Draftables: WR, CeeDee Lamb, Oklahoma

Wide Receiver, CeeDee Lamb

School: Oklahoma
Height: 6’1
Weight: 198 lbs.
Wingspan: 76 5/8

Testing Results

Compared to the average figures of the top 30 wideouts shown in RED

Scouting Report

Massively productive wideout who was a major cog in three straight years of record-breaking Oklahoma offenses, putting up monster stats despite having a different starting quarterback each year (two won the Heisman and went first overall in the draft so… don’t feel too bad for him). In three years playing both outside and in the slot, he had upwards of 3,000 yards and racked up 32 scores with a 19 yd/catch clip.

Big plays? Yes please.

A silky-smooth athlete with elite body control who plays stronger than he looks and faster than he tests, Lamb is a true three-level weapon and a home run threat from anywhere on the field. In the short game, he can pluck the ball off of a slant or quick out and has the burst, slippery elusiveness, and vision to turn any short pass into a big gain. In the intermediate game he uses his hands well to get subtle separation and has the incredible hips to stop on a dime and turn upfield after a comeback or open up for a nasty back shoulder fade. And as a deep threat — while lacking great top-end speed — he walls off defenders, tracks the ball with ease, and routinely wins at the catch point.

Also, his hands are pretty good.

He’s a savvy and natural route runner who gets separation by varying his route tempo and breaking into long gliding strides that bely his play speed, but his cuts aren’t as crisp as you’d like to see. Playing in Lincoln Riley’s scheme and competing against Big 12 defenses, he was able to get away with a little more freelancing and was rarely threatened with physical coverage. That’ll change in the NFL. And while Lamb has the loose hips, body lean, and quick feet to beat the press, he had some issues against it in college. He particularly struggled against DBs who employed an off-the-line catch press style (or taxi technique), and will need to get more efficient at releasing and uncovering underneath against bump-and-run coverage. 

On a similar note, his gliding style is a bit too casual at times. Some of that— as mentioned above — is simply a need to speed up his routes and releases. But some of it’s loafs when he knows he’s not getting the ball. And while a tempo air raid college offense will run him faster and more often than most NFL schemes, taking those plays off won’t fly on good NFL teams.

For Lamb, maximizing his potential is about mitigating his lack of bulk. That means speeding up his foot speed and efficiency on releases, learning the nuances of setting up breaks by uncovering in the early stages of the route, making cuts with more purpose and less wasted motion, and adjusting to the more physical catch point of the NFL. If he can do that, his ceiling is as high as anyone’s in this draft class.

Fit with Niners

Lamb would slide into Emmanuel Sanders’ role, playing all over the field but likely starting initially in the slot to avoid press coverage as he works on adjusting to outside coverage in the pros. Having Kittle, Deebo, and Lamb would further cement our status as the YAC yardage GAWDS, and Lamb would get heavy slant and utility use as the team grooms him into an eventual No.1 wideout position.

While Shanahan is as big a stickler as any for sharp, on-time routes, and Lamb needs to clean up some things in his approach, he has all the physical tools to become an excellent route runner (and already possesses many of the natural traits that are tough to teach). And make no mistake, if he doesn’t clean up those routes or is caught taking a play off here and there, Shanahan will become a permanent (and vocal) resident inside his ass.

NFL Comparisons

Floor: Robby Anderson, Temple (now with Jets)

Skinny, slippery, and a big-play threat down the field, Anderson may never become a true No.1, but his field stretching ability makes him a coveted outside receiver and will probably get him paid this off-season. While lacking the pure speed of Anderson, if the NFL game proves just a bit too big and physical for Lamb, he should still be able to carve out a role as a complementary big-play wideout.

Ceiling: Skinny DeAndre Hopkins, Clemson (now with…“le sigh” Cardinals)

Lamb hasn’t shown the foot speed nor the physicality that Hopkins showcased at Clemson, but they’re both three-level playmakers who play longer than their height at the catch point and are dangerous with the ball in their hands. And while Hopkins is known for his strength and weighed in 16 pounds heavier than Lamb coming out of college, Lamb has the high ceiling to become a similar kind of playmaker — albeit in a more slippery and acrobatic way.

Mock Drafts

First-Round Preview

Can’t wait to see how awkward this will be over Zoom [courtesy of AP]

While discussing our potential options both at pick 13 and pick 31, I’ll be talking a lot about matching good players with positional needs. But in doing so it’s best to remember the “GTFO Man” draft evaluation system that I just made up in the last post. I’ve tried my best to match up value with the consensus opinions of draft prognosticators, but if shit goes haywire in the top ten and the Niners come upon someone who they are confident is an absolute steal, they should pull the trigger. Because getting good players is the #1 priority.

Class Strengths 

For the second straight year, the value of the current draft class seems to match up well with our team needs. In 2019, a loaded crop of edge rushers and a Cardinals team needing a franchise quarterback landed us Nick Bosa, the top player in the class, at #2. While a wideout class with a lot of second-round depth secured us Deebo Samuel at 36th overall. Those were value picks as well as need picks. And they were unquestionably home runs. The draft usually doesn’t line up that well, but — if we play the first round well enough — maybe it can again this year.

The 2020 draft class is known for its wideouts, a position that we’re clearly in the market for. And while no one doubts the class’ depth, there is some debate on the high-end talent of this class. Many draft experts are putting one or two (or sometimes even three) wideouts in the top ten of their big boards, while others see the class’ value as not really hitting until the early-to-mid teens.

Yes, this class lacks a Calvin Johnson or Julio Jones surefire generational talent, a player with insane size and speed to match their complete college tape. But this class has so many guys with high ceilings that it would be a shocker if a handful don’t become studs. In terms of depth, there are probably 10-12 receivers with first or second-round grades who could be immediate plus-level performers and another half dozen in the third round who could wind up major steals. This type of depth could hurt the Niners, as it may create runs on the position (like we saw with edge rushers in 2018) and make the flow of picks less predictable. But it’s more likely to help us, as teams drafting high could be more willing to wait until later in the first round or into the second to address the wideout position. That shows in the draft predictions because — as of now — very few mock drafts have a single wideout being taken in the top ten.

That’s also due in part to the other strengths of this class, which happen to lean into two of the most positionally scarce positions in the NFL. While there are tons of question marks regarding this quarterback class, there are (arguably) up to six signal-callers possessing the blend of mental makeup and physical traits to develop into NFL starters (plus your standard later round higher-risk, higher reward type players). It’s also a top-heavy offensive tackle class, with up to four projecting as potential top ten anchors who can play right away. Now will all of these players become long-term starters? Highly unlikely. But since it’s the draft, it’s that potential to become a starter that will push these players at highly coveted positions further up the board.

So, due to the need and positional scarcity of both those positions, it’s largely expected that three quarterbacks and four tackles could go in the top ten picks. Throw in surefire top ten selections at edge rusher (Chase Young), cornerback (Jeff Okudah), and hybrid linebacker (Isaiah Simmons), and that would already fill out the top ten of the draft without any wideouts taken. And that’s not even including defensive tackle Derrick Brown, a player who tested poorly but was a top-five talent on film.

If Brown comes off the board at some point in those top 11 then we’d be looking at the Raiders (who everyone believes will select a wide receiver), and then us. But that’s a lot of guesswork for a process that each year proves to be unpredictable. So here are a few ways the first round could shake out.

At Pick #13

1 - Take a top three wideout: It’s unlikely that we get to this pick and there hasn’t been a single wideout taken off the board, so we may be looking at whichever one or two is left from the group of Jerry Jeudy, Ceedee Lamb, and Henry Ruggs (a trio which I’ll discuss more at length in a later post). 

