Bye Week Breakdown: Lance’s First Start

Clean Pockets, Full Hearts, Can’t Lose [Michael Zagaris/Getty Images]

Since this was the first (and potentially last) start for Lance during his rookie season, I figured it was worth a deeper look. So we’re gonna dive right into it.

The Gameplan

With Kittle out and Lance making his first career start on the road against the undefeated Cardinals, the Niners’ deployed an offensive gameplan much different than anything we’d seen to this point.

In the passing game, we sat in the gun and spread things out to make it easier for our young QB to read coverages. The spread sets—along with lots of trips formations—gave Lance mostly passing concepts in which he could pick a side of the defense based on pre-snap alignment then focus on half-field reads post-snap. While we ran a handful of stick concepts, there were far fewer lightning-quick underneath passes and RPOs compared to your standard Jimmy G gameplan. We still deployed slants and digs—any Shanahan offense is going to want to use those to attack defenses in the intermediate zones between the hashes—but the focus was more on down the field passing and some work outside the numbers.

The difference was most apparent in our play-action game, where—instead of gobbling up short-to-intermediate gains and dotting between the hashes with RPOS—we ran more deep routes with a lot of max protect. In essence, we catered the offense to Lance’s strengths—opting to showcase his strong arm while minimizing the tight windows he had to throw into and giving him more time to process defenses.

In the run game, we aimed to get outside quick on the edges with pitches to Mitchell behind a horde of crack blocks, and—of course—a heavy (some would say, too heavy) dose of option looks.

The Effectiveness

10 points despite a tremendous defensive effort.

Granted, that total is a bit misleading, as there were MANY points left on the field in this one. As has been the case for much of the season, our offense performed well enough to give us a bunch of great opportunities but couldn’t capitalize in the crucial moments. And this game had a lot of those moments.

We had four or five drops, an incredible five offensive holding penalties, and were only 3-of-11 on third down and 1-of-5 on fourth down. Eight of our nine offensive drives ended in Arizona territory, but only two of them resulted in scores. As a frustratingly perfect microcosm of how disjointed our offense has been this season, we had one ten-play drive that took us from our own 36 to the opposing 34 but ended up in a punt when a first down gain was nullified by our third holding call of the drive and a sack and incomplete pushed us back to 4th-and-22 from the Arizona 46.

The right side of our line was a major weakness in this contest, as JJ Watt had his way with both Dan Brunskill and Mike McGlinchey. According to PFF, Brunskill recorded a 13.7 pass pro score, which seems a bit drastic considering he only technically allowed one hit and one hurry on the game, but it’s a strong enough outlier that it’s worth noting. While McGlinchey, who has long been known for dominant run blocking and the occasional bad miss in pass pro, struggled on the ground. Unfortunately, that’s been a bit of a trend for him this season. In what was the worst run of the game for McGlinchey, he got beat by JJ Watt on three out of four plays, ending in the fourth-and-two QB power that got stuffed in the first quarter.

At the skill positions, we obviously need to minimize the drops. In a few instances, the ball came in a bit too hot or a bit too behind receivers, but they were all catchable passes. Some right on the money. We also need to do a better job of getting separation on our deep routes, as Lance’s down-the-field targets were blanketed more often than not. On the tight end front, we really missed Kittle in the run and the pass game, as Dwelley and Woerner also fell victim to some JJ Watt-ing as edge blockers.

That said, we outgained the Cardinals in total yardage (338-to-304) and per-play average (5.7 to 5.1) despite having one fewer offensive drive than them and a string of backbreaking penalties. We rushed for 152 yards on a whopping 5.4 ypc average despite them committing heavily to stopping the run throughout the day. In short, it’s more of the same of what we’ve been seeing.

Despite all of our backfield injuries and the changing of quarterbacks, entering the bye week we had the NFL’s 9th-best offense in terms of DVOA. Meaning there’s talent, there’s potential, and there’s glimpses of putting it all together. We just haven’t. Which is either encouraging or discouraging depending on how you look at it.

Lance’s Performance

More aggro. As briefly mentioned earlier, we went for it on fourth down five times. This, from a coaching staff that has historically leaned more conservative in fourth down aggressiveness. We’d always theorized that with Lance at the helm, Shanahan would be more comfortable going for it, and through this meager one-game sample size that looks to be the case. Granted, we have room for improvement on fourth down playcalling and execution, but anything that pushes us a bit more towards following the idea that possessions are king in today’s NFL is a positive in my book.

