’t expect many guys to go from special teams to star running backs overnight (Moseley and Brunskill had similarly meteoric rises but are also ERFA, thus they’re boned regardless). Finally, while Mostert has a short track record of elite play and would almost certainly see a drop in production anywhere else, we just traded Matt Breida, Jet McKinnon hasn’t played in two years, and Tevin and Jeff Wilson are more inside runners. We need Mostert’s speed and skill set to really hum as an offense and would likely get very little in return in a trade. Coleman was seen as a discount deal for signing a 2-year deal worth ~$5M/year last off-season. Retaining a back who could potentially be an elite performer at the same rate would still—despite the running back market—make for a great deal. The goal should be to retain him.
So what would that look like? My first order of business would be to guarantee the $2.58M of his 2020 base salary, which is entirely non-guaranteed at the moment. There is zero chance we’re cutting Mostert in 2020, so guaranteeing his salary would be a nice gesture that wouldn’t affect our cap and give him a sense of security that is particularly valuable for a player whose been a journeyman most of is career, during a year where we might not even have a season. I’d then look at adding onto the pre-existing contract with incentives. For as great as Mostert’s been in his limited touches over the past two years, he only rushed for 772 yards last year. It would be incredibly easy to structure NLTBE incentives above his 2019 numbers, which would then move over to next year’s cap if actualized (if that’s what we want), while protecting the team if he gets injured, doesn’t perform well, or the season is cut short. If the Niners believe more so that the season will be cut short or not played at all, they could set lower marks and make those incentives LTBE, affecting this year’s cap but giving us a potentially-much-needed boost to next year’s figure if those marks aren’t hit. I don’t know what Mostert’s team wants after this year, but a similar move—and/or an increase in non-guaranteed base salary—could likely be managed for 2021, and seeing as the Niners would be doing a solid by restructuring a contract a year in, I would push for an additional, team-friendly option year to tack on to the back of the contract. That would give us more locked in years if Mostert does emerge as a true bell cow back, some flexibility if he doesn’t, and another year to potentially spread out any guaranteed money cap hits in case the 2021 cap absolutely plummets.
I’m not in the negotiating room, but that seems fair to all parties. Shanahan is likely never going to give a single running back a monster share of carries, but if Mostert becomes the lead back on the team he gets paid like it while the Niners are protected against potential issues of sample size and injury history that have hurt Mostert in the past.
What will happen with the salary cap next year and how does that affect both of the above?
Now everything above could be void if (a) there is no season this year and/or (b) the salary cap is fuuuuuuucked in 2021.
Since the salary cap is directly tied to revenue, there is no way to imagine that it won’t be down in 2021, which would mark the first time the salary cap has NOT increased since... I dunno, but—for functional purposes at least—ever.
If the cap takes a major hit, it’s a lose-lose for everyone except a handful of cheap-ass owners with a ton of cap space (Mike Brown, anyone?). That would lead to a lot of talented veterans getting cut, much cheaper deals all around, all teams and the overall level of play being way shittier, and—in general—large scale shuffling of rosters that benefits no one (except, again, those usually-shit owners who would likely still be cheap and blame it on the rona). A dip in the salary cap punishes good teams and good players, so—to me—the reasonable move from both sides would be to accept the drop in revenue this year and use projected future earnings to spread out that drop across multiple years. Thus, any money lost this year in revenue cuts into the revenue gains of the however many x years that follow. Then the salary cap can stay largely stagnant until the revenue gains have replenished the losses and it can grow again. The NFL is not like movie theaters or giant buffet chains, it’s being temporarily threatened not permanently threatened. The giant evil empire known as the shield can expect a return to massive revenue post-COVID and with a new TV deal in place (those negotiations will be interesting...), as long as they don’t royally fuck things up now.
Which brings us to our final question. While the Niners’ negotiations are clearly tied in part to uncertainty about the salary cap moving forward, is there a chance that part of the reason the team has been dragging its feet is because it strongly believes there won’t be a season to begin with? Or that the season will be shortened to the point that it will genuinely effect contractual obligations? If that’s the case, the complexity of contract years, payouts, etc. is going to be massively complicated, and perhaps the Niners are just waiting until as much of that is cleared up as possible before pulling the trigger on any new contracts.
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
COVID, baby.