Now, in a class known for its depth does it make sense to pick a wideout here? Or would it make more sense to trade down, accumulate picks, and still get a receiver with tons of potential? My guess is that if the Niners have a dude they think could become a legit No.1 receiver, they pick him at 13. While productive wideouts may seem like a dime a dozen, a true No.1 is very hard to find. If they look at the board and see more complementary pieces rather than future stars then they should look elsewhere, play to the depth of the class, and attack the position later in the first (or — if they secure a trade to acquire second day picks — the second).

Whenever the Niners go for a wideout, I expect them to add one with big-play ability because, well, this tweet: 

RIP Flameis Winston. You will be missed. pic.twitter.com/BJoIbltt6c

— Hayden Winks (@HaydenWinks) March 20, 2020

Names to watch: Jerry Jeudy, Alabama; CeeDee Lamb, Oklahoma; Henry Ruggs III, Alabama

2 - Take a top four tackle: If faced with a potential tackle of the future, one of those top four candidates who we could see bookending with McGlinchey for the next decade, it could be hard to pass up. But there are a handful of variables here, with most of them centering around what Joe Staley’s plans are.

I’ve been working off of the assumption that Staley plays in 2020 (an assumption that I still stand by), but if reports that he could retire before the season are proven correct, then drafting a tackle with this pick immediately becomes more important than a wideout. 

But if Staley returns for one or two more years, it could be smart to invest in his replacement while we’re looking at a strong tackle draft and what will (hopefully) be the highest first-round pick that we'll have for quite some time. 

Again, that depends on how the draft unfolds. If those top four tackles are off the board by the time we pick, it’s doubtful that we have a grade high enough on whoever the fifth tackle is to have him warrant the 13th overall selection. 

It’s also worth noting that — despite the need for strong tackle play and the difficulty in finding it in the NFL — picking a tackle here may only be worth it if he can play major minutes by (at the very latest) year two, regardless of what Staley decides to do. That means he’d have to be able a viable starter on the inside this year or -- if Staley returns, we move on from Richburg, and Brunskill can indeed play center -- in 2021.

Ultimately, we didn’t trade an All-Pro defender for the 13th overall pick to pick a guy we didn't expect to play. But more importantly, you need to maximize the rookie discount and fifth-year option of first-round contracts. Picking guys in the first round with the idea of them waiting around and developing for multiple years is only for the absolutely most stacked and young teams, and — quite often — it can still bite you in the ass (see: Trent Baalke). Championship windows are shorter than you think. Anyone we pick at 13 needs to play well and play early. 

Names to watch: OT, Jedrick Wills Jr., Alabama; Tristan Wirfs, Iowa; Mekhi Becton, Louisville; Andrew Thomas, Georgia

3 - Take an elite defensive tackle: I truly do not understand why so many draft prognosticators think the Niners should go defensive tackle with this pick. Yes, we have a hole there now that Buckner is gone, but with all the young talent we’ve accumulated on the interior it’s not unreasonable to think we can offset some of that loss with our current roster. Also, as I’ve said many times before, you can’t structure your team in a way where you plan to pay everyone at a single position group, especially a group that includes four starters plus many rotational pieces. The exception to my hesitance here would be if Derrick Brown somehow falls to this pick. That would seem like just too much of a value win to ignore and could secure our pass rush dominance for at least another three years before contract extensions are up.

Names to watch: DT, Derrick Brown, Auburn; DT, Javon Kinlaw, South Carolina

4 - Trade down: While incredibly unsexy, trading down must ALWAYS be on the table if you can’t match value and need to draft slot. Clearly, the #31 pick is the easiest to see traded. People love to draft up and get quarterbacks here, teams want to secure the fifth-year option that comes with the first round, GMs get nervous about the top of the second round because then everyone will have a night to maneuver trades to get there, etc. But whether it's the 13th or the 31st pick that gets moved, we must always be thinking about accumulating capital and maneuvering to get our guys in the spots where they present the most value.

So, if we have a lot of guys that we like in that late first / mid-second round range and feel like we would be reaching on someone at #13, we could get quite the coup in return for it. Say the Dolphins wanted to swap for their #18 and #70 picks, or their #26, #56, and a future third? If it falls correctly with our big board, it could make a lot of sense.

5 - Draft a cornerback: Yeah, I’ll be honest, I don’t love this move, but enough people are talking about it that it’s at least worth looking into. To me, unless there’s a cornerback on the board who the Niners love and have ranked in an entirely different tier than everyone left in the draft, there are better options.

If you’re the Niners, this is the highest you expect to pick in a long time, and Emmanuel Moseley, while not a stud, had a very strong season (with a 70.4 PFF rating that was good for 27th in the league amongst CBs) and is locked up for another two years on an ERFA minimum contract. While he doesn’t have insane physical tools, last year was his first NFL action. The arrow on him is likely pointing up. We also run a scheme that, theoretically, minimizes the importance of lockdown cornerbacks in lieu of investment on the defensive line. That is to say, while teams in the “secondary down” style of defense building (Baltimore Ravens, New England Patriots, etc.) will be putting a premium on drafting elite cornerbacks and signing them via free agency, we should be able to develop a starting cornerback who can play within this scheme or add one for a reasonable price point in free agency next year.

Whoever you draft isn’t beating out Richard Sherman this year. Nor is he beating out K’Waun Williams in the nickel. So the best-case scenario is that this rookie corner beat out Moseley, stunt his growth for a year, and boot Witherspoon to the curb after this season. And if he can’t beat out Moseley? He fights for snaps against Witherspoon, DJ Reed, and Tim Harris, and — even if he beats those three out for all the dime package reps — sees maybe a dozen snaps per game.

Simply put, with what could be on the table by the time we draft, an elite wide receiver or future fixture at tackle have greater overall value and considerably more specific value given our team's schematic needs. Thus, the only reason we get a cornerback at 13 is if there's a prospect who is deemed head-and-shoulders above what’s left on the board at the time. 

Names to watch: CJ Henderson, Florida

At #31 (or into the second round, if we trade down)

1 - Trade down: We need picks, and — at the very least — we should be able to trade this pick for a second-rounder and a fourth-rounder and — in many cases — we could do so while dropping less than ten spots in the draft. While a player who has slipped unexpectedly can always throw a wrench in any late first-round projection, I would be shocked if we keep both our first-round picks. Ideally, we trade one away to accumulate the day two capital to address more team needs.

2 - Draft a flexible interior offensive lineman: It would be foolish (and unfair to him) to think that replacing Mike Person immediately shores up any issues we have along the offensive line. While it’s reasonable to expect growth in Brunskill’s second year, he’s not a surefire lock as a plus contributor at guard. And even if he is, Richburg’s lengthy injury history and hefty contract mean we could need a backup center in 2020 and a starting center in 2021.

There are players available around this spot in the draft who are zone-ready centers who can play guard in a pinch and who would be worthy of a selection around the second-round turn or later.

Names to watch: Cesar Ruiz, Michigan; Lloyd Cushenberry III, LSU; C, Matt Hennessy, Temple

3 - Draft a project OT: The top half of the first round isn't the only time when you can find future starting tackles, particularly if you have a year to develop them under seasoned veterans. 

Our outside zone scheme means we’re eliminating (or at least greatly docking the value of) a big chunk of every tackle class, but there are plenty of second round-ish prospects with the movement skills and potential to develop into long-term starters. 

