Eric Wong Eric Wong

49ers 36, Seahawks 24

:)

Did it get dicey? You betcha. Did our special teams surrender a massive momentum-swinging play at the worst possible time to give our opponent life when we could have otherwise run away with the game? YOU. BETCHA. But if there’s one thing these Niners have been over the years, it’s Hard to Kill. Like the Steven Seagull movie. But also like the Steven Seagull movie, there are sizable chunks that are mostly unwatchable. Like our special teams. Or the moments where he “acts.” Nonetheless, we typically play our best when our back is up against the wall, and–for better or worse–that’s likely how we’ll have to play the rest of the season to make another legitimate run at this thing. The hope here is that we peak at the right time. This is at least a step in the right direction.

The Infirmary. We entered this game without CMC, Greenlaw, Hufanga, Ward, and three of our top four defensive tackles, then suffered in-game injuries to Mason and Mustapha before the game was done. But there is good news on the injury front. With the mini-bye to follow, Mason (AC sprain) and Mustapha (ankle sprain) likely won’t miss any more game time, Ward was a game-time decision–meaning he should be good to go 10 days from now–and Ricky Pearsall just had his practice window opened (even if the soonest we’ll see him is against Dallas).

There’s also (finally) some positivity on the CMC front. CMC has apparently ramped up his workouts, and–unlike in the ramp-up before the Jets game–there haven’t been any setbacks. The Niners hope to have him back to practice sooner rather than later, with a post-bye week return seeming the most likely scenario. So his practice window could open as soon as Monday.

Depth Charges. The other good news is that it seems like our rookie class is pretty legit. Sample sizes are always worth noting, but we played eight rookies in this game, with three starting and five getting at least 12 offensive or defensive snaps. 

Dominick Puni–who has started every game this season–registered the highest PFF rating of his career and is currently ranked 8th out of 69 NFL guards. We can say for certain that he’s (at least) good. His PFF rating for this game was eclipsed only by that of Evan Anderson–whose hefty UDFA signing bonus has looked like a brilliant move early in a season where we desperately need interior players. Malik Mustapha and Renardo Green recorded the first interceptions of their careers while helping hold Geno Smith to 6.0 ypa on the day. Even Isaac Guerendo–who has looked pretty meh in limited touches after missing most of training camp–finally showcased his patented speed on a 76-yard scamper that largely sealed the game for us late in the fourth quarter. 

Throw in Jordan Mason–a known quantity at this point–and emerging second-year edge Sam Okuayinonu–who tallied three pressures and our only sack on the day–and it seems like our much-needed influx of youth has arrived. It’s just a start, but after trades, free agency, and bad draft picks have gutted our depth in recent years, it’s a much-needed win for our roster’s long-term health. 

📺💸 This would have been top billing if we’d lost because of it, but if the NFL wants to expand to 50 different streaming platforms, they need to make sure their ducks are in a row production-wise. Because this muffed punt return…

…could have easily been the difference in this game.

If we can see a replay with indisputable evidence BEFORE the refs make a challenge decision over the PA, there is something wrong with the system. And if we’re going to be doing this “expedited review from on high” stuff, it seems more than reasonable that they should be able to call down to the ref, tell him to go back to the booth and give him the new angle before he makes a game-altering decision. Just no excuse for this sort of thing to happen.

OFFENSE

Even if they returned most of their injured DL in time for this game, the Seahawks had just allowed the NY Giants and their backup running back to run for 175 yards. So the plan, as it so often is when we need to right the ship, was to run the ball until they proved they could stop it. In many ways, it felt like the strategy we’d deploy against the Rams in past “get right” games. A heavy dose of the run game paired with a patient chipping away in the passing game against Cover 3 and Quarters. 

Certainly, there was more to it than that, but this run-centric game plan led to 36 points, 0 turnovers, a whopping 7.9 ypp, and 483 yards of offense–the third-highest offensive yardage total in the Brock Purdy era. 

What were the two highest yardage totals since Purdy took over? 527 yards on December 10th of last season and 505 yards in the wild-card round of the year prior. Both against the Seahawks.

Lol.

Back to Basics. Mason has been an absolute stud while filling in for Christian McCaffrey, leading the league in broken tackles and ranking second in rushing yards and third in % rush yards over expected entering this game. But as a runner, the one area where he’s occasionally looked his age is when facing muddied gap run looks. As is the case with many young backs, he’s sometimes gotten impatient, bouncing interior runs or bailing on a tight running lane to fight against traffic for (at best) a minimal gain and (at worst) a loss of yardage that puts us behind schedule.

While we’ve been letting him work through those issues early in this season, we kept things much simpler for his backups once he was knocked out in the second quarter. Guerendo and Taylor combined for 15 carries and 115 yards. All of their runs were variations of zone or stretch concepts. This made sense for this matchup but also from a developmental standpoint.

Despite his 225-pound build and 4.3 speed, Guerendo hasn’t looked that big or that fast through the first month and a half of the season. His runs have often felt a bit robotic and he hasn’t yet figured out how his pacing and angles as a runner can set defenders up for failure–especially in zone and stretch concepts. That was once again the case for much of Thursday’s game, but it was good to see him get a bit more physical as his confidence grew. And to see his speed finally show up when we needed it most.

This is perfect blocking on the edge, but Guerendo’s ability to stay on his track without rushing things, then lets him turn on the jets as he bursts through the hole and blow-up the safety’s angle. Little things like that go a long way when you run a 4.3.

We entered this season expecting Guerendo to be our fourth running back. Injuries changed that in a hurry. When CMC gets back we’re almost certainly looking at a two-man rotation with Mason, but the reps Guerendo is getting now could prove invaluable towards his long-term development. 

Sideline shots. I thought the Seahawks did a pretty good job of mixing up coverages in this game, but in the rare instances where we wanted to go deep, we did a good job of playing to their tendencies. The Seahawks are primarily a press-bail Cover 3 team but their favorite mix-up coverage is Quarters. So our primary deep ball route combination was some variation of a drift-wheel concept.

In the first half, we lined up in pistol with a twin stack to our left. We’re pulling a guard and showing downhill run action in hopes of springing open the drift route behind biting linebackers or the wheel/delay fade route down the sideline.

In response, the Seahawks are either in a two-high pattern matching coverage. I honestly can’t tell if it’s quarters or something like Cover 2 match because of how many people bit on the play fake. But against this pass concept, the rules are similar.

In quarters, the outside cornerback will run with the #1 WR on anything vertical. In cover 2 match, he’ll do the same unless the #2 receiver breaks outside immediately. In both quarters and cover 2 match, the near safety will run with #2 on anything vertical, but—if #2 does anything short—the safety will leave him and try to “rob” #1, essentially creating bracket coverage.

Knowing this, we have Deebo release straight ahead and delay his route with stutter steps (and a run block fake) until Aiyuk exits his vertical stem and breaks into the drift route. This ensures that—regardless of quarters or cover 2 match—the corner will read #1 vertical and stick on Aiyuk while the near safety will read #2 shallow and move his eyes to Aiyuk as well. And with the linebackers underneath having either bit on the run fake or keying Purdy’s eyes in hopes of jumping underneath routes…

Deebo has snuck outside of the coverage and down the sideline. The near safety finally sees this and works to recover, but Purdy intentionally puts the ball a touch inside and behind his receiver. This makes Deebo slow up and come back to the ball, essentially messing up the angle of the safety–who is hoofing it while in catch-up mode–and letting Deebo wall the ball off from the defender.

The result is a catch and run down the sideline for a 76-yard score.

In the second half, we go back to a similar concept for our only other completion thrown more than 15 yards downfield. 

This time, we’re in a pure dropback with five guys out on routes, but it’s still functionally a two-man drift-wheel/fade concept. Only this time, we’ve added a clearout (Aiyuk) and two underneath routes (Guerendo/Juice). Think of the hard play action version as trying to get the linebackers to move forward on the play fake to throw over their heads, while this dropback version wants the safeties to bail deep on the clearout to throw underneath them. We’re still attacking the same zone in the same way, we’re just manipulating a different group of defenders to attack it further down the field.

Here, the Seahawks look to be in Cover 6, so quarters rules to the top of the screen and Cover 2 rules to the bottom.

Just as before, the timing is critical so that Deebo’s break inside pulls the outside corner and the near safety just as Kittle breaks outside. And with all of the linebackers dropping and reading Purdy’s eyes…

They get caught up inside and Purdy makes an easy throw down the sideline to a wide-open Kittle. 

Remember, the Ravens last season picked off Purdy three times largely because they were spot-dropping to our hot spots on the inside and having their linebackers and low safeties read Purdy’s vision. This trend continued into the Super Bowl with Spagnuolo’s “vision rat” defenders and has become a larger trend throughout the league as the Ravens system and sim pressures percolate the NFL.

In both of these plays, we use that to our advantage–pinning the Seahawks’ linebackers inside with Purdy’s eyes and their DBs inside with their pattern match rules before outflanking them to the sideline. As more and more teams try to replicate what the Ravens (and other teams) did successfully against us last year, it’s cool to see how we start to adapt to punish them for it. And if they get tired of getting beat down the sideline and start to play us straight? Then those digs and slants will open back up in a hurry.