Welcome: McKivitz, Woerner, Jennings
Physicality is the buzzword on their LinkedIn profiles
![Looking for smaller humans to eat [WVUsports.com]](https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5e40f3a094d5fa3ebbbedb09/1592590875472-7NA5SDAY4HH889G4XDHB/colton_mckivitz1_vs_nc_state_by_ken_inness_.jpg)
Looking for smaller humans to eat [WVUsports.com]
Round 5, Pick 153: OT, Colton McKivitz, West Virginia
A right tackle for most of his career who also moonlighted a bit at guard, McKivitz was moved to left tackle for the 2019 season and flourished, garnering second-team All-American honors and being named Co-Big 12 OL of the year alongside Oklahoma’s Creed Humphrey (a potential first-round draft pick next year).
A self-described “civilized redneck,” McKivitz was a four-year starter for the Mountaineers (47 starts are third-most in school history), which means a lot of experience and a whole lot of sightings of Matt McKivitz, his dad, who became low-key famous for his homemade game day hats.
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Even the rando in the back has questions.
As an offensive lineman for a team that I didn’t watch and who has no All-22 film, I don’t really know anything else about him. But this is the general consensus from a combination of draft experts…
McKivitz has good height for a tackle (6-6, 306 pounds) but his relatively shorter arms made some teams peg him as a guard only. When in-line, he’s got good body control and has decent feet, but despite his basketball background, his lack of ideal hip flexibility and knee bend means he plays too upright at times, which can result in struggles in space and on the second level. But he’s got heavy hands, a strong upper body to lock onto defenders, and a mean streak that shows in how he finishes his blocks — a trait which should endear him quickly to any offensive line coach.
While that breakdown may not seem like a player who’s a perfect athletic fit for our outside zone scheme, McKivitz’s consistency, intelligence, and work ethic are all top notch. Shanahan’s offense is notoriously complicated, and smarts along the offensive line is something the Niners prioritize more so than most. As a near-50 game starter who was capable of playing all five positions along the offensive line at West Virginia and garnered major post-season honors despite playing on an offense that ranked 119th out of 130 FBS teams in yards per game, McKivitz is a blue-chipper between the ears and as good a bet as any to grasp the mental side of things in a hurry. Plus, his positional flexibility means he’s got swing value as a backup across the line.
Lynch seems awful high on him, talking like he was a potential option to start at left tackle if the Trent Williams deal didn’t go through. While I wouldn’t go that far, this staff has proven that they know what they want in offensive linemen and can develop those players. McGlinchey is a rock, Justin Skule played much better than any sixth-round rookie should have last year, Laken Tomlinson was a theoretical bust before settling into his role as a steady performer at left guard, Daniel Brunskill was picked from the AAF, excelled at two positions, and may start in 2020, and even Weston Richburg—when healthy to start last year—has excelled (it’s just the durability and ensuing salary that are questionable). If any Niners position room other than running back gets the benefit of the doubt when acquiring players it’s the offensive line.
While McKivitz and Skule are both heady prospects with physical limitations that project them better as swing tackles than starters, McKivitz has more high-end production to his name and his mean streak in the run game should give him the versatility to bounce inside. While his high-end experience and intelligence give him a shot to contribute beyond his athletic limitations, for now, McKivitz will slate in somewhere in our swing tackle rotation and as a backup guard with the potential for more down the road. Perhaps, as soon as next year, when the uncertain status of Trent Williams’ contract could leave Shon Coleman, Skule, and McKivitz (plus any new additions) vying for the starting left tackle spot of the future.
Round 6, Pick 190: TE, Charlie Woerner, Georgia
A four-star prospect out of high school, recruiting sites were unanimous in his praise but mixed on where to put him. Depending on who you asked he was listed as an athlete, tight end, or receiver, but always a consensus top 100-150 prospect. While that profile typically lends itself to big, tall guys whose lack of blocking ability mean they’re eventually moved out wide to an X receiver and are listed as a “tight end” in name only, Woerner’s career went the exact opposite direction.
Playing in Georgia’s conservative, run-heavy (and bad) offense, Woerner became the Bulldogs’ blocking specialist, lining up inline, as a wing, in the slot, or even out wide, but doing so mostly to pave the way as a run blocker. His 34-376-1 receiving line is for his career, not a single season, and even if it were the latter, it would still be pretty meh, but his blocking ability shows up on tape and should translate to the next level.
While not particularly exciting, there aren’t many college tight ends with NFL size who have the athleticism, technique, and mentality in the run game as Woerner’s shown on tape. That should translate particularly well to our offense, as he’s shown the ability to pull-off a number of difficult blocks from all over the field.