Maybe this player can play right now on the inside, or maybe they're strictly a tackle who needs time to develop. At the 31st pick and lower, your players don't need to play in year one. Although, as stated above, you'd want them playing by year two at least.

Names to Watch: Josh Jones, Houston; Austin Jackson, USC; Ezra Cleveland, Boise State

4 - Tap the giant glut of wideout talent: If we didn’t pick one at 13, we need to pick one at 31 or on the second day (ideally early in the second round). This is where the bulk of this class’ talent is located, so it’s not unreasonable to think there could be a handful of different guys who Shanahan would like at the position. 

At this point, we wouldn't be looking at a guy who we're confident becomes a No.1 receiver. We'd likely be looking at someone who we could pair with Deebo and feel good about their contrasting and overlapping talents. That could be a slot (Jefferson), a speedier space guy (Aiyuk, Reagor), a swiss-army knife (Shenault), or a size-speed monster who we're banking on tapping his considerable potential (Mims, Chase Claypool).

Whether it’s at pick 13 or here, whatever player we pick should be expected to get heavy snaps early.

Names to watch: Brandon Aiyuk, ASU; Jalen Reagor, TCU; Denzel Mims, Baylor; Justin Jefferson, LSU; Laviska Shenault, Colorado

5 - Draft a cornerback: At this point, I start to understand the value proposition a bit more, and as we're now leaving the first round, we also start to gain the flexibility to go with an outside or nickel corner. 

The nickel is a starter in our defense, and seeing as Sherman, Williams, Witherspoon, and Tartt are all finishing up their contracts this year, getting a guy who could both inside and out (whichever opens up first) would give us ideal flexibility moving forward.

Names to watch: Jeff Gladney, TCU; Trevon Diggs, Alabama; Jaylon Johnson, Utah; AJ Terrell, Clemson

Next up… I’ll compare the top three wideouts in the class

GTFO Man: A new way to evaluate draft picks

At least we never picked these guys [Courtesy of Getty Images]

A “draft grade” is a fun knee-jerk reaction, a take so simplified and easily digestible that it can be packaged within a single letter grade. But in terms of substance and depth, these grades are about as useful as your annual US News College Rankings. While typically capable of pointing out the best-of-the-best (Stanford, Harvard, 2011 Niners draft class, etc.) and the bottom feeders (Bob’s Online Typing School for Profit and Real Employment, 2012 Niners draft class, etc.) they struggle to differentiate the middle 90% of draft classes. And just like said school rankings, these draft grades are often biased based on brand name (when was the last time the Patriots were given a bad grade?), incapable of quantifying locker room and schematic fit, and lacking in the overall nuance, depth, and context needed to paint an accurate picture of draft successes or failures.

So this year I’ll be breaking down every Niners pick through my own made up evaluative system called — for no reason other than my own childish amusement —“GTFO Man.” While it won’t be nearly as clean nor as simple as a draft grade, GTFO Man will (hopefully) give us a better understanding of how well the Niners are doing at maneuvering through the draft to supplement their roster. The system is based around five factors that are integral to draft success; they’re listed below in order from most to least important:

1. Good Evaluation

2. Top Tier

3. Fills Need

4. Optimizes Slot Value

5. Manages Future Capital

Good Evaluation: Obviously, this is far and away the most important factor to winning the draft. Based on an entirely non-scientific guess, player quality is at least 75% of any success metric. You could be picking guys too early, not targeting positions of need, and making bad value swaps to move around draft slots, but if everyone you pick is a winner, so are you. For these purposes, this category encompasses the proper evaluation of everything from skill, size, and athleticism, to schematic and locker room fit, to injuries and off-the-field issues. It’s the whole package of how you grade a player.

Theoretical Example Pt. 1: The standard prospect rating system grades all players from 4.00 (not worth an invite to the 90-man training camp) to 9.00 (the second coming of God… unless that was Jesus. I’m not up on my theology). After evaluating all of the players they deem potentially draftable, the Niners will order them based on these grades and put them into a “big board” of prospects. 

Top Tier: When teams construct their big boards, they group players with similar overall grades and draft ranges (or where the team would feel comfortable drafting each player) into tiers. That way it’s easier for teams to determine value clusters (the range of slots/picks in the draft that are loaded with the most talent), maneuver around the areas that they consider sparse with value, and adapt on the fly if their priority targets come off the board earlier than expected. Teams watch as the players in their top-most tiers are plucked off the board, and — when its their own time to pick — they aim to select a player from the highest remaining tier. Thus, their commitment is to overall player value above all else.

Theoretical Example Pt. 2: Let’s say that after their big board is complete, the Niners believe there are four players with grades worthy of a top 5 selection. Those players make up their first tier. After them, they consider seven players to be worthy of a top 15 selection. Those players make up their second tier. After those eleven players, the Niners don’t have a single other player worthy of a top twenty pick, but their third tier (rated as players worthy of a pick anywhere from 20th selection to the end of the first round) has about twenty prospects. This is the draft’s first major “value cluster.”

Fills Need: The amazingly simple and just as amazingly impractical idea of “drafting best player available regardless of position” is often referenced as the mantra for many successful NFL franchises. But in reality, it isn’t. Yes, I believe drafting good players is more important than filling positional holes (hence why it is higher on this list), but entering the draft, which happens after the bulk of free agency, and not trying to patch the holes in your roster is just ignorant (and very late stage Trent Baalke-ish). 

Remember, short-term solutions and long-term investments. If you’re drafting only for the long haul, it’s easy to lose the forest through the trees. In an ideal draft, you absolutely want to address your positions of need. The difficulty is in doing so while adhering to your player tiers.

Theoretical Example Pt. 3: As the draft commences, the Niners (picking at #13) watch as players from their top two tiers are selected ahead of them. With each selection they’re hoping that a prospect from one of their lower tiers jumps into the top 12 picks because each time that happens one of the Niners’ top 11 players is pushed down the line, and the Niners’ chances of getting someone who matches value at pick #13 increase.

If by pick 13 the Niners have three dudes on the board who are in their top two tiers, they’re thrilled. They can now choose a player from the highest remaining tier (most likely their second tier) and — if they so choose — select the player from this tier who fits their greatest position of need. If none of the players in this tier fit positions of need, they could pull the trigger on best player available. If not, they can attempt to trade down so that they can match their slot value with player grade later in the draft.

Optimizes Slot Value: In the most basic terms imaginable, if you’re on the clock and don’t have anyone you want to pick, you should trade down. More specifically, if there are no players available who match the value of the draft slot you hold (i.e. you’re picking at the end of the first round but have no one left on your board with a first round grade), you should trade down. Additionally, if there’s a player you like but you strongly believe — based on other teams’ evaluations and their positional needs and draft slots — that you could select that player later in the draft, you should trade down and select that player later. On draft day, you always want your guys. But optimizing slot value means selecting them as late as physically possible.

Obviously that last situation is the hardest to get right. Teams come out of nowhere to reach on players all the time, and it’s not like the scouting world is open and prioritizes sharing between squads. If the player you like fits the value of the pick and you’re at all worried that you might lose out on him, you should just pick that player. That being said, you have year round scouting and personnel departments, endless notes on the historical draft records and positional needs of opposing teams, and a war room full of dozens of phones that are directly connected to the 31 other GMs in the NFL —phones are ringing 24/7 on draft day. You’re not exactly going in blind in figuring out what teams may like what prospects so you should have a good general idea of who may be available where.