Batted Balls. Lance had three or four knocked down at the LOS, and at least one was set up for a giant gain if it hadn’t been. This was a bummer but not particularly surprising. Pass rushers are often taught to get their eyes on the quarterback and their hands up if they get stymied in their pass rush, so batted balls most often happen due to some combination of (1) pass rushers knowing that they can’t get to a quarterback in time, (2) a quarterback holding the ball too long so the DL can read his eyes, and (3) quarterbacks with longer releases.

At this point, Lance checks all of those boxes, and it’s no surprise that the majority of the batted passes happened later in the game, after the defense had been gashed so heavily on scrambles that they became content in sitting, reading, and batting down balls rather than chasing a quarterback who’d eluded them most of the game.

Take Fewer Hits (like by 100%). Everyone and their mother was in agreeance that Lance took way too many hits against the Cardinals. Multiple defensive players even said so in their press conferences. This problem was two-fold in that:

(1) He needs to learn to slide and do it 99% of the time: Not running over people. Not fighting for extra yardage on 2nd-and-8. Not that weird kinda falling over or crumbling to the side thing when you realize you should have slid (which also puts you at injury and contact risk). Sliding. Give up 2 or 3 yards on the scramble and just get the hell down so you can continue playing.

(2) We ran too many designed runs: Zone reads are fine as long as you’re making a regular conscious effort to protect him based on formations running to open sides, bluff blockers protecting your quarterback, etc. But the long-term hope for Lance is that he runs about as often as Patrick Mahomes or Russell Wilson, with his designed runs coming off the occasional zone-read keeper that he gets a chill seven yards on before sliding well before contact. What we should actively be trying to avoid is Cam Newton / RG3 ground game usage. And before you mention Lamar Jackson, just know that the only reason he can carry so much of the load as a runner is because he is fast enough and elusive enough and does a great job of not taking direct hits. If he was any less gifted in any three of those categories, his style would not be sustainable long-term.

Marcus Thompson II of The Athletic shared a great statistical tidbit while talking about this very issue.

We get it, Lance is a really good athlete and a big, tough kid. Against the Cardinals, 62 of his 89 rushing yards came after contact, and—to be fair—45 of those 89 yards came on scrambles versus designed runs. But we made the ultimate long-term investment in giving up the draft capital to pick a 20-year-old Trey Lance. Letting him take this kind of contact for a few extra yards in the regular season would be the ultimate short-term decision.

Scramble Drill / Holding = Mobile QB shit. We had a really bad run of holding calls in this one, but a few of them could be attributed to the natural adjustment of more movement behind center. When you have a mobile quarterback, you’re going to get more holding calls on your offensive line when he starts running around and buying time. Linemen are taught to block at an angle that keeps the quarterback protected at a certain depth and location within the pocket, so when that quarterback suddenly moves deeper in the pocket or vacates it entirely, those angles get thrown off and some holding calls are inevitable. Some. Not the amount that we had in this game.

Similarly, when you have a mobile quarterback, receivers need to be more aware of where they should run to get open when plays break down and the QB breaks the pocket. There were a few instances where Lance was flushed out of the pocket and—when the wideouts broke into the scramble drill—they weren’t totally in sync with where they were going in relation to Lance, his passing windows, and each other.

Every team has different scramble rules (some even dictated by specific route combinations), but the general rules for receivers when a quarterback breaks the pocket are: (1) put yourself in his passing window, (2) avoid bunching up multiple receivers heading into one area, and (3) keep moving so that you don’t entice a horrendous across body throw that could lead to an ugly pick.

The play below isn’t the best example, but it shows how our timing and spacing aren’t quite there when adjusting to a more mobile quarterback.

Here we have a slant-wheel concept to the trips side. On the snap, Lance looks to the right but is flushed out of the pocket before the running back can turn into his route, so he scrambles left. When the receivers notice they’re in scramble mode, they should likely be taking paths similar to the ones below so that they can get into passing windows while clearing space for one another.

But that’s not really what happens. And as Lance crosses the LOS, we’re looking at this.

