49ers 17, Vikings 23

Another year, another road loss to the Vikings. Since 1993, the Niners have played the Vikings 17 times and the away team has won 16 of those contests. I’m not sure what to make of that, but it is a stat.

Swing-and-a-miss. On paper, the results of this game look quite even. We had 399 yards of offense to their 403. Both teams committed two turnovers. Neither was particularly successful in the red zone. But we were thoroughly outplayed on the swing plays.

We were 3-of-13 on third and fourth down to their 7-of-12. If we treat our two fourth down fails and the blocked punt as turnovers, we lost that battle 5-to-2. You don’t win games when you are so soundly beaten on the plays that extend possessions and create new ones. That’s the simple explanation.

OFFENSE

As ugly as it was, it was good that we got to play Brian Flores’ defense early in the season because I genuinely think this kind of defense is the next big trend throughout the NFL–in part because it matches up so well against the Shanahan style of offense.

Brian Flores comes from the Patriots’ man-dominant, blitz-heavy coaching tree but adapted his scheme and made it his own while working under Pat Narduzzi and his Quarters defense in Pittsburgh. He still loves to blitz, but he now mixes and matches those pressures with a greater variety of coverages, presenting exotic fronts and just enough confusion on the back end to create open rushers and generate turnovers.

If this sounds familiar, it’s because Flores’ defense–while separate from the Ravens’ scheme–shares a lot of similarities with Mike Macdonald and his three former disciples who are all newly minted DCs. And–despite operating out of base odd fronts versus even ones–it also shares somre similarities with Steve Spagnuolo’s defense in Kansas City.

Amoebous fronts, loaded lines of scrimmage, linebackers who moonlight as defensive ends, the ability to confuse pass protection with alignment and crank up the pressure when needed, and various hidden coverages are what I expect to see from every defense we face that has the coaching, base scheme, and personnel to pull it off.

So, while annoying, our offense should see it as much as possible now so that our players and coaches can get used to it and not be caught by surprise when the games really matter.

No Run, No Fun. Every defense we play wants to prioritize stopping the run, and the Vikings do so through their well-earned reputation of being a blitz-heavy squad (they sent an extra man on 51.5% of snaps last year, tops in the league) and through sheer numbers on the line of scrimmage. Sometimes to the extreme, like this:

With it mathematically impossible for us to run, the Vikings will mix and match which of those extra defenders blitz and which will drop into coverage. Sometimes that coverage is man, sometimes it’s a two-high shell, but they always prioritize jumping and smothering check downs and hot routes. The thought is that if they’re blitzing (or you think they’re blitzing), smothering your safety valve will either generate turnovers or make you hold the ball long enough for their pass rush to get home.

On this 4th-and-3 in the first half, the Niners set up hi-low options to either side, hoping to take advantage of man coverage with a quick hitter (likely Aiyuk on the slant) or to play a two-man game on either flat defender.

The Vikings counteracted it with eight men on the line of scrimmage, implying a blitz, before backing off into a four man rush with Tampa 2 behind it to jump any underneath routes.

This clogged up the short passing lane to the right and before Purdy could potentially get to the open receiver (Kittle backside), he was already under pressure and had to scramble, getting tackled one yard shy of the sticks.

Of course, there are drawbacks to this kind of aggressive front, and one of the best ways to attack it is by targeting the second layer of the defense in the passing game. Which is exactly what we did on our next offensive play.

Here, the Vikings are in a very similar look to the previous play, with eight men on the line of scrimmage and plans to rush four while clogging the underneath routes by dropping back into a Tampa 2. The corner and safety at the top of the screen are switching assignments and the players who are rushing vs dropping have changed, but the base coverage is the same.

Putting lots of guys on the line of scrimmage is great at dissuading runs, generating confusion, and putting potential blitzers closer to the quarterback, but it does inherently put your guys out of position on guarding anything wider or deeper than a quick hitter. Your defenders can still book it and get to those zones, but they’ll be playing catchup due to their alignment.