Theoretical Example Pt. 4: By the time the Niners pick at #13, let’s say all of the players from their top two tiers have been selected. The next guy up on their big board is a wide receiver who tops their third tier and who they value at around the 20th pick in the draft. With seven slots in the middle of the first round too big a value loss for them to pick him at 13, and with the Niners strongly believing that no other team considers this guy worthy of anything earlier than a late first rounder, the Niners decide to trade down.

They flip #13 to move back to the 25th pick, accumulating a second and a fourth and a future pick from a team desperate to move up on a quarterback or left tackle that’s still on the board. At the 25th pick in the first round the Niners still think they can get this wideout, who is the 12th best player on their big board (remember, they only graded the top 11 players as worthy of a top 15 selection), plays a position of need, and would optimize slot value (getting a player worth ~20th overall pick at pick 25). And, seeing as the bottom of the first round is where they believe the first “value cluster” of this draft lies, they’re confident that — in the off-chance that their wideout of choice is gone by the time they pick again — they can still get someone of near equal value.

MANages Future Capital: Attacking championship windows is one thing but mortgaging your future by constantly packaging picks to trade up into the first round is quite another. Large roster sizes, eleven players on the field at once, regular substitutions, and a high-risk of injuries in the sport means that roster depth is much more important in the NFL than in any other professional sport. And in a hard-capped league the only way to obtain the high quantities of the young, low cost talent needed to fill out your depth chart is via the draft. 

Additionally, the best way to get more good players in each draft is to draft more players. While a seemingly oversimplified concept, it’s clearly true. Evaluating players is difficult and — just like any other endeavor — if you want to maximize your returns, you should encourage some level of risk-taking in the process. That means selecting some project players or ones with injury concerns, as long as you net enough successes to warrant the failures. No team is going to strike big on every single draft pick; the best way to ensure you get more hits on target is to invest in more rounds in the chamber.

This isn’t to say that trading down for picks is always the right move. Nor is it a condemnation of packaging picks to trade up and get a player who you think is a generational talent. You just can’t make a living off of the latter. Because if you do, it’s only a matter of time before you gut your roster from the inside out. And a team without young players makes for the longest and most arduous of rebuilds.

Theoretical Example Pt. 5: By trading down to accumulate picks, the Niners have already gained draft capital, and they’ve also added a future draft pick, arming them for next year’s draft (where the Niners are likely only getting a 5th round comp pick from the loss of Emmanuel Sanders)

So… now that you’re all well-versed in my made up means of draft pick evaluation, let’s look at three picks over the past few years and how they’d be evaluated within in this system:

Case Study #1
In 2019, the New York Giants select QB, Daniel Jones, Duke with the #6 overall pick

Good Evaluation: Too early to say. But I think he’ll be an NFL starter.

Top Tier: For most people, no, but the Giants were very high on Jones. He was either in their top tier or — as is common when drafting positionally scarcer players such as quarterbacks, tackles, and defensive ends — the Giants committed to reaching back a tier to get their quarterback of the future.

Fills Need: Yes. They had been riding the corpse of Eli Manning like a two-year extended cut of Swiss Army Man. So in this regard, they knocked this pick out of the park.

Optimizes Slot Value: This was the biggest misstep of this move. Even if Daniel Jones turns out to be great, the Giants picked him at #6 when they could have gotten him much much later than that. Jones was, by most people’s accounts, a late first round draft prospect while the Giants had both the #6 and the #17 pick in this draft. And sure, it’s always possible for a QB-desperate team to snatch up a rookie well before the value proposition makes sense, but look at the ten selections between the Giants’ two picks.

You have six teams that are locks NOT to be interested in a quarterback, a Miami team that clearly was trying to sit out this year’s QB class, and a Carolina team that had Cam Newton. This leaves two squads that could have gone quarterback. The Bengals, picking at #10, and the Redskins, who everyone knew loved Dwayne Haskins (and ended up picking him at #15). So realistically, you had one team (the Bengals) who MAY have wanted to go quarterback and could have picked Daniel Jones within the top ten. But they didn’t, instead selecting Jonah Williams, an offensive tackle.

It is INCREDIBLY within reason that the Giants could have gotten Daniel Jones with their 17th overall pick. Which not only means they left 11 slots of draft value on the board, but that they failed to address another major position of need with the player who — by most people’s accounts, including my own — was the best player remaining on the board at the time of the Giants’ first pick. That player, DE Josh Allen, would get picked 7th overall and go on to lead all rookies in sacks with 10.5 for the Jaguars. But that’s not all…

Manages Draft Capital: While the Giants lost the chance to pick a higher valued player or trade down to the (by the most incredibly conservative of estimates) ninth pick and accumulate more draft capital, that’s not where the ripple effects of this pick ended. As the Giants, still desperate for outside pass rush help, would then trade a third and a fifth (or fourth) round pick for Leonard Williams in a contract year, effectively making the same trade we made for Emmanuel Sanders but in the middle of a rebuild and for an underperforming player at a position that they could have filled just months prior. Holy shit.

Summary: While Jones seems likely to become an NFL starter, and — if he becomes a 10-year mainstay — this pick will certainly be deemed a good one down the road. But it’s apparent that the Giants flubbed their last two evaluations, leaving talent and opportunity cost on the table. Throw in the two picks lost for Leonard Williams at a position that they could have addressed with a better player via the draft, plus the financial cost of that decision (Williams is making $17M this year in the fifth-year option of his rookie deal), and the ripple effects of how the Giants mishandled this first round become abundantly clear.

Case Study #2
In 2018, the Indianapolis Colts traded down from #3, netting the #6, #37, and #49 picks in that year’s draft, as well as a second rounder in 2019. At #6 the Colts would select OG, Quenton Nelson, Notre Dame

Good Evaluation: Yes. Incredibly good. Since being drafted, Nelson has started every game for the Colts, being named First-team All-Pro in both of his years in the league. In 2019, he was PFF’s second best guard league-wide. The other players they got in this trade weren’t bad either…

At #37… OT, Braden Smith, Auburn: Since being drafted he’s started 31 of 32 games at right tackle, recording PFF grades of 71 and 79 in his first two seasons.

Then, after trading #49 to the Eagles for picks $53 and #169…

At #52… DE/OLB, Kemoko Turay, Rutgers: While raw in 2018, he exploded out of the gates in 2019, recording an incredible 91.3 PFF rating and 91.0 pass rushing score in just over 80 defensive snaps before going down on IR.

At #169… RB, Jordan Wilkins, Ole Miss: A valuable rotational piece and one of the team’s better inside runners, Wilkins has played in 30 games across two years, recording 300+ rushing yards in each year while averaging 5.8 yards per carry.

In 2019, at #34… CB, Rock Ya-Sin, Temple: While too early to tell what kind of player he’ll become, he started 13 games for the Colts in 2019 and had — by many pundits entering that year’s draft — a late first round grade.

Top Tier: Yes. Nelson was in everyone’s top tier of players. In fact, the only reason he was available at #6 was the same reason the Colts were able to trade out of #3. The difference in positional scarcity between guards and quarterbacks (the Jets picked QB Sam Darnold at #3).

Fills Need: Yes. The Colts had long neglected their offensive line, wasting years throwing picks at the same exact undersized receiver who would never see the field and getting Andrew Luck killed in the process. They needed to address the OL and they did (twice). Along with addressing their pass rush, backfield, and secondary (in 2019).

Optimizes Slot Value: Yes. Nelson was — at the time — considered a steal at #6. That narrative has only been reinforced in the past two years.

Manages Draft Capital: Dear lord, yes.