Second Half Slog. But what about that butthole-clenching moment in the second half when it was a two-score game? What caused three consecutive punts after we’d sliced and diced this defense so thoroughly coming out of the half? The easiest (see: laziest) answer is penalties and sloppy execution taking us out of the run game and putting us in third and longs.

In those three drives that ended in punts, we had three penalties, one botched play (Brendel likely couldn’t hear the cadence), and third downs of 18, 10, and 9 yards. While we’d hope we’d be better at climbing back from long downs and distances by now, the best way to get our offense off track is still to generate negatives on first and second downs. 

Offensively and defensively, we’re still very much a work in progress. But it’s nice to be able to do this sort of damage while still dealing with injuries and execution issues.

DEFENSE

Hats off to Sorensen and the defense. Yes, we allowed two long touchdown drives in the second half to keep this game annoyingly tight, but we also forced three turnovers and held the Seahawks to only 358 yards of offense and 17 points on 73 offensive plays. Our DC put together an A+ game plan on a short week while piloting an injury-ravaged defense, and it all started with a mammoth effort against the run.

Good v. Bad. The Seahawks haven’t exactly been world-beaters in the run game over the past few weeks, but our front seven held them to 52 yards on a laughable 2.6 ypc. There were some well-timed stems and stunts up front, but we weren’t doing anything crazy schematically to get there. We were just playing cleaner and more confidently.

Sorensen last week talked about “bad” missed tackles and “good” missed tackles, and I think it’s worth bringing that up here. Because we had just as many missed tackles against the Seahawks as we did against the Cardinals, but those missed tackles felt very different. Against the Cardinals, we were missing tackles in the hole or in space that led to an additional 5+ yards down the field. Those are “bad” missed tackles. They were misses that put the rest of our defense in a worse spot. Against the Seahawks, many of our missed tackles were from players being aggressive or trying to grab someone in the backfield or on the edge. So while they may have missed the tackle, they still slowed up the ball carrier and forced him into defensive help. They were misses that still fit within the scheme of the defense.

Front and Center. While we only sacked Geno once, our whopping 31 pressures were our second-best total on the year (32 against New England), with Nick Bosa registering an outrageous 14(!!!) of those pressures himself. Once again, we’ve seen that (for better or worse) our defense runs through our ability to generate consistent pressure up front. Sure, you could say that holds true with most defenses, but–unlike most defenses these days–we rely less on deception and the threat of extra bodies and more on our front four just winning. 

Checking the Checks. In our losses, our defense has had a bad habit of getting beaten by a look early and then getting beaten by a similar look later in the game (typically in back-breaking fashion). The Seahawks tried to replicate that in the second half while deploying a “check with me” offense on some critical third downs. I don’t know what our rules were when this happened, but Warner would regularly wait for them to see the defense and change the play before we’d then check to something else entirely.

Back Seven Developments. Rookies Malik Mustapha and Renardo Green both put up career-high PFF grades while securing a pick each, Isaac Yiadom still needs to improve a bit as a run defender but has only allowed 3 of 9 catches over the past three weeks after being hard-targeted earlier in the season. It’s still a work in progress, but If Ward can come back healthy and closer to his 2023 form, our secondary could round into shape in a hurry.

Special Teams Will Be Mentioned Until Morale Improves. I miss the years of special teams being a sporadic low-key problem versus a consistent high-key momentum-swinging game-losing problem. Nothing new here. Just a re-iteration that there’s gotta be something new here if we want to have high-level success this season.

Also, Eric Wright dislocated his shoulder on one of our bad second-half kickoffs. So we just signed Anders Carlson to our practice squad in case he can’t go on Sunday. I’m sure there’s a reason for this (perhaps he won a tryout) but the last time we saw Carlson he was pretty damn bad. In his one year with the Packers, he missed five extra points and nearly half of his attempts beyond 40 yards. In his last game with the Packers, he missed a 41-yarder against us deep in the fourth quarter of the divisional round. That kept the Packers’ lead at four and allowed Purdy to drive us down the field for the game-winning touchdown.

Let’s hope he’s gotten better. Or that he doesn’t have to play.

NEXT UP: SUNDAY vs. THE ABSOLUTE BONERS (5-0) @ 1:25 PM

One of only two remaining unbeaten teams and coming off a bye week (Andy Reid is 21-3 coming out of byes), the Chiefs are as formidable as they are annoying. But they’ve needed some luck in winning four one-score contests and their point differential is worse than every team in the NFC North. This is a machine, but I wouldn’t call it a juggernaut.

Despite injuries to Rashee Rice and Isaiah Pacheco, their offense continues to charge forward on the back of the creativity of Andy Reid, the arm of Patrick Mahomes, and a talented interior line. Our beat-up DT corps will have their hands full in this one, and our success on defense could hinge on how well we can slow them in the running game and pressure their sketchy tackles. Andy Reid coming out of the bye means they’ll have some designer plays built just for us, so we’ll have to adjust to make sure they’re one-offs (or none-offs) rather than the foundation for a recurring issue (like the fly sweeps two years ago).

Defensively, the Chiefs press more than twice as much as anyone else in the league and are a high-volume quarters and split-field coverage team. But they also run as much Cover 0 as anyone. We know from the Super Bowl that they can bracket up and blitz with abandon if they think that’s the best path forward, so pass protection will be key against a defense that has been one of the league’s best against the run but is a bit more susceptible on the backend with the loss of L’Jarius Sneed. If we can regularly get their safeties in one-on-ones, we’re probably doing alright offensively.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

49ers 23, Cardinals 24

digging holes

Another week, another inexcusable loss to an underwhelming divisional foe. Now, as we enter a two-month stretch against eight straight teams currently with winning records, our margin for error has largely evaporated. And we have only ourselves to blame.

Fortunately (unfortunately?) we’ve been here before. In 2022, when we started 3-4 before running off 10 straight to close the season. In 2021, when we were 2-4 before an 8-2 finish secured us a wildcard spot. In both those seasons, we made the NFC Championship Game. We know how this goes. And we know that the road will be bumpy.

Sneaking into the playoffs from a bloated middle class may be more realistic in a season like this, when—through five games—only five NFL teams have fewer than 2 losses, but our early-season stumbles sure have made Thursday’s game in Seattle feel like a must-win situation. A victory puts us in a tie atop the NFC West. A loss and we’re suddenly the guy holding a rubber chicken in a knife fight.

Because after the Seahawks we have the Chiefs—who will be coming off a bye—then the Cowboys—who will be coming off a bye. Then before you know it we’ll be hosting the Seahawks—who will be coming off a bye—before traveling to Buffalo for a night game in December to play the Bills, who will be–you guessed it–coming off a bye. If we’re going to right the ship, we’ll have to do it at some point during this stretch of the schedule while juggling a historically bad rest differential of -21 days.

OFFENSE

There are so many moments in each game—and statistics, advanced or otherwise—that support the idea that we’re an excellent offense. We almost always move the chains, leading the league by a mile in drives where we pick up at least one first down. We hold the ball on our possessions for longer than any other team, meaning we often string together multiple first downs and rarely stop the clock with incompletions. And we get into the red zone as often as any team in football. Unfortunately, that’s where the good times have come to a grinding halt.

Short Yardage Slump. This week we were a pathetic 1 of 6 in converting red zone looks into touchdowns, with two of those trips resulting in zero points. That dropped our red zone touchdown rate to 40.9% on the season, which beats out only the lowly Patriots and the Tua-less Dolphins for the third-worst mark in the league.

Let’s look at how all six of those red zone possessions ended.

1Q - Field goal from the 10-yard line. 
1Q - Touchdown pass from the 4-yard line.
2Q - Field goal from the 2-yard line.
2Q - Field goal from the 7-yard line as time expired in the half.
3Q - Turnover on downs from the 27(!!!)-yard line when we didn’t have a kicker.
4Q - Jordan Mason’s fumble on the 12-yard line.

We’ll talk about the turnover on downs later, but the two attempts in italics don’t need much explaining. One was a touchdown and one was a back-breaking mistake. However, the three attempts in bold are worth mentioning from a macro-decision-making level.

Talking to Management. 3rd-and-longs are difficult. Passing in the red zone is difficult. Compound the two and a fourth-and-goal from the 10-yard line should be a field goal attempt almost every time. But the fourth-and-goal form the 2-yard line in the second quarter? That’s another story.

Inside the two-yard line–when you have the legitimate threat of a run or a pass–I think you should basically be going for it every time. There are a few specific instances when you’d kick the ball (like if you were down by two with time running out), but this isn’t one of them. 

As for the field goal from the 7-yard line? The logic makes sense to me for the same reasons it made sense from the 10-yard line. But I did have issues with the process we took to get to that situation. 

While scoring as time expires is always the ideal situation, we’re often so hyper-focused on the opponent not getting the ball before the half that we let far too much time run off the clock. This limits the calls we can make and the way we can execute them. For instance, we had a 1st-and-goal from the ARI 7 with 16 seconds left on the clock. Yes, we were able to barely squeeze out three pass attempts at the endzone before kicking, but–because we’d let a minute twenty run off the clock on the first two plays of that drive–those passes were rushed. The concepts we could run were limited. There wasn’t enough time for a sprint out pass, a bootleg, or a patented Purdy scramble. The ball had to get out of his hands quickly. And the plays HAD to be passes. 