Deebo realistically should have broken his route off earlier and headed to the sideline. On a slant, there’s not a lot he can do to help, but at the very least he could operate as a lead blocker if Lance runs or pull a defender away from his pursuit. Dwelley actually does this right. He breaks out of where he’d settled into his route and heads out towards the sideline while looking for space. But there’s no space for him to run to because Juice has attempted to turn back into an open window. There are two major problems with this:

(1) That window isn’t really open. There’s an underneath defender and you want to minimize the attempts your quarterback throws across his body while scrambling. If you draw a vertical line down the field from where Lance is, you typically only want him throwing on that line or outside of it. This is doubly the case since he’s a right-handed quarterback scrambling to his left.

(2) He’s blocking space for another receiver to enter. See, Dwelley.

(3) He’s bringing more defenders who can potentially tackle Lance if he runs. Remember, the goal of a scramble drill is to generate a completion off a broken play OR clear enough space so that the quarterback can run for a positive gain without being hit.

At the time of the scramble, Juice’s route was at a middle depth, and—knowing that Dwelley would be working his way towards the sideline—the fullback should have kept going deeper to clear out defenders. If Juice were simply to lose his man—or if a DB were to jump Dwelley on the crosser—he could still get a shot over the top, but with the spacing we’ve presented, Lance’s only option was to run.

One of the great benefits of having a quarterback who can scramble is that you can create positive plays off of what would be losses or incompletes. But that means putting practice time into getting that situational chemistry dialed in. The Seahawks obviously practice the scramble drill extensively (some would argue it’s their best play). This year the Ravens’ uptick in passing efficiency can partially be attributed to them giving their wideouts more freedom to work into space and freelance on their routes. They’ve basically leaned into the fact that Lamar’s athleticism creates a scramble drill on every play, and it’s paid dividends. For many reasons, it’s unlikely that we go anywhere near that extreme, but we will need to devote more time towards developing the chemistry between wideouts and their quarterback if we want more effective passing off of scrambles. Realistically, we probably can’t get there this season while flipping between Jimmy G and Lance. There’s just not enough reps to go around when each quarterback works differently with his wideouts. But it’s something to take note of for 2022.

The Many Flavors of Zone Read. As expected, option runs played a major part in our game plan this week, to mixed results. Our run game as a whole was strong, but it was also buoyed by Lance’s yardage on scrambles, and there was certainly room for improvement.

Today I’ll be focusing on the zone read—the most basic shotgun option play—and the different ways that it was deployed and defended in this game.

First, a refresher on the zone read with one of the simpler calls on the day.

This spread set means that we have a clear six-man box, which—given the nature of the play—means we have an innate numbers advantage when the QB is a run threat.

The linemen are zone blocking left, with two double teams working up to the second level. Dwelley will release outside to pull the defensive back then engage him down the field as a blocker. Lance is reading the end man on the line of scrimmage (EMOL)—in this case, a stand-up DE—who is marked by a triangle. If he crashes down the line and commits to the running back, Lance will pull the ball and run it himself. If he widens, keys the quarterback, or just sits there, Lance will give the ball to Mitchell.

At the mesh point, the defensive end has already committed. While he looks like he could viably middle both options in this photo if you look closely he is in the first stage of a large hop down the line. Thus, he has no chance of changing direction in time if Lance pulls it. Which he does.

The result is a seven-yard gain on the QB keeper. Yet it is rarely that simple.

When the Niners were trying to get an extra blocker and—typically—an extra protector for Lance, they’d put an upback into the mix. In this case, Dwelley takes on the role by motioning into the backfield.

From the Niners’ perspective, the play is basically the same. Lance is still reading the EMOL. The line is still blocking the same. The only real difference is Dwelley, who is crossing the formation on an arc block. On these blocks he’s taught to read the EMOL. If he crashes down the line, he should bypass him and pick up the second-level defender. If he sits and widens, he should kick him out to give more space for the running back on the give. His decisions should mirror those of the quarterback.

But the Cardinals were expecting this, and—I believe—auto-checked into a double gap exchange on the weak-side after seeing motion into an upback position. Before the motion, this is what the Cardinals defense is showing as their gap responsibilities against the run.

But as the motion completes, the EMOL weakside DE slides from outside Trent Williams to directly in front of him, which tells me he’s shooting the B gap all the way while letting the linebacker behind him take his place in the C gap. They’re setting up squeeze-scrape, the most common counterpunch to defending the zone read.