Summary: This is as big a home run as you could ask for, giving up three slots in draft position while still securing your prized prospect plus two additional starters at positions of need, a key rotational piece, and a potential breakout star as a pass rusher.

Case Study #3
In 2017, the San Francisco 49ers trade down from #2, netting the #3, #67, and #111 picks in that year’s draft, plus a 2018 third round selection. At #3, the Niners would select DE/DT, Solomon Thomas, Stanford

Good Evaluation: Here we can plainly see how getting your player evaluations right is much much more important than any other factor. While Thomas has started 28 games over three years, there’s no denying there were superior players drafted after him both at his position on the edge (Derek Barnett, Jonathan Allen, TJ Watt) and at other positions of need (DeShaun Watson, Patrick Mahomes, Marshon Lattimore).

As for the rest of the picks acquired in the trade, they were involved in a slew of additional trades that I won’t go over in depth, but these are (approximately) the other players we gained.

In 2017, at #31… LB, Reuben Foster, Alabama: Talented? Yes. But we all know how that turned out. This also is NOT a one-for-one trade by any means as we had packaged our second rounder with the Bears’ #111 to move up.

In 2018, at #44… WR, Dante Pettis, Washington: The jury’s out on this one, but the market’s bearish at the moment.

In 2018, at #70… LB, Fred Warner, BYU: Clearly the best player we got out of the trade. Is still improving and should be a mainstay for years to come.

In 2018, at #142… DB, DJ Reed, Kansas State: While he hasn’t gotten a ton of playing time, he’s shown promise as a nickel back and can at least moonlight some replacement snaps as a safety.

Top Tier: Yes. Many people were very high on Solomon Thomas, and I would venture to say he was a top five pick in the eyes of most NFL GMs. And when the Niners moved up into the back end of the first round to select Reuben Foster, they did so because he was a top five talent in their minds.

Fills Need: Yes. Edge rusher was a huge position of need. So were LB when we got Foster, WR when we got Pettis, and (unfortunately) LB once again when we drafted Warner.

Optimizes Slot Value: Yes. We got a boatload of picks that became four players to move down a SINGLE draft slot. And we got the player who we wanted at our original slot as well.

Manages Draft Capital: Yes.

Summary: It’s a pointless effort to look back on who a team “could have” drafted while armed with the knowledge of the present. But while the Niners did a marvelous job of milking value out of moving a single draft slot, it was their player evaluations — especially in 2017 — that prevented this from being an absolute slam dunk of a trade. Mahomes, Watson, Lattimore, Jamal Adams, and Christian McCaffrey all played positions of need and all went within ten picks after the Niners picked Solomon Thomas. While Ryan Ramczyk, many people’s top offensive tackle and a guy who has had 81+ PFF grades his entire career before being named a First-Team All-Pro and PFF’s top offensive lineman in 2019, went a single pick after Foster to end the first round. This trade was still a win. It could have been a blowout. Oh well…

Next up, a look at the Niners’ options in the first round…

Capital Gains and Championship Windows

More of this plz [Ray Chavez/Bay Area News Group]

For the Niners, a Super Bowl runner-up strapped for cash whose main priority this off-season has been retaining its own players, the most exciting part of free agency is very likely over (unless Bill O’Brien wants to pick up the phone and swap DeShaun Watson for Matt Breida). But our moves, both big and small, have hinted at how the team’s brass plans to address our weaknesses and keep our championship window open as long as possible. 

Because in the glow of a massively successful season, it’s easy to forget how quickly those windows close. The Denver Broncos had four years of Peyton Manning before they fell into an abyss of very tall men pretending to be NFL quarterbacks. The Carolina Panthers had three years before their hybrid offense became too inefficient in the passing game and Cam too beat up in the running game. And the Seattle Seahawks, while still contender-adjacent, won only one Super Bowl despite having the cap space and young talent from selecting — over the course of three straight drafts — Golden Tate, Earl Thomas, Kam Chancellor, Richard Sherman, KJ Wright, Bobby Wagner, and Russell Wilson (on a third round contract no less). 

Thus, the greatest optimism that comes from the DeForest Buckner trade is the fact that the Niners seem fully aware of that shrinking window. And they’re attempting to extend it with the most tried and true method — by being strict with your budget and increasing draft capital.

Entering the off-season, this was the Niners, in the far bottom-left quadrant of this draft capital x cap space chart.

This info will change a lot in the next ~48 hours, but here's where teams' offseason resources sit right now-ish.

Data is courtesy Tankathon and Over the Cap and uses @fbgchase's draft pick valuation model. pic.twitter.com/xTwKPwFa0n

— Lee Sharpe (@LeeSharpeNFL) March 16, 2020

That was before the DeFo trade. And while we won’t be creeping much higher in terms of salary cap space any time soon, we’ve now got a lot more chips to deal with as we approach the draft (and that means, for selfish reasons, I get to justify spending more time prepping for it).

So let’s take a look at our latest moves and see if they can shed some light on what our plan might be come April 23rd.

Farewell: Emmanuel Sanders

While the extensions of Armstead and Ward seemed to make Emmanuel Sanders’ departure a foregone conclusion, he officially signed elsewhere on Friday. Yes, it sucks that we gave up a third round pick and dropped 17 slots between rounds four and five for a half-year rental. And yes, we will never know if a bidding war put us in that position or if the two picks were a product of us bidding against ourselves (a phenomenon known in scientific circles as “Trubisky-ing”). Either way, it’s totally fair to blame the Patriots for giving up a second rounder for Mohamed Sanu just earlier that day. But ultimately, I do think we needed him to get anywhere as far as we did last year. And, as I’m sure I’ve already said way too many times, if he isn’t overthrown in the fourth quarter, there is NO discussion on whether or not he was worth the value we gave up.

To make matters worse, Emmo was very truthful when he said he wanted to play 1-2 more years and was focused on winning another championship above getting a big payday. Because he signed a two-year $16M deal with the Saints. That gives a conference rival who has long been in search of a second option one of the better No.2’s in the league and does so at a bargain price. As for the Niners, while the writing has been on the wall for a minute now, this assures us of one thing: we will be drafting a wideout this year.

Best of luck to you, Emmo. You honestly balled out as well as anyone could have asked for. And while I think Sean Payton is a bit of a tool, I really do like Drew Brees, and — excluding the Niners, of course — will likely be rooting for the Saints over any other NFC contenders.

OL shuffling

Shon Coleman, last season’s top reserve tackle who went on IR before the season even started, returns on a one-year ~$900K contract. This is a move that was likely done because (A) the updated collective bargaining agreement allows one additional offensive lineman to dress on game days, (B) Coleman, despite his age and lack of playing time to this point, still has decent potential, and (B) the staff is planning to give all-purpose swingman Daniel Brunskill a shot at a starting position on the inside.

That starting position would almost certainly be right guard, as Mike Person, last year’s starter (and man whose name is amazingly generic), was just released.  Person, 32, was a solid run blocker who was familiar with Shanahan’s scheme and who served us well considering his price tag and journeyman career. That being said, he was also our very obvious weak spot in pass protection (according to PFF, he ranked 51st out of 61 qualifying guards in pass block efficiency), and — with his age and the lack of guaranteed money on his contract, the Niners decided to move forward and free up $2.5M in cap space. For Person, who was originally drafted by the Niners before getting cut, and who Shanahan once replaced in Atlanta with Alex Mack, it’s always the bridesmaid, never the bride. We thank you for your service, but it was time to move on.