Here he is in the slot, road-grading a safety (Jalen Elliott, UDFA to the Lions) on a stretch play…
Or out of the wing, with a second-level arc block like we ask out of our split stretch looks…
Or a simple effective down block on one of Notre Dame’s highly-touted defensive ends.
Considering the difficult paths and blocking angles that we ask Kittle and Juice to pull off to spring our potent run game, it’s clear to see how Woerner could fit as a sub/backup for the former and perhaps also the latter.
But what does he bring as a receiver? As a former top 150 wideout who ran a solid 4.78 forty at the combine and has nearly the exact same height and weight as Kittle, it’s easy to hope that Georgia’s stale offense (much like Iowa’s) depressed Woerner’s stats and he could be in for a breakthrough. But unfortunately, that seems pretty unlikely. First off, Kittle is much much more athletic than Woerner. Second, when you watch Woerner’s tape you see a guy who has decent straight line speed but is the opposite of dynamic in the open field. He lacks separation, doesn’t change up his route tempo to set up defenders, shows little wiggle in his game, and makes short, choppy steps to slow down and change directions. In fact, he actually looks stiffer as a receiver than he does as a blocker. Maybe Jon Embree can unlock something in him, but it would require a top-down rebuild of how he moves as a receiver.
So while there’s certainly a chance for Shanahan to scheme him open off play action passes, Woerner was brought in more to replace Levine Toilolo and Garrett Celek. He is first, foremost, and likely almost exclusively a blocking tight end. And while his relative lack of size (6-4.5, 244 pounds) makes it seem like he’s better suited for duties on the wing, in the slot, or potentially even in the backfield, he’s a gritty dude with some time to pack on weight; he’ll find a way to make it work inline against power ends too.
With tight end depth an off-season priority, Woerner’s strong value on special teams, and the fact that two of the four tight ends from last year have either departed (Toilolo) or retired (Celek), Woerner will be given every chance to make the roster, and his blocking likely gives him a leg-up on the higher-upside, more-receiver-leaning Daniel Helm in the competition for the third tight end spot. Unless the Niners decide to keep four tight ends on the active roster (which they did last year but while Celek was on the PUP list), the loser of said battle will likely be stashed on the practice squad.
7th Round, Pick 217: WR, Jauan Jennings, Tennessee
For the second straight year we’ve snagged one of PFF’s biggest draft steals in the last two rounds (Tim Harris, 6th round), but in this case the prospect’s fall was (mostly) due to factors outside of his injury history.
At 6-3, 215 pounds, Jennings is immediately one of our bigger wideouts, and he actually plays larger and nastier than his size would indicate. He lined up inside and out for the Volunteers and is, without a doubt, one of the toughest and most physical receivers in the country (so much so that—like Jalen Hurd last year—he was his team’s wildcat quarterback). He translates that physicality to the passing game as well, where his tough running and leg churn make him incredibly difficult to tackle in the open field. While Aiyuk led the nation in yards after the catch, Jauan Jennings led all FBS receivers in broken tackles (30), and it’s not hard to see why.
While his lackluster combine showing certainly hurt his stock (4.72 forty, 29” vertical), he does a better job of getting separation and creating after the catch than those numbers would indicate. He turns up field quick, has a natural sense of space, and—again—is hard to tackle unless you get a full body on him. Thus, he’s got the spacial awareness and vision to fall forward and get hidden yards with or without contact.
When the ball’s in the air, Jennings shows nice adjustment skills. He’s got enough hip fluidity to snag passes outside of his frame and make plays in bad-ball and contested catch situations, and he uses his size well to wall off defenders both on slants and plays down the field—making him particularly intriguing in the red zone.
So why was Jennings available in the seventh round? Well… a loaded wideout class didn’t help. There was clearly going to be some value found in the later rounds if you were flexible enough in what you were looking for. And while he plays faster than his testing numbers, his top speed is just adequate. He’s a long-strider, not particularly sudden, and is far from an easy athlete like Raheem Mostert or Brandon Aiyuk (guys who can accelerate with a burst that seems like they’re barely even trying). Jennings’ separation is never going to be great, and he’ll have to clean up his route running and movement efficiency in order to get open in the NFL. He also missed the entirety of the 2017 season due to a fractured wrist in the opener that led to a redshirt.