But the Cardinals have taken it one step further. They're doing a similar gap exchange with their next lineman and linebacker. On the snap, the weak-side tackle shoots across our center’s face, forcing his way to the opposite A gap and latching hold so that Mack can’t release to the second level. At the same time, the strong-side linebacker—now free to roam—shuffles to the weak-side, then totally abandons his strong side A gap responsibility to fly outside and chase the quarterback.

The rationale behind this makes a lot of sense. It’s basically reverse-engineering the rules of the option. The weak-side end and linebackers switching gap responsibilities confuses the quarterback’s read. The end forces a pull because the QB sees the EMOL crashing towards the running back while the linebacker runs unblocked to the outside to chase the quarterback after they keep the ball.

Even if the QB diagnoses this and options that linebacker instead of the EMOL, a give would send the running back behind Trent Williams and into the hands of either the first linebacker on the squeeze-scrape or the strong-side linebacker who is going across formation unblocked. Yes, both A gaps are technically uncovered, but against the zone read, the Cardinals know that if they can force Trent Williams to block hard down the line, Mitchell would need to run behind him and into unblocked defenders. He wouldn’t be able to exploit the other open gaps because he’d never get to them in his read progression.

In case of a pull, even if the weak-side linebacker can’t bring down the QB, the strong-side linebacker has come across formation unaccounted for into what is effectively the D gap. While the option out of this set is meant to put the C gap defender in a bind, it doesn’t account for a D gap defender because there wasn’t any D gap before the play. So even if Dwelley can pick off one of the linebackers in his arc block, the Cardinals are betting that one of their speedy linebackers, unblocked, will be able to chase down Lance for a short gain. Which is exactly what happened.

The result was a gain of two, which was brought back on a hold by Travis Benjamin. Because of course it was.

But there’s a reason gap exchange isn’t commonly used outside of stopping the option. It can get gashed by traditional run plays, especially those like same-side powers, counters, and traps whose playside down blocks resemble weakside zone blocks. In essence, you want the gap exchanging players to think you’re running zone and cheat to stop it. Then you hit them in the areas that they vacated while doing so.

We tried an opposite side power out of pistol early in the game, but a JJ Watt inside slant into the backfield sent off a chain reaction of recovery blocks that led to a measly gain. That was a shame because I thought there were more opportunities to go to it in this game.

The one other time we did show something similar, a pistol split zone read with a kick-out block coming backside across the formation, we had success despite some sketchy execution.

The set-up here is very similar to the last play diagrammed, with the major change being Dwelley is starting from a wing-back position versus an upback, which—in turn—sells the misdirection better because he’s telegraphing his move less and is still a traditional passing threat. All blocking rules remain the same.

On the snap, JJ Watt ole’s Brunskill as he shoots inside, causing McGlinchey to block him down the line—which he does very well. The EMOL sits, trying to middle the mesh and likely force a give, while the weak-side linebacker drifts outside of McGlinchey’s block, anticipating either a handoff that will bend right outside of McGlinchey or a keeper that he can chase down unblocked.

But in this case, Lance gives the ball, Dwelley kicks out the defensive end so he can’t pursue, and Brunskill recovers nicely to get a hat on the linebacker, who has put himself out of position from his gap responsibility because he’s trying to cheat based on his knowledge of zone read rules. After an impressive jump cut to get back on track, Mitchell runs for a nine-yard gain through a hole that opened up like the red sea.

It’s also worth noting that gap exchanges can leave you very susceptible to the inverted veer, which we ran twice—in very janky fashion, I might add—to the tune of 21 yards in this contest. But since the inverted veer requires our quarterback to run the ball inside, it’s best that we have a few mixups that protect him a bit better. Mix-ups such as same-side powers and split zones.

Even without Lance at the helm, we’ve had a lot of success with our shotgun running game in years past, but—with Lance involved and teams adjusting to favor stopping the zone read—attacking defenses inside with quick-hitting runs that look like zone off the snap should become a greater emphasis in our rushing attack.

Timing/Anticipation. By now we know that Lance’s biggest areas of improvement are (1) making his mechanics more consistent so that his accuracy follows, and (2) adjusting to the speed of the NFL by quickening his progressions and anticipating open receivers. Ultimately, those are improvements that must come over time, but Lance’s ability to rapidly learn from his mistakes has us hoping that growth could come sooner rather than later.