The Niners sniffed around about former Bronco Connor McGovern, who was one of PFF’s top pass protecting centers last year and also has experience at guard, but he ultimately signed a three-year $27M contract with the Jets (a figure that the Niners surely were NOT planning to match). While McGovern likely would have been both a starting guard and/or an insurance policy / 2021 replacement for Weston Richburg, the Niners instead settled on Tom Compton, a part-time starter for the Jets. Based on that description alone, I can assure you, I have never seen this guy play a snap of football. 

Compton is another journeyman, and — according to PFF — one that actually graded out considerably worse than Person in 2019. My guess, on literally zero evidence, is that Compton is a guy whose athletic profile somewhat matches what Shanahan is looking for, who the Niners believe can perform better in their system than he did in New York, and who is being brought in entirely for depth. I would also be shocked if his one-year deal, worth “up to” $3M is anything close to $3M against the cap. I would assume he’s getting paid closer to the minimum, and his contract is loaded with NLTBE incentives that can only be achieved if he earns a starting role. 

Ben Garland, back up center, run blocker extraordinaire, and questionable-to-okay pass protector was also re-signed to a one-year deal worth $2.25M. While the terms of that contract aren’t available, I would believe — after he made $800K last year — that, like Compton, some of that sticker price would come in incentives that are unlikely to affect the 2020 cap.

So to round up this thrilling write-up on backup offensive linemen, the Niners have signed three one-year deals with very little guaranteed money while also retaining Brunskill on a minimum ERFA contract (a low rate which they have two more years of if they so choose). That likely means three things: (1) Brunskill, who played well everywhere and only struggled in his first career start at guard against Aaron Donald, will be given every chance to start at right guard this year, (2) we’re positioning ourselves for more shuffling along the offensive line in the next few years, and (3) we’re adding an offensive lineman at some point in this draft.

Short-term fixes and long-term investments

So now, with the smoke cleared and free agency likely over (for our purposes at least), we can get a clearer picture of what the Niners need to address in the draft, and — like always — it’s a layered set of immediate and long-term needs. When we were building towards a championship window, it made sense to lean heavier towards those long-term value, investing in foundational pieces and developmental projects for the coming years. But now that we’re currently smack dap in the middle of our championship window, keeping that window open as long as possible requires finding as many moves as possible that can simultaneously address both short and long-term concerns.

For example, Joe Staley is 36. And after coming back from injury last year, he played outstanding football. But he’s still 36. At best we should expect him to run out his current contract (two more years). So, if a player falls to us high in the draft who we see as a future starting tackle, we might select that player as a long-term investment (yes, in the NFL, one to two years away can be considered “long term”). But we are chip chasing now, and that player doesn’t move the needle as a third or fourth string tackle. But if he could start his career on the interior, perhaps learning the ropes as a guard or — while less likely — a center, then they could also be addressing a short-term concern as well.

Ultimately, I think former GM Trent Baalke’s inability to invest in both the short and long-term was — among other things — a major reason for why he flamed out. While the Niners were riding a dominant defense and run game to three straight NFC championships, Baalke got lots of the credit. And rightfully so. His 2011 draft class (rookies in Harbaugh’s first year) had Aldon Smith, Colin Kaepernick, Chris Culliver, Kendall Hunter, and Bruce Miller, and that influx of talent — along with veteran additions like Carlos Rogers and Donte Whitner — powered the team to three straight NFC Championship Games. But Baalke became too obsessed with the future, too overconfident in risky long-term investments, and too complacent with the idea that present-day success would perpetuate forever. 

Baalke’s next three drafts were headlined by AJ Jenkins, LaMichael James, ACL rehabbers Tank Carradine and Marcus Lattimore, Carlos Hyde, and Jimmie Ward. Yes, Eric Reid was in that crop and was a good fit for the remaining Harbaugh years, but even Ward — and future high picks like Arik Armstead — took multiple years to mature into major contributors. And long before those picks of his did pan out, the championship contending corps of the team was too old, there were too many holes that needed patching, and — of course — the relationship between Baalke and Harbaugh had soured beyond any potential reconciliation.

In short, no matter how good you think you are or how talented your roster is, you need to keep making moves. That’s the only way to sustain winning in the NFL. So our needs entering the draft, on a spectrum of short-term to long-term would look something like this:

Wide Receiver - Everyone and their mother wants the Niners picking a wideout at #13 overall. Sanders is gone, and despite the draft capital we’ve invested in the position in recent years, the only two wideouts we can truly count on in 2021 are Deebo and Bourne. Luckily, this draft class is stacked with receivers. The biggest question becomes if we target a more prototypical No.1 early or tap the depth of the class later with a co-star to pair with Deebo in a more specific role (outside deep receiver, speedy slot, etc.).

Interior OL - I’m bullish on Brunskill and how he’ll perform at guard, but — despite his promising first year — it’s far too early to tell what he could become as a full-time player at a position in which he’s had two career starts. The Niners showed their cards a bit by looking into McGovern, and with Compton and Garland on one-year deals, and the injury-prone Richburg’s restructured contract allowing the Niners the financial flexibility to — if needed — release him in 2021 while saving $3M on the books, getting a guy with center/guard flexibility and the ability to play soon would be nice insurance in case any number of things don’t go our way in 2020. The dream candidate? A future center (long term) who can at least make a push to play immediately at guard (present).

Secondary - While our secondary’s entire two deep returns this year, things will look a lot different a year from now. Moseley has two accrued NFL seasons, so he can be retained on an ERFA rate for one more year, but 2021 will see contracts up for Richard Sherman, K’Waun Williams, Jaquiski Tartt, and Ahkello Witherspoon. It would be smart to start adding players now who can work their way into sub-packages now and have starter potential as soon as next year.

Offensive Tackle - I wouldn’t put it past Joe Staley to play out his contract at a high level, but with the dearth of tackles around the league and this year’s talent-rich draft class at the position, it could be smart to invest in a future bookend to pair with McGlinchey. Unless of course that player is already on roster. Justin Skule — while protected by game-planning — performed mostly well when thrust into playing time as a rookie, but he likely projects as more of a third tackle than a long-term starter. Shon Coleman was a former third round pick with developmental upside who flashed well in Cleveland, but he’s yet to play a snap for the Niners in two years on the roster. He’s got potential and is known as an incredibly hard worker (he did win a two-and-a-half year battle with leukemia in college after all), but he’s at best a dark horse candidate for the position. As stated above, a guy who can play now inside and later outside could be a nice addition.

Tight End - The Niners kicked the tires on Austin Hooper before he signed with the Browns, so it’s clearly a position they’re looking at. Shanahan loves his 21 and 12 personnel groups so it’s not like the guy will go unused. And if the Niners are going to be investing big money in Kittle in the form of a fat extension, they’d prefer if he didn’t take so much of a beating on a snap-to-snap basis. Plus, there were just too many times where Kittle — one of their best receivers — had to stay back and help in pass pro on crucial downs. Adding a capable receiver and pass catcher could lighten the load. Practice squad-er Daniel Helm is a good athlete and has shown promise, but is he ready for a real role in 2020? Also, Delanie Walker is a free agent. Just saying… This is a spot the Niners could address in the mid rounds of the draft.

We’re now officially into draft season. And the posts will be comin in HAWT.

Oh, shit! Breaking down the first two days of 49ers free agency

Before dominating some poor interior lineman no doubt [Ezra Shaw/Getty Images]

There were always questions about how the Niners would free up the cap space necessary to retain and extend their core players. But after a flurry of moves on Monday, those questions have largely been answered.

Even if those answers came in shocking fashion.