But the main reason Jennings slipped was due to questions about “emotional maturity.” In draft circles, that term is thrown around a lot, and it can mean a number of different things. Sometimes it means that a player is lazy, or that they lack a pro-like preparation and training outlook, or simply that they have yet to tap into their potential because they’re young and still haven’t bought into the idea that they can’t get by on physical talent alone. In general, scouts are asking if the player is ready to go from a college kid to a professional and deal with everything that comes with that jump. Sometimes it’s just about no longer being a college kid, and the red flag is forgotten the second the player steps into a pro locker room and becomes more serious about his craft. Other times, the accumulation of problems lead to an immediate flameout (Joe Williams). In Jennings’ case, I’m leaning towards (and hoping for) the former, but here’s what we’re dealing with.
At the end of the 2017 season, Jennings was kicked off the team after he went on an expletive-filled social media rant about the Tennessee coaches. During the IG video, he accused the staff of being “lying-ass, fake-ass, snake-ass” coaches after they’d apparently led him to believe he’d be able to play in the season finale but held him out anyway. While the coaching staff was fired soon after and Jennings was reinstated by Jeremy Pruitt when he took over the job, that’s still a red flag. It’s also not aided by the fact that—at the end of the 2019 season—Jennings was suspended for the first half of the bowl game for engaging in the long-standing Volunteer tradition of stepping on the head of another player (which he claimed to be an accident). Thus many scouts consider him—in the parlance of a lieutenant in an eighties cop movie—a “loose cannon.”
Now, is there some context to these issues? Sure. In the video, he’d been out since week one with a wrist injury, and it’s not out of the question that the coaches—given this was a staff led by known piece of shit Butch Jones—were stringing him along in his rehab with the pitch of him playing in the final week of the season despite never intending to actually let him on the field. After all, this is the same staff that Jalen Hurd—after 26 touchdowns over three years—approached to switch from RB to WR, and—after their steadfast denial—he chose to transfer to Baylor and sit out a year. If Jennings was never going to play regardless of how hard he worked in rehab and how much he pushed himself, then yeah, frustrations are understandable. Also, when Jones and interim Brady Hoke were let go at the end of the year, new coach Jeremy Pruitt came in and asked every single player on the team if they really needed Jauan on the team moving into 2018. The answer was unanimously yes, and so he was reinstated. As for the head stomp?
Who knows. You could see how it could be unintentional as he’s turning with someone grabbing on him. Or you could see how it was intentional as he was pissed off at the dude he just tackled who he was clearly jawing with on the ground. We’re in Draymond territory here (although I will contest Draymond should not have been suspended in the playoffs and that the Warriors got fucked in multiple ways that series).
Either way, Jennings brings some risk, and while his draft slot and the specifics of his red flags make him a less risky proposition than, say… a quarterback with a known gambling problem that everyone hates (Johnny Manziel) or someone with a history of legal problems, it’s at least worth tempering expectations given the question marks.
In terms of fit, I would expect Jennings to be groomed mostly in the same role as Jalen Hurd—a big slot who hybrids like a wideout/tight end. While smaller than Hurd and not the same blocker, Jennings is a much more polished receiver, and it’s easy to see how his style will make for a quick transition to the position. His profile screams physical overachiever. The Niners want guys who can bang inside the box and consistently swallow up defensive backs in the run game, as well as a receiver-leaning sub for when Kittle takes a break or is working in-line or out of the wing, and Jennings could provide just that. I’d also expect him and Hurd to get some reps at X receiver, particularly in the red zone. The Niners like Bourne there a lot, but it’s not hard to see how the size of Hurd and Jennings could have a few different roles inside the twenties.
Injuries to both Deebo Samuel and Richie James throw a wrench in what was already set to be an excellent wide receiver competition once the Niners report in July. One or both of the injured players could be back by the beginning of the season—and James was likely on the outside of the roster looking in—but the injuries make it more likely that the Niners enter this season with seven wideouts. Samuel, Bourne, and Aiyuk are locks. Hurd is likely as well. If Trent Taylor is actually healthy, he should be good, but if injuries flare up then his traditional slot receiver spot could go to Travis Benjamin or UDFA Chris Finke. Forgotten man Dante Pettis could still see a third-year resurgence, which we should be hoping for even more now with Samuel hurt. If all of that goes according to chalk, then we’d still have Jennings, Benjamin, Poindexter, Thompson, and James competing for a seventh roster spot. In that case, Jennings likely has the edge since he presents a more unique positional fit, but we’re a long ways away from roster cut downs, and a fully healthy Jalen Hurd could relegate him to the practice squad to start the year.