On the last play of our opening drive, we can see all of his current weaknesses at once.

The play call here is a max protect play-action pass with a single-side read to the field (left) side of the formation. The progression is Benjamin, to Deebo, to Dwelley—with our tight end the delayed check down if the two-man route combo doesn’t work.

12:57 left in 1Q: 2nd-and-10 from ARI 45

The Cardinals are in a two-deep shell, and they don’t run with Deebo as he goes in motion, meaning they’re in some form of quarters or Cover 2. Since the field side corner backs away on motion towards him, it becomes even more likely that they’re in—or have at least checked to—quarters. Given the play call and the pre-snap motion, it doesn’t really matter which coverage they drop into as both will basically play out the same.

On the snap, the defense drops into quarters, with the middle linebacker sinking deep into the hole like it’s Tampa 2, trying to take away two staples or our play-action game—crossers and digs. Before the snap, Deebo’s motion widens the play side linebacker. After the snap, his swing/wheel keeps the attention of the field-side corner, who drops off Benjamin to cover him.

Benjamin takes a mandatory inside release that sets up his inside curl and plays to the rules of the defense. Whether it’s Cover 2 or quarters, two-high safeties with no real vertical seam threat means the corner has help inside. He won’t fight an inside release, especially one so inside as to put him out of position against Deebo. Thus, Benjamin gets cleanly off the LOS, which preserves the timing of the route combinations.

This play is intended for Benjamin all the way. Deebo is a decoy who only gets the ball if the cornerback bails on his responsibility to follow Benjamin’s inside release (aka, a blown coverage). It opens up perfectly, as the field side safety is respecting Benjamin’s speed and playing far overhead, the play-side corner is locking up Deebo, and Benjamin has gotten the perfect depth to threaten the dig before curling into the hole outside of the inside linebacker and inside and over the outside linebacker, who was originally widened out by Deebo’s pre-snap motion.

This is when the ball should be released. For a duo with more reps/chemistry together, you could even throw it earlier. But right now, Lance has a clean pocket and a passing lane to an open receiver. However, he holds it a beat too long—perhaps not yet seeing the route open up or unsure of where exactly Benjamin is going to curl up.

Even with the timing off, Benjamin remains open.

Benjamin giving the universal sign for being open

But Lance has started to feel the pass rush. He moves up into the pocket, which—due to how open Benjamin is could honestly be okay—but instead of sliding in the pocket while keeping his body ready to throw, he turns his shoulders as if he’s going to run.

To be fair, by squaring his shoulders downfield, Lance pulls the attention of the outside linebacker (you can see him starting forward in the previous photo), which puts the defender in no-man’s land between dropping to defend the pass and playing the run. This keeps open the window of time to throw to Benjamin.

But since Lance now has to flip his shoulders back to wind up and throw, he’s losing valuable fractions of a second. This allows the defenders to close in on Benjamin, tightening the passing window. Lance has the arm strength to fit into that window with ease, but he’s now rushing things. As he starts his throwing motion Benjamin begins to work back towards the LOS, a habit that he’s surely been taught to do but was actually unnecessary in this case as the safeties were so far off from him that there was no backline pressure.

Lance’s pass—likely intended to be thrown to where Benjamin was and not where he wound up—sails high—and into the awaiting arms of Budda Baker.

This unfortunate outcome is the product of both a lack of individual and combined reps between quarterback and pass-catcher and the janky overall timing that led to Lance’s throwing mechanics looking like this when he released the ball.

But there’s a clear silver-lining to this mishap, and that’s that—just one quarter later—Lance showed much better anticipation and accuracy on a very similar concept.

On third down late in the second quarter, the Niners showed trips to the field side with Mohamed Sanu and Brandon Aiyuk running—what I believe to be—double dig/post option routes. Both are given free rein to read the defense and break their routes off flat, head upfield on posts, or sit in the holes of zones if they find an opening.

The progression numbers are my best guess. Juice has a one-step slant to occupy underneath defenders and open up passing windows down the field, while Deebo has a run-off route. He’s got a mandatory outside release to make sure the deep defender on his side has to turn to the sideline and away from the posts coming the other way. He’s running off defenders and would only get the ball in a pre-snap alert against press-man coverage.