We easily could have been more uptempo earlier in that drive and given ourselves some run-pass optionality and play-calling flexibility down by the goalline. Now, would speeding up earlier run the risk that we might give the ball back to the Cardinals with time for a few plays left on the clock? Yes. But I’d rather give them 25 seconds after a touchdown than settle for a field goal. The way we approach the ends of halves often feels too much like we’re playing for a kick rather than a touchdown. Possessions and scoring opportunities are critical, and in a game where we only had four possessions in the second half, these kinds of decisions—which fail to maximize our scoring output—are magnified. 

We don’t need another hero. Let’s talk about that last red zone attempt: the turnover on downs from the ARI 27. To me, this was the worst game of the year for Purdy. He had his moments–especially in the second quarter–where he diced up the Cardinals, but there were signs last week that he was holding the ball too long for the homerun and neglecting checkdowns. And that trend continued in a bad way in this game.

Shanahan said after the game that the Niners were comfortable kicking field goals with Wishnowsky from about the 15-yard line and in. With that in mind, Purdy CANNOT take a scramble-around sack for -9 yards on second-and-14 from the ARI 18. It’s one thing if a free blitzer came in and Purdy had no shot, but he could have gotten rid of that ball earlier. He could have dumped it off to an underneath receiver, or—if no one had opened up—just thrown it away. It was second down and we were mere yards from a comfortable field goal attempt.

Purdy has to have better situational awareness there and know that–in this odd and unlikely scenario–he may be in the red zone but he’s also on the cusp of giving up points. Instead, he takes the sack, we throw an incomplete on third down, and we functionally use the fourth down as a punt to pin the Cardinals back deeper into their territory. That’s a likely three points off the board.

Plays like this make me a bit more willing than usual to blame Purdy for his interception on the final drive. Here we’re lined up in a standard 2x2 set with Kittle in-line and we’re trying to send our outside receivers on deep comebacks, our slot on a two-high splitting skinny post, and Kittle on a delayed shallow in case the secondary plays way off.

The Cardinals line up in what looks like some kind of Cover 3 or man variation but are actually sending six and backing way off in a quarter-quarter-half shell.

This means the Saints have an unblockable overload blitz to the side of the running back but that Kittle will open early and with plenty of space to run. And that’s exactly what happens.

The middle linebacker—the only defender who could make a play on Kittle—has totally lost him and is instead eyeing Purdy (almost like a spy defender). The two DBs to the left of the formation are bailing deep to cover the vertical routes. Kittle is WIDE open with a ton of room to run if Purdy hits him here.

But he doesn’t. In a hurry to get the play snapped, Purdy missed the overload blitz and he holds too long on the skinny post in hopes that it will break open. By the time he starts the throw to Kittle, it’s too late. The result is a game-losing interception off a QB hit. Purdy had been big-game hunting all day long, and he did it one too many times here, costing us the game in the process.

We love how Purdy can improvise, buy time, and make plays off-schedule. But there needs to be a balance. We need to hit the plays ON-SCHEDULE first. Because hero ball is NOT (nor has ever been) a sustainable offense.

Identity Crisis. It’s great that we can throw the ball deep this season and that we can deploy more dropback looks in varied situations. That allows Purdy more time to see coverages develop without having to turn his back for play-action looks, gives us more firepower on long downs-and-distances, and in general allows us to attack defenses with another look. But it’s hard not to feel like we may have overcorrected and that our offensive identity has become foggy as a result. 

Our dropback game has always been the least advanced and unique aspect of our offense, and our skew toward true pass sets seems to have taken away from the explosive play-action passes, intense misdirection, and YAC generators that we’ve excelled at for so many years. 

Shanahan is calling the offense more like when he had Matt Ryan at the helm than at any other point in his tenure with the 49ers. That’s a testament to his ever-growing trust in Purdy. But there’s got to be a middle ground where we can still showcase the power run game and play action haymakers that we’ve thrived on for years.

The good thing is it’s still early. By figuring out how much Purdy can handle now, he gets important reps for the stretch run and we gain the confidence in him to call more pure dropback passes when the games get tight and the defenses get more savvy. But for now, let’s lower the level of difficulty (and variance) a bit, and get back to what we do best.

One Stat to Rule Them All. Since the beginning of 2022, we are an NFL-best 29-3 when we don’t turn the ball over two or more times (and one of those three losses was week 18 last year when we rested our starters). But when we turn the ball over 2 or more times, we are 2-11, which is tied for 24th in the league. Turnovers are always important in football, but the formula is especially clear for us. We are practically unbeatable when we take care of the ball (the last game we lost without a turnover was the season opener of 2020). But when we give the ball up in bunches, we struggle more than most to keep up.

DEFENSE

Yards per play is far from a be-all, end-all stat, but it’s worth noting that through 17 regular season games last year, we gave up upwards of 6.0 ypp three times. Through five games this season, two teams have already eclipsed that mark. And one of them was THIS team.

To be fair, things were promising in bunches. We only allowed 10 points and were stout against the (non-QB) running game in the first half. But that changed in a hurry. We held the Cardinals to zero first downs three times. But also allowed them to score on three straight long drives to end the game. The Cardinals were only 4-of-11 on third- and fourth-down attempts. But two of those successful conversions kept their last two scoring drives alive.

Running Man. They referenced this stat like fifty times throughout the game but James Connor going 6 for 9 yards (1.5 ypc) in the first half and 13 for 77 yards (5.9 ypc) is telling. So were the 14 missed tackles the Niners racked up. And the fact that the Niners only had four offensive drives in the entire second half. We couldn’t stop the run or get off the field to save our lives.

We kinda knew that the Cardinals–who were first in the league in conversion % on third-and-short and last in the league on third-and-long–would live and die by their ability to run on early downs. So when the Cardinals got their run game going, everything snowballed from there.

Injuries didn’t help here. Javon Hargrave is out the year and Yetur Gross-Matos–who was expected to play more inside reps to help shoulder the load–had knee surgery on Friday and is out at least 1-2 months. Talanoa Hufanga had to leave the game after 11 snaps with a wrist injury and will almost certainly miss the Thursday night game. And Fred Warner–despite playing the whole game at mike linebacker and racking up a team-leading 12 tackles–was clearly hampered by his ankle sprain. But the fact remains that the guys who did play had to tackle and fit the run better. And they didn’t.

The Sequel No One Wanted. Then there were Kyler Murray’s rushing yards. Murray is the fastest QB in football and is tough to bring down in the open field when he takes off scrambling, but 70 of his 83 yards were on designed runs.

So far in every one of our losses, our defense has gotten beat multiple times by a recurring concept. The Vikings forced bad switches with bunch sets and exploited the “safety on JJ” coverage for—among other things—a 97-yard touchdown. The Rams ran duo over and over and motioned Tutu Atwell into bunches on crossing routes against our vacated interior when we went man. The Cardinals also beat us with switches (I don’t know what the problem is with our communication on the edges), but the recurring backbreaker was the read option.

On the first drive of the game, the Cardinals have shifted their third tight end (#84) to the left of the formation and are planning to run a pistol duo read to the right. The tight end is going to loop around and kick out our corner, with Bosa (in the red triangle) as the read man. If he crashes inside, Kyler will pull. If he sits, Kyler will give the ball to Conner.

We’re slanting weak-side so—versus a read play—this is basically squeeze scrape, meaning Bosa and DeVondre Campbell will switch gap responsibilities against the run (run fits are shown with dotted lines). Bosa will slant inside, causing Kyler to pull the ball, and DeVondre Campbell will be tasked with working outside to play the QB, or—in this case—reset the edge and funnel Kyler inside to help.

On the snap, an excellent ball fake (with Conner turning his backside shoulder away from the defenders to hide the ball he doesn’t have) and bad reads from Warner and Huf take all of our support defenders inside. While DeVondre is too slow to trigger downhill, gets hooked, and gives up his outside shoulder—thus giving Kyler a free path to the edge.

Realistically, neither Huf nor Warner was likely going to make this play because they’d bit too far inside, but—if Kyler was forced up the field into help—Huf at least had a shot. Instead, Campbell gets hooked, Ward doesn’t step up soon enough or aggressively enough to squeeze down the hole, and Kyler hits the edge for long, untouched score.

Fast forward to 2:08 left in the fourth quarter. The Cardinals are driving for the game-winning field goal. They’re on our 46 and are running almost the exact same concept.

They’re in gun instead of pistol this time and don’t have the loop-around blocker from the back side, but they once again have two tight ends to the formation’s right and are optioning Bosa with duo read. And we’re once again slanting inside to combat it.

Just like before, we know that Bosa will go inside and Kyler will pull the ball. But now, we’re in much more of a pass defense look. Mustapha, who is eight yards off the line of scrimmage, and Campbell will be tasked with playing the quarterback on a pull and forcing him back inside to help.

Unfortunately, on the snap, Warner gets caught up inside by a second-level blocker, Campbell gets blown off the line of scrimmage by a tight end—widening a hole that we wanted to shrink—and Mustapha has been slow to trigger in run support, opening that hole even further.