Welcome: WR, Brandon Aiyuk, Arizona State
Toasting defenders like these GIFs toast your internet connection
![With the ball, in space, his natural habitat [Sundevils.com]](https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5e40f3a094d5fa3ebbbedb09/1588981081297-DHDLW8DN4IFPJCX57CLT/aiyuk+photo.jpeg)
With the ball, in space, his natural habitat [Sundevils.com]
It’s not crazy that the Niners had Brandon Aiyuk as their No.1 wideout in the draft. This class had a lot of receiver depth but just as much debate about its pecking order. Henry Ruggs (#12 to Raiders) has the athletic ceiling but also many of the question marks that come with any speedster projected for a No.1 role beyond his college production. Jerry Jeudy (#15 to Broncos) has all the production you can ask for, but his shaky hands and skinny frame make you wonder how some of his play style and production will translate to the pros. And CeeDee Lamb — the receiver the Niners admitted was neck-and-neck with Aiyuk at the top of their rankings — has production, jump-ball ability, and elite YAC skills, but lacks the quickness and speed that gives Aiyuk just slightly more athletic upside.
In the end, I had Aiyuk rated as the fourth-best wideout, but also the one who I wanted the most. That’s because (A) he is such a perfect schematic fit and a player whose arrow is clearly pointing upward, (B) he was clearly going to be around longer than any of the consensus top three wideouts, and (C) my dream was a first round of Derrick Brown/Tristan Wirfs and Aiyuk. Granted, that dream was before I knew Joe Staley was retiring and that we were deep in talks for Trent Williams. And it was a dream built off of a potentially ludicrous hope that Brunskill can shape himself into a plus starter at center by 2021 and that Wirfs at 13 and Aiyuk at 31 was a possibility, which… I’ll get to later, but in retrospect seems unlikely.
Anyways…
GTFO Man
Good Evaluation: Per usual, this is TBD until we see him on the field. Scouting report will be at the bottom.
Top Tier: A+. The Niners said both Kinlaw and Aiyuk were in their top six “foundational players” in this draft. With that said, and Aiyuk ranked as their top receiver, getting him at 25 is clearly a home run based off of their board.
Fills Need: A. From my POV, this was the only position where we absolutely NEEDED to find a new starter during the draft (this excluding left tackle of course because it wasn’t public knowledge that Staley would be retiring until Trent Williams was acquired).
Optimizes Slot Value: B. Aiyuk at 25 is far from a stretch so determining this grade means answering two questions: (1) Does it make sense to trade up in a draft that is so deep with wide receiver talent, particularly in the 20-50 pick range, instead of tapping that depth with a later pick? (aka is Aiyuk THAT much better than the dudes who were drafted after him?); and (2) would Aiyuk have been around at 31 if the Niners had stayed pat?
For the first question, it’s important to note that while there were plenty of available wideouts with similar-ish grades to Aiyuk, he was not only the consensus #5 wideout based on the (potentially pointless) opinions of most draft pundits but also the last prospect who could do what the Niners wanted from this pick: fill Emmanuel Sanders’ role as a Z-receiver with the versatility to line up inside or out.
Anyone who says “the Niners could have waited and gotten Tee Higgins or Michael Pittman” really does not have a strong understanding of the Niners’ offense or the role that they were looking to fill. Those guys are pure X receivers. Denzel Mims and Chase Claypool, both also drafted in the second round, are pure X receivers. KJ Hamler is a pure slot. Laviska Shenault can move all over a formation, but he will require a lot of development to become even a second option in the passing game. Van Jefferson should be plug-and-play in the pros, but he may have already hit his ceiling. Aiyuk was absolutely the last dude left on the board who you could be confident to ask to come in and play major minutes all over the formation AND have the upside of a No.1 receiver.
The second question is a bit trickier. In hindsight, if Aiyuk was going to be there at 31 then moving up to get him was clearly a bad move. So would he have been there?
It’s been floated that the Niners traded up to 25 to cut off the Packers, who were high on Aiyuk and would have picked him if he was available. While it's impossible to know if the Pack would have selected Aiyuk or Love at 26 if both were on the board, believing there was interest from the Packers — who hadn’t drafted an offensive skill player in the first round of the draft since Aaron Rodgers, who had been in deep pre-draft talks with Aiyuk, and who clearly lack a No.2 wideout — was totally reasonable.
It’s also been said that the Dolphins, who had just acquired a rookie quarterback, are totally devoid of skill players outside of DeVante Parker, and immediately traded out of the 26th pick after the Niners selected Aiyuk, would have taken Aiyuk a pick later if the Niners hadn't traded up. Or even the Ravens, who wound up drafting wideouts in the third and sixth round (although as both project more as slot receivers this one seems the least likely of the three).