If the middle safety jumps your first option (Sanu) then that should open up your second option (Aiyuk) behind him. And if the Cardinals drop into man coverage across and you don’t like your matchups (although in the case of Aiyuk on a linebacker, you should like your matchups), then the double vertical stems from the slots will pull defenders out of the alley to open up space underneath, Sanu’s mandatory outside release will create a natural rub on the corner, and you can hit Juice in stride for a chunk play off the slant.

Just before the snap, the overhang safety (#34) bails to the middle of the field and the Cardinals rotate into what looks like Cover 3 Mable, which is Cover 3 to the trips side and man to the solo receiver side. Since they’re rotating their overhang safety to the deep middle, they’re running a cloud variation of Cover 3, meaning the corner and the trips-side hole defender (in this case the high safety) switch responsibilities. The corner squats in the flats while the high safety takes the deep third to the field side.

To the boundary side, the low linebacker opens up aggressively to the solo receiver (Deebo) to cover the flats, while the cornerback over him is playing inside leverage and deep. Often times you’ll see a bracket technique in this situation, where the corner is playing high and outside and the linebacker is playing low and inside. In this case, both defenders are playing inside. Almost certainly because they’re selling out to take away the slant from Deebo, which—if you’ve watched Deebo play—makes a lot of sense.

Upon seeing Juice take an immediate path inside towards the dropping JJ Watt, the field corner opens up to Sanu’s vertical release, tasked with helping on any kind of out or corner down the field. But it doesn’t really matter, as both the corner and the deep sideline defender will be out-leveraged by Sanu’s route.

As Sanu and Aiyuk reach their breakpoints, you can see the two low defenders are even with them, meaning the digs are not available and both wideouts must adjust into posts. Since the deep middle defender (#34) is middling both routes, Lance knows that he has to throw to Sanu immediately before that safety can close the gap.

Lance does exactly that. The photo above is right as he starts his throwing motion, which is before Sanu even clears the defenders and breaks into the post. And while the ball placement looks behind Sanu, that is an intentional decision by Lance, as a ball on the back shoulder slows up your receiver and prevents him from running head-on to the safety crashing down on him.

While it’s far from the tightest of NFL passing windows, you can see from the endzone angle that Lance is throwing on time, with anticipation and accuracy, past defenders on different levels coming from multiple directions.

Unfortunately, this pass got dropped, and we punted the next play.

It may seem like baby steps, but it’s nice to see that Lance so quickly learned from his first quarter mistake and that he already has the capability to see receivers early and throw them open—even if his consistency in doing so is still a work in progress.

In Conclusion

All things considered, I thought Lance played pretty well. After watching film, I thought he played even better. His accuracy is going to be an issue, especially early in games. He just comes in super juiced and hasn’t had the time to consistently iron out those kinks in his mechanics quite yet. He’s also not going to see the field or get the ball out as quickly as Jimmy G. But he does add explosive potential with his arm, legs, and improvisational ability. That can absolutely open up an attack that’s been bogged down as of late, but it also doesn’t play to our current strengths as an offense.

Jimmy probably still gives us the best chance at winning. After all, the last time we saw him he was dicing up the Seahawks before being pulled due to injury, and that—and the Green Bay game—were when we only had one healthy running back. Now, Mitchell is back and Hasty should be returning soon. For a team that wants to run the ball—and wants to have the speed in the backfield to run stretch plays—that’s a pretty big deal.

But… if you told me tomorrow that we were trading Jimmy (for good value) and riding it out with a healthy Lance who we were going to protect much better than we did against Arizona, I’d be okay with it. Because while Jimmy may give us a better chance at winning now, it’s hard to say who would give us a better chance of winning two months from now.

That said, Lance isn’t healthy, and he’s unlikely to even suit up for the Colts game this weekend. And if our game plan is limited to the point where Lance has to run this much because the staff isn’t yet confident in him carrying more in the passing game, then there’s no sense in rolling him out in a way where he could get seriously injured. The most likely scenario is that Jimmy starts the rest of the season (unless he is, knock on wood, injured again) with the QB change happening over the off-season—when the staff has more time and focus to build the offense around our young quarterback and find more ways to protect him from contact. But at the very least, I think Lance showed that he’s ready to tackle a few more snaps per game, and we should allow him that opportunity once he’s back to full health.

Go Niners 👍🏈