If we’d been able to hold the line on the edge and push Kyler back inside, the hope is Warner and Ji’Ayir could have cleaned him up for a short gain.

But by the time Kyler has hit the hole, Campbell has been widened from just outside the hash to just inside the numbers, Ji’Ayir and Warner are far too inside to be able to close that distance, and Kyler scampers for a free run of 13 yards that puts the Cardinals into field goal position.

These were well-structured plays that were called at the right time. It’s not easy to know when they’re coming and the option game is always mathematically difficult to stop. But we have got to stop getting beat in critical downs with these kinds of repeat concepts.

Blitzgression to the Mean. I wondered last week if we were going to see more blitzing from our defense to (a) make up for our dwindling depth and mediocre success rates up front and (b) take DeVondre Campbell out of coverage situations. At least for this week, the answer was yes and yes. Unfortunately, the efficacy of those blitzes was not particularly good. 

We blitzed on 36% of dropbacks on Sunday, the 10th-highest rate in the league, and a continuation of a season-long trend towards sending extra men.

Unfortunately, those blitzes led to little success. Which is also a troubling season-long trend. Even with all the pressure we generated on blitzes last week against the Patriots’ JV offensive line, our season total numbers when blitzing have resulted in a 67% completion percentage and a league-worst passer rating of 150.2.

Not great, Bob. Not great.

While our scheme was built as a four-man pressure unit, it is possible to blitz and blitz well out of our defense. The Jets have been doing it this season without their holdout edge rusher and their defense is still one of the top units in the league. The Texans have also been upping their rush rate, with Ryans going to the double mug well to great success as of late. So it’s possible. Which is good. Because with two of our three best pass rushers gone from last season, we will probably need to send extras a healthy amount to turn things around defensively.

Mooney Matters. Not quite sure what’s been going on but Charvarius Ward–who was legitimately a top 5 corner last season–has struggled in coverage through these first five weeks. While Isaac Yiadom only allowed one catch on Sunday (it was the big 4th down one to Marvin Harrison Jr.) and Lenoir blanked his matchups, Ward gave up three catches for 75 yards and a 116.7 passer rating. 

In 2022, Ward was PFF’s 6th-best corner. In 2023, he hopped up to 5th. Through five games thus far, he’s ranked 89th. Ward’s not hiding from it. After this game, he told the media that he was playing “the worst ball of his career.” Considering one of Ward’s signature games last season was blanketing DK Metcalf against the Seahawks, it would be a good time for him to shake that funk and figure things out.

Return of the Mack? I don’t know how well this would go over with our newly installed DC or if we’d be looking at a "too many cooks” situation with Staley already in the building, but you can’t help but wonder if recently-fired former DC Robert Saleh can get back to Santa Clara ASAP—even as just a consultant.

Saleh didn’t kill it as a head coach in NY, but he unquestionably got railroaded by an incompetent GM, a horrendous OC who was forced on him by a meddling owner, a neverending game of shitty QB roulette, and Aaron Rodgers’ best attempt at late-stage Lebron cosplay. Good luck running zero motion and throwing slants and high-difficulty fades to Allen Lazard 🫡

I’m sure it’ll turn out great.

But if this is the scheme we’re sticking to long-term (or even if it isn’t), it may make sense to get Saleh—one of the best to ever run it and a guy beloved by our locker room—back in the fold.

NEXT UP: THURSDAY DEATHMATCH @ SEATTLE (3-2) @ 5:15 PM

The Mike Macdonald era started with three straight wins before a highly entertaining slop-fest shootout of a Monday night loss against the Lions led to a shocking home loss to a Giants team without Malik Nabers or its starting running back (tbf, their starting running back is Devin Singletary so…). While the Seahawks seem to have taken well to Macdonald’s coaching and his staff has pulled them out of the schematic stone age, it’s tough to tell what’s real and what’s a product of a schedule against some of the worst offenses known to man.

As the godfather of the modern amoeba defense, Mike Macdonald’s scheme is all about varying coverages and fronts while sending (or simming) blitzes from all over the field. He wants his defense to feature many interchangeable parts (kind of like our offense) and so far that’s resulted in a heavy use of three-safety lineups. Macdonald loves to put that extra safety into the nickel while curling up his big-ass corners into press coverage, basically attempting to eliminate the outsides with his corners and letting everyone else create confusion and havoc on the interior. Right now this Seahawks defense is a bit beat up, particularly along the DL, but they had a few of their injured guys return last week and expect a few more to return by Thursday. While they’ll certainly be more formidable at full strength, it’s important to note that this defense has faced off against Bo Nix (in his first NFL start), Jacoby Brissett, Skylar Thompson, Jared Goff—who went 18-of-18 and CAUGHT a touchdown against them—and Daniel Jones—who kinda diced them up while throwing to Darius Slayton. Through three weeks they looked like one of the surprise units of the season. But after giving up 78 points over the last two weeks, we can’t even be certain they’re good. Again, injuries are big here, so the truth is probably somewhere in the middle.

Offensively, the Seapenises have imported Ryan Grubb from last year’s University of Washington team. He runs a modern pro-style offense, which means it’s the most advanced thing Seattle has seen since Mike Holmgren was in charge. Kenneth Walker is their bell cow, and he can break a big run at any time (especially if we tackle like we did against the Cardinals), while their trio of pass catchers remains potent. Former Niner Laken Tomlinson has paired with Charles Cross to give them solid play along the left side of their OL but the right side is somewhere between bad and terrible. Their right guard, Anthony Bradford, is graded as PFF’s 69th guard out of 70 qualifiers. Right tackle Stone Forsythe is PFF’s 74th tackle out of 78. Blanketing DK, tackling well, and taking advantage of those two question marks along the line seems like the best recipe for success.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

49ers 30, Patriots 13

on the path to good

With so many pre-season darlings stumbling out of the blocks, this could be a year where many of the end-game contenders emerge from what could be a burgeoning middle class. So while our performance was too sloppy and our opposition too horrendous to call it a “get right” game, Sunday was a much-needed victory in a season where W’s may be at a premium. 

OFFENSE

With 431 yards on 7.2 ypp, we carved chunks out of the Patriots’ defense like the roast beef guy at Hometown Buffet. But missteps and sloppiness prevented us from truly actualizing our full potential. Is that still good for one of the game’s better offenses? Yes. According to DVOA, we’re the league’s 7th-ranked offense. EPA also has us ranked 7th. And per PFF, we’re the top offense in the country. But there’s potential (and reasonable expectation) for much more. And we likely need to hit those lofty heights if we want to ride this unit to the promised land.

Fuck it, go deep. The Patriots loaded the box against the run and played man across, basically daring us to throw over them to open up the offense. We happily (perhaps too happily) obliged, hucking the ball deep down the field more regularly than we have all season. Purdy finished the game 4-of-7 for 142 yards and a pick on passes that traveled 20+ yards downfield, completing two deep crossers and–once they started keying those–two big posts further down the field. This helped contribute to Purdy’s weirdly low completion percentage (55.5%) and season-high in yards per attempt (10.7). 

This was not the cleanest Purdy game, as the aggressive nature of the script seemed to lead to him occasionally vacating the pocket a bit early and locking onto deep receivers a beat too long. But it did help reiterate what we already knew–that a gameplan like this might have slowed down our 2020 offense, but Purdy can (and wants to) sling it deep when the occasion arises. With so many teams loading boxes and stuffing defenders into the middle of the field, the more ways we can beat defenses, the better we’ll be down the stretch. 

It’s also worth noting that while the Patriots’ defense is considerably different than the Flores / Macdonald-style systems that are currently permeating the league, the top-down strategy for attacking it might be translatable. After all, one of the biggest weaknesses of Cover 2 is just passing concepts that send three or four dudes vertical. So if you can throw it deep, it may be worth sacrificing some consistency and completion percentage for big chunk yardage. That’s easier said than done against the sort of pressures those teams can apply, but when we can protect upfront, don’t be surprised if we have a few more games where we let it rip in a way that would have seemed unfathomable a few years ago.

More like the “dead” zone (count it). After stalling out inside the Patriots’ ten-yard line on both of our opening drives, we finished the game 2-for-4 on converting red zone opportunities into touchdowns–matching the 50% mark we’ve had this season. That coin-flip figure, which lands us right around the league average, is still miles away from the 68% mark we led the league with last season. But we’re not alone.

Across the NFL, scoring has dropped but redzone scoring has plummeted–in part because passing success rate and on-target percentages have cratered inside the 20s. While the latter has been on a steady decline since 2016, there’s a chance this dip in redzone scoring balances itself as the season goes on. Only time will tell. But if we can up our game inside the twenties faster than average, it could go a long way towards separating ourselves in what has been the lowest-scoring NFL season in a decade.

Bumbling Balls. Clean execution would help up that scoring. With three fumbles (one on special teams) and an endzone pick, our carelessness with the ball let the Patriots stay in the game longer than they should have. The string of penalties (even if a lot of them were trash) didn’t help either. Now there’s an argument that the Patriots are so devoid of offensive talent that they were never truly in this game, but the point stands. Our record when we win the turnover differential is unquestioned. So is the negative impact of penalties that put us behind the sticks and into passing mode. Cleaning up our red zone game may increase our offensive ceiling, but fixing our execution and ball-security issues is the best way to raise our floor. 