Knowing this, we’ve decided to hard target the space behind that wall of defenders, with three receivers out on intermediate—to-deep routes and another two checking for blitz before releasing on short routes underneath (primarily as safety valves and eye candy for underneath receivers).

Just before the snap, the non-blitzing defenders start to back off a bit so they can get in better position, and on the snap, the middle linebacker opens up and bails deep into his Tampa 2 zone. Theoretically, this should make him capable of defending—and responsible for—Deebo on any deep in-breaker, but he’s looking in the wrong direction.

This is by design. We know that whether or not it’s Tampa 2 or simply quarters, whoever is dropping back to defend the middle of the field is going to have to open up to one side to get the proper depth. This is the drawback of putting so many men on the line of scrimmage. They have more distance to travel to get back into position to cover downfield.

By putting Deebo opposite the passing strength, we know that even if there is a deep middle defender, that defender will be turned away from the dig, which opens up nicely for a big gain as the defender overruns it.

There weren’t a lot of truly open receivers in this game, but this is the one area where we had very consistent success. On passes between 10-and-19 yards downfield, Purdy was 9-of-11 for 155 yards. And the more we were able to attack this area, the more Flores and the Vikings had to back off the line of scrimmage, which then opened up our run game.

Purdy + Protection. The problem with having to regularly hit intermediate routes to keep a defense honest is that your QB needs to see the coverages right and your offensive line needs to keep him upright long enough to deliver the ball.

Pass pro was a struggle all game. Colton McKivitz and Dominick Puni (this was always going to be an excellent test for the rookie guard) combined to allow nine pressures. Brendel allowed two, including an ugly steamrolling in back-to-back weeks. Even Trent Williams allowed four pressures. There’s no real way around it. We just need to get better in pass pro against these varied fronts. And we need to structure our weekly gameplans with that in mind.

This was far from Purdy’s best game. He had a handful of turnover-worthy plays and held the ball longer than usual, even if that wasn’t necessarily his fault given that’s what the defense was giving up. But this was far from a truly “bad” Purdy game. There weren’t a lot of receivers open or big windows to throw into, but he stayed accurate and confident throughout en route to a whopping +17.8% completion percentage above expectation.

Still pounded dat rock doe. It is worth noting that once we got a little rhythm offensively we ran the ball quite well. Jordan Mason had his second straight 100-yard game on 20 carries for a clean 5.0 ypc, with 80 of those yards coming on tosses, stretches, and other off-tackle or outside runs. As is usually the case, if we can get defenses into fronts where we can feasibly run on them, we usually do so successfully. We just need better (and easier) ways of getting them into those looks.

DEFENSE

17 points felt about right for our offense given our mediocre performance, but allowing only 23 was honestly flattering for our defense.

The Vikings’ 7.5 yards per play were the worst we’ve allowed since giving up 7.6 YPP to the Raiders in week 16 of the 2022 season. Vegas racked up 500 yards of offense and 34 points in that overtime game on New Year’s Day. If it weren’t for an outrageous game from Fred Warner, a few timely sacks from our front four, and our massive time-of-possession advantage, this game could have easily gotten into the 30s.

Teetering on the Edge. We had a ton of communication problems on the boundaries, including issues on switches from motion and bunch formations—like on the Vikings’ wide-open touchdown following the punt block—as well as on a handful of dump-off and short passes where receivers had far too much room to run.

The issues on the edges even extended to the run game, where our corners—who are typically strong in run support—were either late or off-angle when forced to step up and set the edge as run defenders.

Hindsight But Also Just Regular Sight. As stated before, last week was not going to be our new DC’s big test. Now, we get to see how he adapts. The Vikings had a few “gotcha” moments from a play structure and play-calling perspective in this game. Some of those were just well-built designer plays called at the right moment. But others felt like they could have been prevented.