ESPN's Seth Walder has been highly critical of the trade and has referenced a 59% chance that Aiyuk would have been there based on the fuzzy, potentially made-up math behind "ESPN's Draft Predictor Machine." ("only a 3% chance of catching that ball but he did? Oh fuck, I love it when ESPN throws meaningless stats at me!"). But Walder's basing this claim on some combination of the idea that Aiyuk is considerably worse than the top three wideouts and that the wideouts picked in the second round are talent and scheme equivalents, a flawed theory that I've already discussed. According to any NFL Draft Valuation Chart, the trade (based on points) was, if anything, slightly to moderately favorable for the Niners, and — while you all know my love for obtaining more picks — that chart (theoretically) accounts for the loss in hit chances due to decreased pick quantity.
Based on my own made-up numbers, I would say there was a 27.68% chance of Aiyuk being there at 31. So while it's totally fair to critique the trade and the packaging of picks to "go get your guy" mentality that has hurt the Niners in the past (Dante Pettis, Joe Williams, etc.), if the team wanted Kinlaw AND Aiyuk, they most likely had to trade up to get it done. And even if they didn’t, it made perfect sense that they thought they did.
Thus, the B grade.
Manages Future Capital: C. If Aiyuk kills it then, again, this is the least important part of the puzzle, and we’ll happily sacrifice the capital loss for on-field performance. But godDAMN it would have been nice to have (at least) that fourth-rounder back.
That pick (and the late fifth-rounder) would have given us a shot at an abundance of cornerbacks — from developmental boundary guys to promising nickels who could play right away — any and all types of interior line support, and a wide selection of tight ends with legit receiving chops who could have excelled in a backup role for Kittle.
Harrison Bryant, last year’s Mackey Award winner, would go two slots before our would-have-been pick in the fourth. Colby Parkinson, seam-stretching tight end out of Stanford, went later in the round (and to the Seahawks). Josiah Scott, a highly accomplished corner whose lack of size projects him as a potentially starting-caliber nickel corner, went just a few picks later. And Bryce Hall, who led the FBS in pass deflections as a junior and was a fringe first-rounder before a serious ankle injury, could be a future stud outside (and we could have gotten him with our fifth-round pick as he went a few slots after McKivitz)
As has been repeated ad nauseam, you hit more targets with more bullets. And while having two first-round picks is great, it’s important to note their hit ratio. League-wide, first-rounders only get their fifth-year option picked up 61% of the time, and up until Arik Armstead signed this off-season, do you know who the last 49ers first-round pick was who was inked to a multi-year extension off their rookie deal?
Patrick Willis in 2011 (drafted in 2007).
More bullets. More targets.
BIO
At 5-11.5 and 205 pounds with an 81-inch wingspan (80-inches at the combine so… there is human error here somewhere, but regardless his arms are long!), Aiyuk has a build that gives him some of the strengths of both a smaller and a bigger receiver without the weaknesses (like Blade. You guys remember Blade?).
With his smaller stature, it’s easier for him to be quicker out of breaks, change direction, and move in the open field, which will all be critically important both in our offense and the inside-outside role that he will be groomed to play. While his long arms — one of the longest in this year’s class and just one inch shorter than the 6’5 Calvin Johnson’s — allow him to high point jump balls, give him a catch radius of a much larger receiver, and can be a very useful weapon against press coverage.
COLLEGE CAREER
A high school running back, Aiyuk started his college career at Sierra Canyon CC, where he played wide receiver and cornerback as a freshman before transitioning fully to offense and scoring 18 touchdowns (14 receiving, 1 rushing, 2 KR, 1 PR) before moving to the D-1 ranks.
Aiyuk had a wave of suitors near signing day (many, like Alabama, had missed out on high school prospects), but he stuck to his early commitment to ASU. In his first year playing behind 2019 first-round pick N'Keal Harry, Aiyuk was slow to come on but finished the season strong, putting up nearly 2/3 of his production in the last four games of the year, when he averaged 5.5 catches and 74 yards/contest.
As the No.1 receiver last year, Aiyuk fully broke out with 65 - 1,192 - 8TDs on a whopping 18.3 yards per catch, totals that were good for 37% of the Sun Devils' passing yardage and 38% of its passing touchdowns; this despite Aiyuk sitting out their bowl game to prep for the draft. He also returned kicks, averaging 31.9 yards/kick and 16.1 yards/punt (including one score).