Let’s get to it.

NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement

I won’t go in-depth into this deal (at least not right now), but — for free agent and draft purposes — the most important element of the new CBA is that while the players will get 47% of league revenue in 2020, that hops to 48% in 2021.

That may not seem like a lot, but with the continual growth in revenue from media deals, new stadiums, etc. the NFL has seen a salary cap increase of $10M or more in each of the past seven years. So, if the NFL’s next media deal is on par with its current one, the 2021 cap will see a one-time spike.

While that doesn’t mean a lot for staying under the 2020 cap, it does put a team like the Niners in a position where they would preferably retain their core players this year instead of next (as salaries should be looked at as % of cap spent rather than pure money). It also means there will be a lot of back-loaded contracts this off-season.

Okay, now let’s look at the deals (in chronological order)…

Re-signed Arik Armstead to a five-year $85M contract

Bringing back Armstead was thought to be a major priority this off-season, and while some may have seen that as a smokescreen or an attempt to maintain leverage in the case of a tag-and-trade situation, the Niners showed they were serious early on Monday.

We’ve already talked a bit about the risks of re-signing Armstead to a long deal and how — despite those risks — there was enough evidence pointing to 2019 as a season where he was coming into his own rather than balling out for a payday that such an extension would make sense. So in short, despite 2019 being his only strong pass rushing season (he has always been a great run defender), I’m a fan of the extension.

On paper, the contract is fair and (in stark contrast to the sticker shock of past Niners contracts like Kwon Alexander’s) openly team friendly. Armstead is averaging $17M a year over the course of the contract, a figure that makes him the 11th-highest paid defensive lineman in the NFL. Since he’s the most recent defensive lineman to sign a long-term deal, that ranking will certainly drop in the ensuing days, but — as it stands now — he’s making less per year than the 2018 signings of teammate Dee Ford ($17.1M), Trey Flowers ($18M), Frank Clark ($20.8M), or DeMarcus Lawrence ($21M), and is within $1 million a year of guys like Leonard Williams ($17M), Olivier Vernon ($17M), Geno Atkins ($16.3M), and Kawann Short ($16.1M). It’s also worth noting that Armstead is only 26 years old, and it’s well within reason to expect him to improve over the next few years. But even if he’s topped out, as long as he stays around the productivity level he set in 2019, this is a high value deal.

The salary cap structure of Armstead’s contract is back-loaded, speaking both to our limited cap space this year and the spike to come in 2021. His cap hits for the next five years are as follows:

2020 - $6M

2021 - $12.5M

2022 - $20M

2023 - $21.7M

2024 - $23.3M

But Armstead’s contract can’t be looked at in a vacuum, as his re-signing was clearly done in conjunction with the Niners’ next move…

Traded DeForest Buckner to the Colts for the 13th Overall Pick in the 2020 Draft

It’s tough to watch Buckner, who was the rock of our defense through the garbage years and one of the most consistent and durable defensive linemen in all of football throughout his career, get swapped out for a pick when all the talk leading up to this was how he would be a priority extension for the Niners. But… when the emotions settle and you look at it practically, the deal makes a lot of sense for both parties.

The Colts — a team rife with cap space that has been critiqued in the past for being too thrifty in their off-season spending — get a building block along their defensive line, a disruptive three-tech who can help offset some of their lower achieving players up front and a guy who gives them a young stud at each level of their defense. And — with a second-best $85M in cap space — they can afford it, signing DeFo to a contract that averages a whopping $21M per year over five years.

We’ve talked about it before, but ultimately the Niners could not afford to pay big money to three defensive linemen at once (with a fourth due up in a few years when Bosa can be extended). And while that talk was centered more around next off-season and whether or not Dee Ford would be retained if he wasn’t healthier in 2020, the Niners made the move now. They flipped Buckner while his value was high and they had contract leverage, figuring that an additional $4M in annual cap space, a mid-first round pick, and the outside-in versatility of Armstead were worth more than the (probably second round) pick they could have gotten for an Armstead tag-and-trade and DeFo’s longer track record of health and performance.

Make no mistake, this trade makes our defensive line worse, particularly in passing downs when the DeFo and Armstead combo on the inside was wildly unfair to the interior linemen of this world. But with DJ Jones’ emergence as a one-tech, with Jullian Taylor and Kevin Givens both young and showing tons of promise on the interior, and with Solomon Thomas — in the last year of his rookie contract — finally able to play his best natural fit position as a three-tech, the Niners are in as good a position as any team could be to mitigate the damage of Buckner’s loss.

Because ultimately, while I love DeFo, there are AT MOST four interior defensive linemen who could argue that they’re worth over $20M a year (Aaron Donald, Grady Jarrett, Fletcher Cox, and a healthy Chris Jones). And the only one of them currently making that money (and the only one who you are absolutely sure is worth it) is Aaron Donald. $21M a year is simply too much for DeFo, and as we added talent on the edges and shifted to the Wide 9 scheme, Buckner’s incredible physical gifts at his size were less on display as in his previous years. Frankly, his position just became a bit less valuable than before.

The move immediately frees up $12M in cap space and gives us the 13th overall pick in a historically good and deep draft class for wide receivers (and a class where many mock drafts don’t have a wideout going until #12). We are now right in the thick of this wideout class and still have our 31st overall pick, which — unless someone slides drastically — I expect us to package and trade down to accumulate picks in the second and later rounds.

It also shows that Lynch and Shanahan — while committed to building the team from the locker room out — are also willing to make the unsentimental decisions if they think it’s best for the long-term future of the team. That’s something that — to this point at least — has been untested, and something that they’ll need to do each year to keep us in contention.

But as fans, we’re allowed to be sentimental, and it’s tough to see Buckner, who helped anchor the squad on and off the field through some dark times and was a key component in getting us back to the Super Bowl, get shipped out of town. Even if the move makes sense.

Happy Trails DeFo. Best of luck in Indianapolis.

Re-signed Jimmie Ward to a three-year $28.5M contract

Last night, the Niners locked up 10 of their 11 defensive starters from last year by giving Ward a three-year deal with an average annual salary of $9.5M. That ranks him 13th highest-paid amongst safeties, narrowly edging Adrian Amos’ 2019 deal but falling well short of the deals handed out to Eddie Jackson ($14.6M), Kevin Byard ($14.1M), Tyrann Mathieu ($14M), or Earl Thomas ($13.8M) last off-season.

Like Armstead, Ward’s contract is backloaded. The cap hits for his three year deal are as follows:

2020 - $4.6M

2021 - $11.6M

2022 - $12.3M

It’s a good deal. If Ward plays anything like he did last year then we’ve got him at quite the discount. And if his significant injury concerns pop up once again… well, at least we have Tarvarius Moore behind him. As well as a contract that has only an $8M signing bonus and thus — if his availability and/or play require it — the flexibility to release him in 2022 and save $10M off the cap. I don’t know what availability / health bonuses and clauses are put into this contract, but — given Ward’s extensive injury history — I would hope there are many.

This also gives us a bit of consistency moving forward with our secondary. As mentioned before, while our top four cornerbacks and top three safeties are now all locked up for this season, 2021 has Richard Sherman, Jaquiski Tartt, K’Waun Williams, and Akhello Witherspoon all as unrestricted free agents (plus Emmanuel Moseley as an ERFA). There could be a lot of turnover in the near future, but at least re-signing Ward means we have someone locked up beyond this year.