In what is becoming our annual tradition against the Vikings, we got burned for a massive touchdown on a blitz in the second quarter that seemed like it could have been easily avoided. This was not as egregious of a call as last year’s–when we dialed up a Cover 0 blitz with 17 seconds left in the half and sixty yards from our goalline–and I have no issue with heating up Darnold when he’s throwing from his own three. But the execution, situational dynamics, and base structure of the play were quite poor.

I was going to go into a whole breakdown of what happened on this play, how it was drawn up, and how situation-based checks could have turned a massive negative into a positive, but ultimately the most important takeaway is this:

Why is George Odum on JJ in man coverage? I get trying to hide what you’re in, but Odum on either of these two receivers in Cover 1 is just a bad matchup, even if he has deep help from Ji’Ayir Brown. Why not put Ward on JJ? Or better yet, put Ward on JJ and have Lenoir join him to the two-receiver side while bumping Odum over the tight end to the closed side of the field?

Was the execution poor? Yes. Ji’Ayir could have not peeked in the backfield, read the route correctly, and stayed on top of it. Flannigan-Fowles could have had a blitz adjustment on play action away and hit Darnold before he could throw, rather than just sit at one yard deep and QB spy as he unleashed a bomb down the field. But ultimately, we were set up for failure from the jump.

Static Shock. Last year, the Jets (who run our defense) were the only team in the NFL who was more likely to line up in one coverage look pre-snap then run that exact same coverage post-snap. In an era of complex defenses and sim blitzes and all variety of bracket coverages, this style of defense may sound overly simple, but it can still result in elite defenses because if you keep the playbook thin, defenders can master each call, learn how to adapt to anything and play fast and aggressive on every snap.

That’s the pitch behind our (relatively) static defense. But if the players are NOT playing fast. If there are communication issues or botched assignments. If we don’t have dynamic adjustments for different situations. Then we’ve lost the supposed advantage. We’ve lost the entire point of the scheme.

This is not to say that we should change up our defense. Far from it. But this is where we learn a lot about what kind of coach Sorensen really is. Because this scheme only works when everyone is on the same page. When we’re not, we get performances like this one. And that is not sustainable.

NEXT UP: Sunday (9/22) @ Los Angeles Rams (10:00 AM PT)

After a fundamental shift away from zone and stretch and towards downhill gap runs and shotgun passes, the Rams’ offense is now less about rhythm and flow and more about a stable of 5’9” running backs, whatever slot receiver is healthy (Kupp or Nacua), and the arm of Matt Stafford. Right now, none of those slot receivers are healthy. Oops.

At his best, Stafford is a top 5 quarterback, capable of rifling the ball into any window on the field and confident enough to try it. But he has and will always be victim to bouts of turnovers–some Jimmy G-like in their absurdity. Even in their Super Bowl-winning season, Stafford led the league in interceptions and nearly lost in the divisional round (self-recovered 4th quarter fumble) and NFC champ game (dropped pick in the 4th quarter) after turnover-worthy plays. With both of their top wideouts injured, much of this game will come down to stopping the run and collapsing the pocket against an offensive line that has been sketchy at best in hopes of creating those kinds of turnovers.

Defensively, Chris Shula (yes, of that Shula family) takes over for Raheem Morris, and–as a McVay disciple who has been with the Rams since 2017–he’s likely to run much of the same 3-4 base (but really a 3-3-5), two-high stuff his predecessor did. He’s kind of like their Nick Sorensen. As always, the matchup we’ll be looking to exploit is their linebackers in pass coverage. Like Troy Reeder, who now starts at mike linebacker, but–in the past three games he’s played against us–has not once eclipsed a 35 PFF rating while missing 7 tackles and allowing 9 of 10 completions for 142 yards. No Deebo is tough here because soft zone coverages against linebackers not meant to play in space is basically his catnip. We’ll need some receivers to step up in this one (and for the foreseeable future), which means some of these young guys are gonna get some run (and hopefully, some success).

Go Niners 🏈👍