SCOUTING REPORT
Let's start with what makes Aiyuk such an incredibly great fit for our offense: Yards After Catch. Depending on what statistical breakdown you follow, he either led the entire FBS in YAC average (11.1 YAC/catch) or was really damn close to it.
And while he ran an unimpressive 4.50 at the combine, it's worth noting that was shortly before undergoing core muscle surgery, and he looks considerably faster on tape. It's also worth noting that he still had a 40" vertical on that day and that explosiveness shows in his breakaway burst in the open field.
Top speed is great but it's the ability to accelerate to it in a hurry and the knowledge of when to use it that helps create separation in the NFL and bust angles after the catch. Like in this clip against WSU:
Aiyuk's top speed looks plenty good there, but it's that angle-breaking burst the second he gets the ball that -- when combined with the loose hips that let him bend away from contact as he turns upfield in a hurry -- beats the corner to the spot and busts the safety's pursuit angle en route to an 86-yard touchdown.
Or, against Colorado, it's that burst and hip turn that turns a dig into a deep score.
But Aiyuk doesn't need a clear runway to the endzone to excel after the catch, as his understanding of pursuit angles and open space allows him to generate extra yardage all over the field.
Often what makes a guy a possession receiver versus a threat with the ball in his hands isn't just speed and burst, it's the spatial awareness to immediately know where the open field is and the skill to best exploit a defensive player's positioning to get there.
Aiyuk has that in spades, and it shows up both in the big plays...
And the smaller ones.
Most receivers could get 2-3 yards after that catch with a quick upfield turn into contact. But Aiyuk finds the space, exploits defensive positioning, and tacks on an additional 10 yards instead. With the Niners' emphasis on creating chunk gains, both Aiyuk's knack for the big-play and his ability to find hidden yardage underneath will be relied upon early and often.
In terms of getting him the ball in the first place, Aiyuk has strong, natural hands and can pluck the ball out of the air with ease, but he tends to let too many passes into his body. That’s part of what’s led to some concentration drops. According to PFF he had six drops and only two contested catches last year, and while part of that was the system the Sun Devils ran, it’s still a worrisome stat. The idea of him using that wingspan and 40” vertical to play much bigger than his size and win 50/50 balls is currently more theoretical than practical, and while he may never have to be a dominant jump ball threat (although… plz become that), he will have to consistently catch the ball with contact on slants and digs. Again, it’s not something he’s proven he CAN’T do, but it’s also not something he’s proven he CAN do.
His route running is in a similar vein, but with more positive data. Aiyuk has the quickness, smooth hips, and change of direction skills to develop into an excellent route runner, but at ASU, he got a lot of his yardage on slants, screens, and vertical routes. However, as the season progressed and he was asked to run a more complex route tree, he showed out well, and even in his “Four-S” routes (streak, slant, screen, shallow), he’s shown the ability to adapt to defenders with subtle moves that aren’t necessarily in the play call.
Down four in the fourth quarter against MSU, Aiyuk plays off the corner’s inside leverage, showing a nice inside stem and jab step before bursting outside down the sideline on a vertical route (and would-be go ahead touchdown if the ball wasn’t so under thrown).
And in the fourth quarter against Oregon, Aiyuk was tasked with another simple vertical route. But after reading the corner and seeing he was itching for a big play…
...Aiyuk threw in a single stutter step, hit the turbo button down the sideline, plucked the ball cleanly out of the air, and outran one of the best secondaries in the nation (in PFF’s ranking of college football’s top 30 returning DBs, four are from Oregon) and scored the game-sealing TD that kept Oregon out of the CFP last year.
Those are big plays in big moments that show the on-the-fly adaptability that you need to excel in the NFL. And, even if he hasn’t shown that 50/50 ability on tape, they also show his potential as a true vertical threat.
But the savvy and potential as a route runner are seen in more than just his 9-routes. While he lined up mostly outside in college, he’s shown intelligence and nuance out of the slot as well. Here he destroys a linebacker’s clear inside leverage with a great stem, outside lean, and head fake before breaking wide open inside for a solid gain.
The routes need work and repetitions, but there's just enough freelancing and savvy to his game to make you think he can master the little nuances that are hard to teach while polishing the more coachable aspects of route running. Which is largely the same way I’d describe his releases.
Lynch has gone on record saying that what ultimately led to Aiyuk being ranked over CeeDee Lamb was the fact that he was quicker, both in getting separation and releasing off the LOS.
So let's look at those releases.