Lacking YAC. Ever since Shanahan arrived in 2017, even when we’ve sucked we’ve been at the top of the league in YAC yardage. A month into the season, this hasn’t been the case. After placing 1st (2021, 2023) and 2nd (2022) in yards after catch per reception over the past three years, we’re currently ranked 31st. Some of this has to do with CMC, Deebo, and Kittle–three of the top players in the game at generating YAC yardage–missing a combined six games through four weeks. But this is the same scheme that–on a short week with a last-second COVID scratch in 2020–led Richie James to 184 yards receiving on 15 YAC/catch. So what gives?

A lot of this is a product of opposing defenses’ heavy emphasis on two-high shells while crowding the middle of the field. This not only takes away our favorite hot spots in the passing game but funnels passes to the outside, where a receiver’s proximity to the sideline lessens YAC potential. Additionally, with extra bodies in the shallow areas, the passing windows that used to belong to slants, square-ins, and other “on-the-run” routes are now smaller and more likely to be attacked with routes where receivers sit in the zone or curl back to the quarterback.

The result has been less YAC yardage but similar total yardage. Purdy led the league in yards per attempt last year and continues to lead it in 2024 while pacing the NFL in overall passing yards. The passing yardage isn’t gone. It’s just that the point of completion is further down the field with less room to run. Hopefully, as the season goes on, we can find a healthy middle ground. Because I do miss the childlike glee that comes with Deebo catching a slant route in space.

DEFENSE

Neutering this Patriots offense is about as impressive as using your turn signal. Sure, some people can’t do it, but that doesn’t mean it’s impressive. Due to that, all defensive improvements should be considered with a grain of salt. But that doesn’t mean we can’t get excited about a few positive developments in a unit that has struggled early this season. 

The Heft. What happens when Javon Hargrave goes down for (likely) the season and Jordan Elliott, his replacement, gets hurt in the first half? Naturally, our interior DL responds with 5 sacks. Rookie UDFA Evan Anderson–in his first call-up NFL game–registered his first career sack on a clean-up play, Maliek Collins added 1.5 sacks of his own, and Kevin Givens registered more sacks (2.5) in this game than he had in any season in his previous 5 years in the NFL. 

On the edges, Nick Bosa demolished the poor tackle he was matched up against, Leonard Floyd registered three QB hits, and Sam Okuayinonu–in limited but growing snaps–continues to look like a potential diamond in the rough–registering two pressures, a QB hit, and a forced fumble. This was both a promising and a sobering reminder of how we structure our defense. When the pass rush is eating, the timing of everything else falls into place.

Blitz Boys. But was our upfront dominance more a product of our talent on the defensive line, the terrible Patriots OL we were facing, or our foray into blitzing? Despite entering this game last in the NFL in blitz rate, we took a page from the Jets’ playbook a week ago and ramped up our blitz rate closer to the league average (~30%). 10 hits, six sacks, and 168 yards of passing allowed would indicate that the blitzing worked. But was this a one-week aberration that we committed to after seeing it work against the Pats a week ago or a sign of things to come?

Youth Movement. The silver lining of injuries is you get to give the kids some run, and this was a great “transition game” to test the readiness of some of our younger defenders. We talked about Okauyinonu and Anderson, who both played 19 snaps on defense, but Malik Mustapha started and played every snap at safety in place of Hufanga, Dee Winters played in three linebacker sets (they were likely still holding him out from big snaps for health reasons), and–for the first time this season–Renardo Green got more snaps with the first-team defense than Isaac Yiadom. Even Tatum Bethune played a handful of snaps late when Flannigan-Fowles got banged up.

All-in-all the kids performed well. Both the d-linemen played great. Mustapha got shook bad on a third-down completion but otherwise seemed comfortable playing major snaps. And Green was only targeted once (on the deep ball that Ja’Lynn Polk almost caught), so we may have to wait until next week to get a better read on whether he should replace Yiadom in the starting lineup. 

Glasses and fake mustaches. Over the past two games, I’ve been on the Niners’ about telegraphing pressure and man coverage on crucial downs and then getting promptly burnt as a result. So it was nice to see Sorensen go to what initially looked like a similar look before backing off into a fire zone blitz to tremendous effect.

On this third-and-5, the Patriots are in trips and we’ve lined up in what looks like Cover 1 with six-man pressure.

To counteract this, the Patriots are trying to run what is functionally a weak side three receiver over concept with a strong side shallow underneath.

The thought is that one of these crossers will open against man and the shallow will either free up due to a natural pick or create a pick for someone else.

But we’re not in man. We’re dropping Campbell and Warner off the line of scrimmage and playing Cover 2 behind it. I’ll be honest, I don’t love straight Cover 2 against trips, but I do love the general idea of showing pressure and letting Warner use his unique set of skills to patrol and make plays in the middle of the field on critical downs.

The result was a lot of (sometimes clunky) hand-offs in the middle of the field, a confused picture for Brissett, and a highly enjoyable exclamation point to cap it all off.

All-Pro Fred. Granted, the play call above is only a good one and not an exceptional one if we had a mere mortal playing Mike linebacker. It’s been ten years since an off-the-ball linebacker won DPOTY, and during that stretch, only one non-lineman (Stephon Gilmore, 2021) has taken home the award. But Fred Warner is making quite the case for himself. He didn’t play in the second half after hurting his ankle late in the second quarter, but as of now, he’s listed as day-to-day.

HolyShitThoseSpecialTeamsThough. If it wasn’t for the last two weeks we might be able to write off some sketchy punt coverage and a fumbled kickoff return on injury depletion. Alas, the last two weeks did indeed happen. And man do our special teams suck.

It’s hard to pinpoint exactly why our special teams are so horrid. It would be too easy to say it’s our coordinator since he was one of the better special teams coordinators in the NFL for a decade with the Seahawks. It’s unlikely he’s just lost his touch. Maybe it’s not enough of an emphasis during practice? Maybe it’s not enough of an emphasis in our roster decisions?

It’s impossible to say from the outside. But mother of god is it a problem that needs fixing. There’s a very real argument that, with just adequate special teams play, we could be 4-0 right now. That kind of special teams ineptitude is how you guarantee an early (and likely devastating) playoff exit.

NEXT UP: SUNDAY VS. ARIZONA (1-3) @ 1:05 PT

For no reason whatsoever, the Cardinals have been kind of a pain in the ass for us over the years, tallying tough outs and random upsets with regularity (even when they suck). This year they probably(?) don’t suck, as they’ve had one-score losses against the Bills and the Lions and whupped a Rams team we just lost to. Then again, they just got blown out at home against the Commanders. So… ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

These Cardinals are schizophrenic even by Cardinal standards, but offensively we know they start hot (35 points in opening quarters this year), we know Kyler is off his two-year Call of Duty sabbatical and playing well, and we know James Conner continues to be difficult to tackle. Marvin Harrison Jr and Michael Wilson make for an intriguing young wide receiver corps, even if they don’t seem to be utilized that creatively, and Trey McBride—if he’s healthy—helps them tremendously as an underneath safety blanket.

Defensively, Gannon hails from the Fangio coaching tree, and his 3-4 base defense features a heavy dose of disguised coverages, sim blitzes, and just blitzes in general. Some of these complex defensive schemes elevate their personnel (Vikings) while others shape a creative and disruptive shell to showcase it (Ravens ‘23). In the case of these Cardinals, I’d argue the scheme mostly masks an overall lack of talent. They have a couple of players (Budda Baker comes to mind), but a whole lot of randos who feel ripe for the picking as long as we can sift through the smoke.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

49ers 24, Rams 27

bad, v bad

Last week’s loss was a complicated mess of factors against an ascending team. This one was just a bed shitting. 

In a game that felt like a classic Seahawks tilt from the jump—where the other team hangs around too long and a game that never should have been a game becomes one late—we arrived as the much better squad and looked it for the majority of the contest. But game flow issues, limited possessions, horrendous special teams, and massive execution issues down the stretch led to a truly pathetic giveaway. Our schedule is weeks from getting into its toughest stretch. This was not a game we could afford to lose.

Breaking Backs. For the second straight week, the swing plays killed us. If you wanna see how a team that racks up 425 yards of offense on 6.5 ypp can struggle to shut the door when they’re moving the ball steadily all day, look at the six drops, the soft holding call in the fourth quarter on a five-yard first down run that took us out of field goal range, or the massive miscues on special teams.

Football has never been a game about who dominates the largest majority of plays because so many of those plays are just set-ups for the critical moments that truly dictate the game. Chances to extend or steal possessions. Scoring opportunities on offense and defense. Losing a game like this means faltering in those moments, and we did exactly that in all three phases. On offense, it was mostly drops. On defense and special teams, it was unfortunately everything.

On the bright side, we’ve been here before—flailing early in a season and giving up games to lesser opponents—only to turn things around with massive win streaks and deep post-season runs down the stretch. But that doesn’t make it easier to stomach in the moment. And those seasons were brutally dramatic. So while we shouldn’t be anywhere close to writing off these Niners and their long-term goals, we should brace ourselves for a stressful season.