Re-signed Ronald Blair to a one-year deal

As recently as this morning, Blair was said to be linked to the Browns — where former Niners coaches Joe Woods and Chris Kiffin now reside — but apparently that’s no longer the case. According to Ian Rapoport, Blair will be returning to the bay on a one-year prove-it deal, with the idea that he can play well and cash-in on the free agent market in 2021.

This is a major win for both parties, as Blair had really come into his own in 2019 as an outstanding second-line defensive end who also had the heft and ability to slide inside. With Buckner gone, expect to see even more of Blair at tackle, particularly on passing downs. And while he didn’t play enough snaps to qualify for end-of-season rankings, Blair’s 77.5 PFF rating through 8.5 games would have ranked him 25th in the league among edge defenders.

From Blair’s POV, while he had a career year in 2019, jumping ship to another team and scheme while coming off an ACL injury was bound to limit his market. Matt Maiocco has noted that other teams may have been wary because the coronavirus didn’t allow them to bring Blair into their facility for a medical checkup, and — likewise — Blair may have been discouraged with the thought of complicating his rehab with a timetable and a process that is entirely unpredictable as the country continues to deal with the effects of the current pandemic. With the Niners he can continue his rehab with the people he knows on a set schedule, and he can try and leverage a strong 2020 into a more lucrative free agent contract. And, since he is an edge rusher and those contracts are always high, that could mean a substantial compensatory pick for us in 2022 if he does indeed net a big payday.

Re-signing Blair was an under-the-radar priority move, one made even more important once Buckner was traded. Hopefully we can also retain Damontre Moore, whose 75.0 PFF rating (albeit through only two games) would have ranked him 28th in the league among edge defenders. Moore doesn’t have the versatility nor the two-way ability of Blair. But he is a pass rushing presence off the edge, and due to the fact that he was unemployed until midway through the season, we’ll hopefully be able to re-sign him for cheap.

Restructured Jerick McKinnon’s contract

Like Blair’s contract, the details of McKinnon’s restructuring have yet to be publicly released. But it’s safe to say that he’ll be getting paid far less than his would-be cap hit of $8.6M and likely less than the $4.6M that they could have saved in cap space if they were simply to cut him. With the amount of money we’ve paid out to him and the fact that we stuck with him (and paid him) through last year when we really didn’t have to, I wouldn’t be shocked if he takes something closer to the veteran minimum. 

And while that may sound like an unreasonable loyalty discount, a running back who has missed both of the past two seasons to knee injuries is highly unlikely to net much more (if any more) than that on the free market. Besides, McKinnon should know that the best way to rejuvenate his career and his value is to play within Shanahan’s system in a running back-by-committee role where he doesn’t have to shoulder a huge amount of punishment.

While it would be unreasonable at this point to expect McKinnon to contribute given the past two years, if he can return to form, he is still the Niners’ best pass-catching back. So perhaps that long-awaited marriage of receiving ability and Shanahan’s scheming can finally come to fruition in 2020. And if not, at the very least this restructuring will save us more money than if we were to release him.

Bourne and Breida Given Second Round RFA Tenders

This afternoon, the Niners tendered both Kendrick Bourne and Matt Breida with the second-round RFA tender. That means both players will make $3.3M in 2020 unless another team offers them a better deal. Then, if we don’t match, that team would have to give us a second round pick. For either player, that seems highly unlikely, but especially for Breida, who was a total non-factor down the stretch last year. 

Perhaps this is a CJ Beathard-esque situation, where the Niners don’t want to give up a player who they consider to be an NFL caliber athlete for nothing. But with a tight salary cap, a crowded backfield, and Mostert (who himself is only counting $3.2M against the cap in 2020) as the clear bell cow, $3.3M is a lot to spend on someone who could be a fourth or even fifth back in 2020.

Maybe they’re trying to trade him? Perhaps to a team who has the cap space and is willing to give up a late round pick? I dunno, but tendering Breida seems a bit odd.

The Rest

• The Niners continue to work on a contract extension for George Kittle. That is likely their top priority at the moment.

• With contracts given out to Armstead and Ward, I don’t expect Emmanuel Sanders to get re-signed. The third and fourth round picks we gave up for a half year rental was a steep price, but given we never would have gotten to the Super Bowl without him (and that in said Super Bowl he ran a dirty route to free up from double coverage for a would-be game-winning touchdown), I still believe it was worth it. If he’s not signing here, root for him to get PAID, as a hefty contract — in conjunction with our likely lack of activity in free agency — should net us a third or fourth round compensatory pick in 2021. 

• I would still expect Marquise Goodwin to get moved one way or another. But with this draft class of wideouts and his underwhelming performance given his contract, the most likely scenario for that move is through biting the dead cap and cutting him.

• Tevin Coleman remains on the books for $4.9M, none of it guaranteed. He’s another name to watch, although the tenuous situation with Matt Breida means the Niners are likely in no hurry to make a decision on Coleman.

• So long Levine Toilolo, our jumbo blocking tight end who ran a pass route on only 33 of his 232 offensive snaps last year. He joins 2019 Niners’ draft pick Kaden Smith in New York. As evidenced by our reported interest in Austin Hooper this off-season, don’t be surprised if we sign another tight end to replace him.

• I’m not going to do a real free agency preview since we don’t have the cap space to make any big moves, but Taylor Gabriel is a potential name to watch. He had success with Shanahan in Atlanta, and could fill in slot snaps for Emmanuel Sanders as well as provide insurance in case Trent Taylor / Jalen Hurd continue to be hampered by injuries. 

Elsewhere

• The DeAndre Hopkins - David Johnson trade is the worst NFL trade in recent memory: David Johnson, and his albatross contract, was a clear candidate for a Brock Osweiler-esque salary dump (where you give up a player AND a pick so someone else can shoulder the cap burden) or — at best — a deal where you give up Johnson for a late round pick, with the agreement that the Cards are biting a large chunk of his salary. Instead, the Cardinals swap Johnson, a second rounder, and a future fourth rounder for Hopkins and a fourth rounder. Truly absurd. Bill O’Brien has absolutely no idea what he’s doing as a GM.

• Vikings double down: By giving a contract extension to Cousins and trading Stefon Diggs for a bevy of picks, the Vikings are clearly trying to make their roster a bit more balanced, likely using the picks and leftover cash from the Diggs trade to fill in holes like on their interior line or at cornerback. That being said, they’re also relying on Cousins to play like he did in the second half of the season (and not the playoffs lol), despite the loss of his most dynamic pass catching target and the offensive playcaller who settled Cousins in the first place. Sure, Gary Kubiak is a proven commodity and could maintain Cousins’ success, but the Vikings are still doubling down on Cousins. Which… yeah.

• Jaguars fire sale: Speaking of Brock Osweiler-esque salary dumps… does anyone want Nick Foles? Anyone at all? After getting injured then going 0-4 in four starts, the Jaguars are handing the keys over to resident deviant Gardnew Minshew and are now stuck with Foles on a $22M annual salary and an insane cap hit of $34M (!!!) if they were to cut him this off-season. And after getting rid of AJ Bouye for a fourth round pick, Calais Campbell for a fifth round pick, and Yannick Ngakoue currently asking for a trade, they may start 2020 with only three defensive starters from their 2018 AFC Championship game squad. As I’ve said before, the Jaguars are the blueprint for a talented team who simply cannot sustain winning because they lack the proper culture and management.

• Ravens continue to do what they always do: Getting Calais Campbell for a fifth round pick? Swapping a fourth round pick and their third tight end for a second and a fifth? This is a team that understands how to play the market and is constantly making proper value bets (except for that Joe Flacco contract lol)