Here he is on the goal line, getting that early separation that Emmanuel Sanders was so good at. Aiyuk is patient to not get open too soon, shows foot quickness, shoulder lean, and just enough of an outside jab step to get the DB on his back heel and his shoulders turned so that Aiyuk can slip underneath untouched for the score.
Here, in a move that (sigh) greatly resembles the releases that Davante Adams and Sammy Watkins used to beat Sherman in the playoffs, Aiyuk uses an explosive outside step to feign a 9-route with a "go" release, turning the corner's hips before using his foot quickness and hands to gain immediate inside leverage. Then he (mostly off-screen) uses a "shove by" to get wide open on an out route. This is a good example of both his diversity of releases and how his route running and polish drastically improved by the end of the season.
But it's not always that pretty. Like most college wideouts, he has had his issues against the press, letting corners get up into his shoulder pads both on the LOS and down the route despite his solid weight and significant arm length advantage.
In this first clip, he’s simply way too late with his hands, as they never come up and he gets hit in the mouth because of it.
While in this second clip, not only does he once again allow the DB’s punch to get his shoulders back and his pads raised, but he fails to disengage down the field, totally disrupting the path and timing of his route.
Like a prizefighter prone to getting knocked out, he simply keeps his hands down too often for too long on the press. With the amount of bump-and-run he’s likely to see, he’ll need to get better at this VERY quickly in order to see major minutes in 2020.
Much like with jump balls, he has all the talent, athleticism, and wingspan to become a master at beating the press, but, like with jump balls, he still needs to put it together and show it on tape. Which is really the story of Aiyuk at this moment. He does a couple things very very well and has the potential to do practically everything at that level, but he’ll need coaching and polish to get there.
It’ll be up to him and our coaches to make sure that the explosive upward trajectory in which he ended last season bleeds smoothly into the beginning of his rookie year. If that’s the case, a Deebo-ish developmental path is not out of the question.
Fit With Niners
While Aiyuk was brought in to replace the departed Emmo Sanders, his role as a rookie might look a bit different. And due to that, the Niners' receiving rotation could look a lot different than in 2019.
With 540 of Aiyuk's 655 snaps coming outside versus in the slot, I think that's where he starts out, playing both Z and X while getting some manufactured touches both inside and out with Four-S routes and reverses. The Niners' goal will be to get him in space, and -- based on Shanahan's track record -- I'm gonna go out on a limb and say they'll succeed in that goal. But with Bourne established at the X, Pettis a question mark, and Deebo a moveable chess piece that can play everywhere from Z to whatever the NFL-equivalent of an old Wing-T wingback is, we'll still need more pure slots. Theoretically, we should have plenty to choose from.
If healthy, Trent Taylor is our standard slot receiver and -- if he performs as he did as a rookie and in training camp -- he could be quite the valuable addition to our offense. A lot of "ifs" there, which is likely why Travis Benjamin was brought in as injury insurance. Meanwhile, the recovering Jalen Hurd and seventh-round sleeper Jauan Jennings both profile as big slots, providing tremendous size and power in the alleyway. And of course, there's Kittle, the ultimate mismatch, who also extends into the slot from time to time.
After our drop-laden loss to Seattle last year, our receiver rotation tightened up to three bodies: Sanders, Deebo, and Bourne. Based both on Sanders' departure and the fact that IR and the draft have given us four (practically) new additions to the receiving corps, I would expect a lot more rotation in 2020. While potentially troublesome for fantasy teams, that could be very interesting for us.
Because while I would argue that Shanahan has been the best play-caller in the NFL since at least his last season in Atlanta, he's still never had the personnel, injury luck, or team-building input to structure an offense in exactly the way he would like. Until (hopefully) now. Adding Aiyuk was ultimately done to replace Sanders, but with Aiyuk's YAC ability, he can do some of the things Deebo can as well. How will teams guard against a stable of wideouts who can win match-ups outside or motion into a wingback and take an inside handoff on a fuggin tackle trap at any moment? Or jumbo slots who can stretch linebackers into space in the passing game on one play then block down on them to clear an off-tackle run on the next? All the while worrying about the only NFL fullback who people still know by name and the world's best tight end?
The mismatch potential and versatility of Shanahan's big slot/wingback experiment is tantalizing. And while the hope is that Aiyuk can slide smoothly into Emmo's snap count in 2020, if all else goes according to plan, perhaps he doesn't have to quite yet.
But it would be a lot cooler if he did.
P.S. He also returns kicks.