OFFENSE

The game plan was sound from the jump. Since the Rams are a quarters-dominant defense, we wanted to pound the rock and chip away in the passing game with intermediate routes. But accomplishing this required consistent execution, and–with three stars out on offense–our overall performance hinged largely on which of our lesser-used skill players would step up and which would falter.

Highs and Lows. Blowing past the expectations of even the most ardent Jauan Jennings stan, our bully ball receiver posted career highs across the board–dominating to the tune of 11 catches for 175 yards and 3 touchdowns. Some of those catches were more impressive than others…

…but all of them were desperately needed in a game where few other receivers stepped up.

Brandon Aiyuk was once again out-of-sorts with Purdy, dropping two balls–one a third down killer on a drive that could have broken the game open in the first half–and often struggling to get on the same page on timing routes. Meanwhile, Ronnie Bell tallied three drops, including a back-breaker on our last offensive drive which would have likely sealed a victory. In the post-game presser, Shanahan politely alluded to the idea that rookie Jacob Cowing was still grasping the offense (aka, he doesn’t know the whole playbook). Well, he’d better learn quick. Cause we’ve seen enough to know what Bell is and what he’s not. He seems like a hard worker and a good practice player, but once a roster spot has to open for Ricky Pearsall’s return from the PUP list, it would be surprising if Ronnie Bell were still on the active roster.

OL Stock Watch. Trent Williams has yet to round into the “destroyer of worlds” form we’ve come to expect from him, but he’s still playing at a very high level. Beside him, Banks has been consistently solid. Puni has taken some rookie lumps, but the arrow is still sky-high in his projections. And he’s not exactly being helped by the guys he’s paired with.

Any hope that McKivitz’s relatively strong finish to last year would roll over into this season has proved unfounded. His run blocking has improved, but he still paces our team in pressures allowed, and his whiff in pass pro directly led to Purdy’s fumble against the Rams. Meanwhile, Jake Brendel has joined him in receiving at least one absolute ass-beating in pass pro per game. Our 32-year-old center took a big step back in pass pro last season and he’s unfortunately still trending in that direction. The game against the Rams wasn’t as alarming as his first two contests but—after more than doubling his number of pressures allowed from 2022 to 2023—he’s currently on track to set another career-worst mark.

This is where it would be nice to have any young talent whatsoever at tackle or the point position. At tackle, we have Jaylon Moore and that’s about it. One injury puts us in a tough position. Two means we’re calling dudes off the street.

While at center, Drake Nugent is intriguing—as far as an undrafted free agent rookie on the practice squad can be intriguing—but certainly shouldn’t be playing any snaps this year. The same could have been said for Jarrett Kingston, even if his size and athleticism projected better before he got poached by the Panthers. Personally, I’d have rather kept Kingston than our current backup center, Nick Zakelj, who seems destined to follow in the footsteps of the Justin Skules before him—hanging around on the roster due to his intelligence, blocking more promising prospects, and never having the athleticism to ever give us valuable snaps. If things get really bad for Brendel, maybe the stopgap solution is Jon Feliciano, who likely has a claim to being one of our top five linemen once he returns from injury. But the most likely scenario is Brendel and McKivitz remain our starters at C and RT, pass pro issues be damned.

Purdy Good Though. The silver lining of this thoroughly messy start to the season is that Purdy–despite lesser stats than last year–has taken a sizable step forward in his play. His pocket presence is better, the out-of-structure plays he flashed have become a more regular (and more impressive) occurrence, and his accuracy and reads have gotten much more consistent. Yes, he had one fumble and missed the read on the shot play to Aiyuk that could have flipped this game in our favor, but the fumble was more of a McKivitz issue than a Purdy one, and Purdy created much more yardage out of structure than he missed within it.

Since his emergence, the constant knock on Purdy has been “Well, what would he do without all that talent around him?” Sunday, while playing without three All-Pros on offense, with his highly-paid receiver in a middling rut, and with only one guy consistently getting open and catching the ball, Purdy extended plays, rushed for 32 yards, and threw three tugs and only eight incomplete passes despite six drops. Sure, at least one of those drops was wiped away due to penalty, but Purdy kept us in the game. He’s taken the next step. If we can get healthy and clean up the execution elsewhere, our offense should be fine.

Through three up-and-down games, we’re third in yardage, fourth in yards per play, and seventh in scoring. Lots to clean up, and it would be nice to do so sooner rather than later, but I’m not particularly worried about our offense long-term.

DEFENSE

For now, I am stressing patience because it’s still early. But the second half of this contest was another L for Sorensen. Some hiccups from the offense were expected with so much talent missing, but we just allowed an undermanned Rams team to score on their last four straight possessions. Just three weeks into the season, opposing offenses have targeted the weak spots in our defense, and we’ve been happy to let them. Things will only get harder with the surprising news that Javon Hargrave—fresh off his best game of the season—is now out for the season (or at least the regular season) with a torn triceps.

Connectivity Problems. The one thing no one can argue about the short-lived Steve Wilks era is that he got excellent play from our secondary. So far, things have been much looser this year, whether that’s our coverage (Yiadom) or our communication. I didn’t notice nearly as many communication breakdowns this week, but it’s not a good sign how much separation this depleted crop of Rams receivers was able to generate when it mattered most. 

Tutu Atwell and Demarcus Robinson, two absolute randos deep on the Rams receiver depth chart, combined for 125 yards receiving against a fully healthy secondary. If that’s the sort of performance we can look forward to, what happens when we play a good receiver corps?

Where’s the rat? One of the major inflection points of the DeMeco Ryans DC era was when he started deploying Fred Warner in mug looks on critical downs, putting our star linebacker into the A gap on the line of scrimmage, forcing the OL into one-on-one looks against our pass rush, and then dropping Warner into coverage where he could take away anything across the middle. Sorensen has started to lean on something kind of similar, but the scheme behind those looks has changed and the execution has left much to be desired.

Here the Rams are facing a 3rd-and-8 in the first half.

We’re in a Cover 1 with Huf helping on anything deep. We’ve lined up six men on the line of scrimmage and four defenders to the weak side of the formation to force the OL to open their pass pro to the defensive left. The plan is to have our two tackles slant weak, occupy (hopefully) three linemen, and loop Floyd inside. Warner is rushing as well. Dee Winters (in yellow) is also looping across, but my guess is he’s on an adaptive loop path where he’ll bail off the rush and match up with the running back if he releases on a route.

This isn’t inherently unsound, but situationally, I have some issues. The Rams (and the Vikings last week) LOVE crossing routes, which inherently play to the weaknesses of this coverage. On third downs like these, our expectation should be a crossing route and our call should be one that understands that and has a defender patrolling the area. This is only exacerbated by the loss of Kupp and Nacua and the limitations of their remaining receivers.

Tutu Atwell—who is lined up in the slot—is a 5’9 155 pound wide receiver who ran a 4.39 at his pro day. That alone should tell you exactly what he runs. Deep routes and crossers. That’s what he ran against us on Sunday…

…and that’s what he’s running against us on this third down.

Stafford sees we’re in man coverage, checks the play at the line of scrimmage, motions Tutu Atwell into a bunch formation, and runs a full man-beater concept. The vertical man acts as a rub for the angle route, the crosser is out-leveraged by the late motion, and the return to the solo side is the fallback in case nothing else works.

It’s one thing to lose the rock-paper-scissors battle of playcalling. That happens to everyone. But we’re beat in multiple ways before the ball’s even snapped because we’re trotting out a defense whose greatest weakness is one of their single most common concepts. And we’re showing it pre-snap.

Not to mention, this kinda misses the point of why we went to those mug looks in the first place. Half the reason they work is because Warner is the best coverage linebacker in football. He can line up over the center on the line of scrimmage but is still fast enough to take away a wideout on a deep crosser. He’s the only person in the world who can do that. Use it. Drop him back and take out their crosser. Or have Dee Winters take a bluff rush step then drop back into the hole with eyes towards the first threat from the trips side.

Warner’s a strong pass rusher, and you gotta send him sometimes in these looks just to keep the offense honest. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. Either deploy a defense that matches up against what they wanna do most or bluff them one way or another. We’re making it too easy.

Hard Targets. In Sorensen’s defense, everything he does is limited by the fact that he has to hide two guys in coverage. Two guys who opposing offenses are hunting with regularity. Isaac Yiadom’s been in the vicinity but is consistently too loose in coverage—allowing 5-of-5 passes for 52 yards and committing a costly pass interference call on the Rams’ first scoring drive. While Devondre Campell let up 3-for-3 for 53 yards, a touchdown, and a 25-yard pass interference that set up the Rams’ game-winning field goal. Through three games, he’s now allowed 14-of-16 for 149 yards and a score.

At cornerback, we at least have bodies to throw at the problem. After adding Yiadom and Rock Ya-Sin, drafting Renardo Green in the second round, and the healthy return of Darrell Luter Jr. this should (theoretically) be the deepest cornerback room we’ve had in the ShanaLynch era. But Green is the only one of those guys who has been playing and it’s uncertain how much the coaching staff wants to throw him into the fire less than a month into his career.

Dee Winters—who had a strong off-season but missed the first two weeks of the season while recovering from an ankle injury—was rotating in and out with Campbell before re-injuring that ankle on the fake punt conversion—a plan the coaching staff said was in place during the summer. So they’re not blind to Campbell’s limitations. We also deployed a lot of five-man DL fronts in this game—likely to overload against the run (it didn’t really work) but also to find another way to put one less linebacker on the field. But given Winters could miss more time and Dre won’t return until mid-season at the earliest, we’ve gotta get creative.

Against the run, Campbell is decent. And according to PFF, he’s registered a pass rush grade of over 70+ in all three of his seasons in Green Bay. Maybe that means he’s more of an early-down player and—on passing downs—we either blitz him or pull him for a third safety. Maybe he can get by in coverage if we put less on his plate, deploying him only on a few different assignments with plenty of help. Whatever it is, we have to adjust our scheme and what we’re asking of our players so that Campbell and Yiadom aren’t so heavily targeted. Easier said than done, but if we don’t at least put in the effort, things are going to get worse before they get better. Or at least stay the same. Which is bad.

You can’t spell “special teams” without “ass.” A narrowly missed 55-yard field goal is annoying but at least excusable. But how many times do we have to see a coulda/shoulda blowout become a game due to a fake punt, a muffed punt, or a big punt return against us? This game ends before it begins if the Rams don’t convert on that fake (a fake that we expected but somehow still couldn’t stop). It likely goes to OT if we cover down on our punt. In the past two weeks, we’ve had a punt blocked, a punt muffed, a long punt return that led to the go-ahead points, and a fake punt that was converted against us on a touchdown drive.

That is unacceptable.

Depth Disparity. It’s worth noting that there were depth wins in this game. Jennings was the first Niners receiver to tally three touchdowns in a game since T.O. in 2001. Eric Saubert had a whiff in pass pro but otherwise looks like a sizeable improvement over Charlie Woerner at backup tight end. Jordan Mason—as the only one of our top three running backs who is healthy—is an absolute wrecking ball. But as much as those players were featured in a positive light, our issues elsewhere were just as bright.

Ronnie Bell is the most obvious scapegoat, but the fact that Devondre is even on the field is a testament to how our young linebackers taken in the past two drafts haven’t developed into playable territory. While Yiadom was added—and made a starter—this off-season because none of the many cornerbacks we’ve drafted over the years have asserted themselves beyond Lenoir. And while you could certainly point to the Trey Lance and CMC and Chase Young trades over the past years as gutting our high-round draft capital and leading to that lack of depth, our third-round whiffs have been at least equally as responsible.

I’ve always believed that any picks made in the first two days of the draft should be expected to play major snaps within a calendar year, and the third round is a natural place to add depth pieces who you can bring along slowly as rookies. But our third rounds have been barren for years. And that’s just magnified when we’ve been without so many first and second-round picks. 

Ji’Ayir Brown (2023) and Jake Moody (2023) are regular starters. Dominick Puni (2024) has started right away and could round into a stud. But Cameron Latu (2023), Tyrion Davis-Price (2022), Danny Gray (2022), and Trey Sermon (2021) were all whiffs. Ambry Thomas (2021) at least started some games but if we were at all confident in his ability in that role, we wouldn’t have imported Yiadom. While Drake Jackson (2022)—our only second-round pick over a two-year stretch—is out the year with a preseason injury. His most valuable contribution may wind up the three-sack season opener from last year. That’s half of his career sack total. 

Now there are some important caveats to be applied here before we get too out of control. We were missing three All-Pros on one side of the ball. There isn’t a unit in football (offensive or defensive) that’s not going to miss a beat with that kind of talent sidelined. And offensively, we only really felt that dropoff with Ronnie Bell’s disastrous outing at wideout—a position we did try to address in the off-season, both in the fourth round with Jacob Cowing—who likely doesn’t know the whole playbook after missing a big chunk of training camp—and in the first with Ricky Pearsall. He just happens to be on the PUP list for, you know… getting shot. Even Grant Cohn couldn’t pretend that was our fault. And while we don’t know a ton about Ricky as a pro due to his injury, we know that his hands were lauded as some of the best in a historically deep receiver class. So we can safely assume he’s probably not dropping three passes on four targets. 

While at linebacker, even a team as dependent as ours on quality LB play still only regularly plays two of them. So it’s not like we were going to be spending first or second-round picks on the position when the two we have are top 10 talents who are just now 27 years old. It’s also worth noting that we have had, over the years, Kwon Alexander and Azeez Al-Shaair—a current plus starter for the Titans—as our third linebacker. And there is at least talk of Dee Winters as a rising player. So how much capital were we really supposed to spend at linebacker prior to last year?

But the short careers and wealth of injuries in the NFL means roster building is always a multi-year process. It takes years to develop the players you play now and years of preparation to fill the holes that form when they depart. We’ve known we needed CB depth for years. Just cause we threw numbers at the problem this off-season doesn’t mean that would necessarily fix it.

So while CMC, Deebo, Kittle, and Greenlaw should all return at some point this season, this does shine a light on depth concerns moving forward and our upcoming cap crunch after this year. Our incredible late-round and undrafted track record has helped us paper over some of those issues to this point, but this class needs to hit (and so does the next one) if we want to keep this window open through the primes of many of our top players. 

NEXT UP: SUNDAY VS. NEW ENGLAND (1-2) @ 1:05 PM PT

Rookie Drake Maye got some run late in last Thursday’s game and the Pats have a few extra rest days to prep him this week to take over starting duties, but veteran placeholder Jacoby Brissett is expected to remain as the Pats’ QB1 for a largely anemic offense. This could very well be the right call in the long term, but it does put a rather obvious short-term cap on a passing attack that has some developmental weapons but little consistency or explosive potential. RB Rhamondre Stevenson is the weapon to key in this matchup and forcing them into a pass-heavy attack is the best way to stifle what should be a very stifle-able offense. The Jets, who run our scheme, just held them to 3 points and 2.9(!) yards per play. Let’s do that plz. 

Defense is Jerod Mayo’s specialty, and he adheres to the “blitz and play man with versatile pieces” approach that New England has employed for years. It’s a sound scheme and one that could present some problems depending on how many of our weapons we have injured. But it’s also a unit that just allowed 400 yards of offense to the Jets. The talent level just isn’t what it used to be. There will be openings but we’ll need to find them in the passing game to loosen up what is generally a stout run defense.

Despite a week one upset of the Bengals, the Patriots seem well on their way to a top 5 draft pick as they continue their quasi-rebuild. If we lose this one, it’s time to panic.

Go Niners 🏈👍

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Eric Wong Eric Wong

49ers 17, Vikings 23

i hear the state fair is nice at least

Another year, another road loss to the Vikings. Since 1993, the Niners have played the Vikings 17 times and the away team has won 16 of those contests. I’m not sure what to make of that, but it is a stat.

Swing-and-a-miss. On paper, the results of this game look quite even. We had 399 yards of offense to their 403. Both teams committed two turnovers. Neither was particularly successful in the red zone. But we were thoroughly outplayed on the swing plays.

We were 3-of-13 on third and fourth down to their 7-of-12. If we treat our two fourth down fails and the blocked punt as turnovers, we lost that battle 5-to-2. You don’t win games when you are so soundly beaten on the plays that extend possessions and create new ones. That’s the simple explanation.

OFFENSE

As ugly as it was, it was good that we got to play Brian Flores’ defense early in the season because I genuinely think this kind of defense is the next big trend throughout the NFL–in part because it matches up so well against the Shanahan style of offense.

Brian Flores comes from the Patriots’ man-dominant, blitz-heavy coaching tree but adapted his scheme and made it his own while working under Pat Narduzzi and his Quarters defense in Pittsburgh. He still loves to blitz, but he now mixes and matches those pressures with a greater variety of coverages, presenting exotic fronts and just enough confusion on the back end to create open rushers and generate turnovers.

If this sounds familiar, it’s because Flores’ defense–while separate from the Ravens’ scheme–shares a lot of similarities with Mike Macdonald and his three former disciples who are all newly minted DCs. And–despite operating out of base odd fronts versus even ones–it also shares somre similarities with Steve Spagnuolo’s defense in Kansas City.

Amoebous fronts, loaded lines of scrimmage, linebackers who moonlight as defensive ends, the ability to confuse pass protection with alignment and crank up the pressure when needed, and various hidden coverages are what I expect to see from every defense we face that has the coaching, base scheme, and personnel to pull it off.

So, while annoying, our offense should see it as much as possible now so that our players and coaches can get used to it and not be caught by surprise when the games really matter.

No Run, No Fun. Every defense we play wants to prioritize stopping the run, and the Vikings do so through their well-earned reputation of being a blitz-heavy squad (they sent an extra man on 51.5% of snaps last year, tops in the league) and through sheer numbers on the line of scrimmage. Sometimes to the extreme, like this:

With it mathematically impossible for us to run, the Vikings will mix and match which of those extra defenders blitz and which will drop into coverage. Sometimes that coverage is man, sometimes it’s a two-high shell, but they always prioritize jumping and smothering check downs and hot routes. The thought is that if they’re blitzing (or you think they’re blitzing), smothering your safety valve will either generate turnovers or make you hold the ball long enough for their pass rush to get home.

On this 4th-and-3 in the first half, the Niners set up hi-low options to either side, hoping to take advantage of man coverage with a quick hitter (likely Aiyuk on the slant) or to play a two-man game on either flat defender.

The Vikings counteracted it with eight men on the line of scrimmage, implying a blitz, before backing off into a four man rush with Tampa 2 behind it to jump any underneath routes.

This clogged up the short passing lane to the right and before Purdy could potentially get to the open receiver (Kittle backside), he was already under pressure and had to scramble, getting tackled one yard shy of the sticks.

Of course, there are drawbacks to this kind of aggressive front, and one of the best ways to attack it is by targeting the second layer of the defense in the passing game. Which is exactly what we did on our next offensive play.

Here, the Vikings are in a very similar look to the previous play, with eight men on the line of scrimmage and plans to rush four while clogging the underneath routes by dropping back into a Tampa 2. The corner and safety at the top of the screen are switching assignments and the players who are rushing vs dropping have changed, but the base coverage is the same.

Putting lots of guys on the line of scrimmage is great at dissuading runs, generating confusion, and putting potential blitzers closer to the quarterback, but it does inherently put your guys out of position on guarding anything wider or deeper than a quick hitter. Your defenders can still book it and get to those zones, but they’ll be playing catchup due to their alignment.

Knowing this, we’ve decided to hard target the space behind that wall of defenders, with three receivers out on intermediate—to-deep routes and another two checking for blitz before releasing on short routes underneath (primarily as safety valves and eye candy for underneath receivers).

Just before the snap, the non-blitzing defenders start to back off a bit so they can get in better position, and on the snap, the middle linebacker opens up and bails deep into his Tampa 2 zone. Theoretically, this should make him capable of defending—and responsible for—Deebo on any deep in-breaker, but he’s looking in the wrong direction.

This is by design. We know that whether or not it’s Tampa 2 or simply quarters, whoever is dropping back to defend the middle of the field is going to have to open up to one side to get the proper depth. This is the drawback of putting so many men on the line of scrimmage. They have more distance to travel to get back into position to cover downfield.

By putting Deebo opposite the passing strength, we know that even if there is a deep middle defender, that defender will be turned away from the dig, which opens up nicely for a big gain as the defender overruns it.

There weren’t a lot of truly open receivers in this game, but this is the one area where we had very consistent success. On passes between 10-and-19 yards downfield, Purdy was 9-of-11 for 155 yards. And the more we were able to attack this area, the more Flores and the Vikings had to back off the line of scrimmage, which then opened up our run game.

Purdy + Protection. The problem with having to regularly hit intermediate routes to keep a defense honest is that your QB needs to see the coverages right and your offensive line needs to keep him upright long enough to deliver the ball.

Pass pro was a struggle all game. Colton McKivitz and Dominick Puni (this was always going to be an excellent test for the rookie guard) combined to allow nine pressures. Brendel allowed two, including an ugly steamrolling in back-to-back weeks. Even Trent Williams allowed four pressures. There’s no real way around it. We just need to get better in pass pro against these varied fronts. And we need to structure our weekly gameplans with that in mind.

This was far from Purdy’s best game. He had a handful of turnover-worthy plays and held the ball longer than usual, even if that wasn’t necessarily his fault given that’s what the defense was giving up. But this was far from a truly “bad” Purdy game. There weren’t a lot of receivers open or big windows to throw into, but he stayed accurate and confident throughout en route to a whopping +17.8% completion percentage above expectation.

Still pounded dat rock doe. It is worth noting that once we got a little rhythm offensively we ran the ball quite well. Jordan Mason had his second straight 100-yard game on 20 carries for a clean 5.0 ypc, with 80 of those yards coming on tosses, stretches, and other off-tackle or outside runs. As is usually the case, if we can get defenses into fronts where we can feasibly run on them, we usually do so successfully. We just need better (and easier) ways of getting them into those looks.

DEFENSE

17 points felt about right for our offense given our mediocre performance, but allowing only 23 was honestly flattering for our defense.

The Vikings’ 7.5 yards per play were the worst we’ve allowed since giving up 7.6 YPP to the Raiders in week 16 of the 2022 season. Vegas racked up 500 yards of offense and 34 points in that overtime game on New Year’s Day. If it weren’t for an outrageous game from Fred Warner, a few timely sacks from our front four, and our massive time-of-possession advantage, this game could have easily gotten into the 30s.

Teetering on the Edge. We had a ton of communication problems on the boundaries, including issues on switches from motion and bunch formations—like on the Vikings’ wide-open touchdown following the punt block—as well as on a handful of dump-off and short passes where receivers had far too much room to run.

The issues on the edges even extended to the run game, where our corners—who are typically strong in run support—were either late or off-angle when forced to step up and set the edge as run defenders.

Hindsight But Also Just Regular Sight. As stated before, last week was not going to be our new DC’s big test. Now, we get to see how he adapts. The Vikings had a few “gotcha” moments from a play structure and play-calling perspective in this game. Some of those were just well-built designer plays called at the right moment. But others felt like they could have been prevented.

In what is becoming our annual tradition against the Vikings, we got burned for a massive touchdown on a blitz in the second quarter that seemed like it could have been easily avoided. This was not as egregious of a call as last year’s–when we dialed up a Cover 0 blitz with 17 seconds left in the half and sixty yards from our goalline–and I have no issue with heating up Darnold when he’s throwing from his own three. But the execution, situational dynamics, and base structure of the play were quite poor.

I was going to go into a whole breakdown of what happened on this play, how it was drawn up, and how situation-based checks could have turned a massive negative into a positive, but ultimately the most important takeaway is this:

Why is George Odum on JJ in man coverage? I get trying to hide what you’re in, but Odum on either of these two receivers in Cover 1 is just a bad matchup, even if he has deep help from Ji’Ayir Brown. Why not put Ward on JJ? Or better yet, put Ward on JJ and have Lenoir join him to the two-receiver side while bumping Odum over the tight end to the closed side of the field?

Was the execution poor? Yes. Ji’Ayir could have not peeked in the backfield, read the route correctly, and stayed on top of it. Flannigan-Fowles could have had a blitz adjustment on play action away and hit Darnold before he could throw, rather than just sit at one yard deep and QB spy as he unleashed a bomb down the field. But ultimately, we were set up for failure from the jump.

Static Shock. Last year, the Jets (who run our defense) were the only team in the NFL who was more likely to line up in one coverage look pre-snap then run that exact same coverage post-snap. In an era of complex defenses and sim blitzes and all variety of bracket coverages, this style of defense may sound overly simple, but it can still result in elite defenses because if you keep the playbook thin, defenders can master each call, learn how to adapt to anything and play fast and aggressive on every snap.

That’s the pitch behind our (relatively) static defense. But if the players are NOT playing fast. If there are communication issues or botched assignments. If we don’t have dynamic adjustments for different situations. Then we’ve lost the supposed advantage. We’ve lost the entire point of the scheme.

This is not to say that we should change up our defense. Far from it. But this is where we learn a lot about what kind of coach Sorensen really is. Because this scheme only works when everyone is on the same page. When we’re not, we get performances like this one. And that is not sustainable.

NEXT UP: Sunday (9/22) @ Los Angeles Rams (10:00 AM PT)

After a fundamental shift away from zone and stretch and towards downhill gap runs and shotgun passes, the Rams’ offense is now less about rhythm and flow and more about a stable of 5’9” running backs, whatever slot receiver is healthy (Kupp or Nacua), and the arm of Matt Stafford. Right now, none of those slot receivers are healthy. Oops.

At his best, Stafford is a top 5 quarterback, capable of rifling the ball into any window on the field and confident enough to try it. But he has and will always be victim to bouts of turnovers–some Jimmy G-like in their absurdity. Even in their Super Bowl-winning season, Stafford led the league in interceptions and nearly lost in the divisional round (self-recovered 4th quarter fumble) and NFC champ game (dropped pick in the 4th quarter) after turnover-worthy plays. With both of their top wideouts injured, much of this game will come down to stopping the run and collapsing the pocket against an offensive line that has been sketchy at best in hopes of creating those kinds of turnovers.

Defensively, Chris Shula (yes, of that Shula family) takes over for Raheem Morris, and–as a McVay disciple who has been with the Rams since 2017–he’s likely to run much of the same 3-4 base (but really a 3-3-5), two-high stuff his predecessor did. He’s kind of like their Nick Sorensen. As always, the matchup we’ll be looking to exploit is their linebackers in pass coverage. Like Troy Reeder, who now starts at mike linebacker, but–in the past three games he’s played against us–has not once eclipsed a 35 PFF rating while missing 7 tackles and allowing 9 of 10 completions for 142 yards. No Deebo is tough here because soft zone coverages against linebackers not meant to play in space is basically his catnip. We’ll need some receivers to step up in this one (and for the foreseeable future), which means some of these young guys are gonna get some run (and hopefully, some success).

Go Niners 🏈👍

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